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ARTICLE 
GUIDANCE RULES MID ENFORCEMENT RULES: 
A BETTER VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL 
Dale A. Nance* 
Contemporary economic analysis of law is a product of the confluence of 
standard microeconomic analysis with a legal tradition heavily influenced by 
American Legal Realism. The effect of this merger has often been an analysis 
of legal institutions from the perspective of the Holmesian "bad man," who 
sees predicted legal actions as merely costs or benefits to be taken into account. 
This approach might be illuminating for the purposes of an "outsider," such as 
a behavioral sociologist or perhaps even a legal advisor alerting her "bad man" 
client to the risks of adverse legal consequences. But it produces bizarre results 
when used to understand basic legal concepts, such as the notion of property, 
that in fact reflect the perspective of "insiders," that is, persons who try to shape 
the law to achieve various purposes and those citizens who willingly conform 
their conduct to the law's requirements. The resulting distortion is demon-
strated by an analysis of one of the most important articles in the literature of 
law and economics. Reexamination of that article forms the basis of an im-
proved understanding of the relationship between economic analysis and such 
legal concepts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
O NE of the challenges of legal ~heory is to articulate a core set of concepts, not too large m number, that can be used 
to analyze the enormous variety of particular laws. Some theo-
rists have sought to reveal the recurring patterns in legal rela-
tions while paying no particular attention to the broad institu-
tional goals served by such patterns. For example, early in this 
century, Wesley Hohfeld analyzed jural relations as falling into 
one of eight related categories or combinations thereof. 1 AI-
'Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16 (1913). For future reference, it is convenient to 
summarize his entitlement forms here. The categories are: right, duty, privilege, no-
right, power, immunity, disability, and liability. Id. at 30. All start with the primitive 
notion that A can have a duty to B with respect to act X if A is obligated to B to do 
or refrain from doing X. One can then say that B has a right (also sometimes called a 
claim-right) against A with respect to X. But if B has no such right against A, then B 
has a no-right against A with respect to X, and A has a privilege as against B with 
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though some have criticized his work as mere formalism, there 
can be little doubt that Hohfeld's analysis of entitlement forms 
provides considerable insight for those who are willing to take 
the time to study it careful1y.2 
On the ·other hand, some theorists, while laboring over more 
macroscopic issues concerning the nature and functions of law 
in general, have also done much to advance our understanding 
of the relationship between such big questions and more mun-
dane analytical questions. For example, starting with the notion 
that law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules, Lon Fuller dedicated much of his career to 
the elaboration of principles to answer questions like "What 
kinds of conduct are suitable to be governed by rules?" and 
"What kinds of rules are most appropriate in each of the various 
domains of sociallife?"3 Answers to such questions inevitably in-
volve exploration of the ways that various kinds of rules function. 
With the increasing importance of economics in the analysis 
of legal rules, one article has emerged in recent decades as per-
haps the most influential piece of scholarship relating the mac-
roscopic to the microscopic. In 1972, building on the work of 
other pioneers in the field, Guido Calabresi and Douglas 
Melamed identified a particular typology of legal rules-distin-
guishing among property, liability, and inalienability rules-and 
analyzed those rule types with respect to efficiency goals, distri-
butional goals, and "other justice considerations."4 Their frame-
respect to X. ld. at 30-33. If C has the authority to change the existing relationship 
between A and B with respect to X, such as changing B's right into a no-right, then C 
has a power with respect to A, B, and X, and A and B each have a liability with 
respect to C and X. ld. at 44-53. But if C has no such authority, then C has a 
disability with respect to A, B, and X, and A and B each have an immunity with 
respect to C and X. ld. at 55. (As a special case, C can be either A or B.) While 
Hohfeld clearly and rightly believed that clarity in the use of these conceptions is 
helpful in resolving practical legal problems, he made no attempt to relate his 
conceptions to macro-level governmental policies. See id. at 20. 
2 See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 1119 (1990) (illustrating the radical antiforrnalism inherent in Hohfeld's 
analysis). 
3 See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969); The Principles of 
Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981 ). 
• Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter 
C&M]. 
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work has since been used in countless law school classes to ex-
plain and critique substantive doctrines like the law of adverse 
possession, the law of nuisance, and the law of eminent domain,5 
as well as remedial doctrines governing the choice between 
damages and injunctive relief in any substantive area.6 It has 
also found its way into an enormous number of scholarly writ-
ings on these and many other subjects.7 
The impact of their article indicates the importance of a clear 
understanding of the typology that Calabresi and Melamed 
("C&M") articulated. Unfortunately, a careful reexamination 
of the original work reveals that it is flawed in an important and 
fundamental way. Ultimately, the flaw can be attributed to the 
authors' failure to appreciate a distinction long recognized in 
the work of the "macro" legal theorists-the distinction be-
tween guidance rules and enforcement rules. In this Article, I 
will identify this mistake, trace some of its unfortunate conse-
quences, and suggest its cause. What results is an enriched ty-
pology that distinguishes between rules for the guidance of the 
law-abiding citizen and rules for the enforcement of such guid-
ance rules against the not-so-law-abiding. The resulting per-
spective complements similar work by Jules Coleman and Jody 
Kraus8 and sheds additional light on the distinctions between 
5 See, e.g., Olin L. Browder et al., Basic Property Law 997-1000 (5th ed. 1989) 
(eminent domain); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 140 n.19, 985 (3d 
ed. 1993) (adverse possession); Charles M. Haar & Lance Liebman, Property and 
Law 103-04 (2d ed. 1985) (nuisance); Sandra H. Johnson et al., Property Law: Cases, 
Materials and Problems 763-66 (1992) (nuisance); Sheldon F. Kurtz & Herbert 
Hovencamp, Cases and Materials on American Property Law 769-71 (nuisance); Grant 
S. Nelson eta!., Contemporary Property 140-41 (1996) (nuisance). 
'See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials 
355-56 (2d ed. 1994). 
7 In fact, theirs is one of the most frequently cited of all law review articles. See 
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent. L. 
Rev. 751, 767 tbU (1996) (reporting that C&M was the eleventh most frequently 
cited article in the surveyed journals during the 1956-1995 period, which includes 
sixteen years before the article was even published). 
n Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale 
L.J. 1335 (1986). 
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tort and crime and between distributive and corrective justice, 
both matters of enduring scholarly interese 
It will be evident that the argument presented here could be 
developed more abstractly as constructive criticism of various 
strands of modern legal theory not limited to law and econom-
ics. Indeed, the later Parts of the Article move far away from 
the details of the contribution by C&M. I have nonetheless cho-
sen to ground my discussion in a critique of their work, both be-
cause of the analytical precision that is made possible by focus-
ing on a specific example of post-Realist theorizing and because 
of the continuing importance of their contribution. 10 
In Parts I and II, I reexamine the typology presented by 
C&M, identify an important ambiguity in their scheme, and ex-
plain the best way to resolve that ambiguity. The key, it will be 
seen, is to identify their rule types as guidance rules rather than 
enforcement rules, exactly the opposite of the prevailing view. 
In Part III, I relate this result to the distinction between a price 
and a sanction, illustrating the untoward consequences of con-
flating the guidance and enforcement functions. In Part IV, I 
discuss the cmitribution of Professors Coleman and Kraus and 
present another possible resolution of C&M's ambiguity. In 
Part V, I further demonstrate the importance of the distinction 
between guidance rules and enforcement rules by illustrating 
certain features of the analysis of legal norms that tend to be 
masked by the usual understanding of C&M's framework. 
C&M welcomed the potential results of taking a different 
view. Likening the matter to Claude Monet's famous paintings 
of the Rouen Cathedral, they acknowledged that their typology 
was only "One View of the Cathedral."11 In that spirit, and with 
• See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 
1 (1996); Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's 
Neighbors, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403 (1992). 
10 Several articles, the most notable of which are discussed hereafter, have appeared 
in the last couple of years continuing the debate largely initiated by Calabresi and 
Melamed. The continuing influence of C&M is also evidenced by a collection of 
papers presented as a twenty-fifth anniversary retrospective on that piece and its 
influence at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools on 
January 5, 1997, and published as Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 Yale L.J. 2081 (1997). 
11 C&M, supra note 4, at 1090 n.2. 
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the undeniable benefit of much hindsight, I offer another view 
of the law's domain. It is not so much a different perspective, 
however, as a broader one: I offer an n+m dimensional view that 
includes two interpretations of C&M's view, one n dimensional 
and the other m dimensional, as special cases. 
Moreover, the significance of this expanded focus is not merely 
analyticaL It allows one to correct a severe distortion present in 
C&M's scheme of analysis, considered as a component of legal 
theory for a liberal state. That distortion arises from the pecu-
liar blending of an interest in the incentives that affect behavior 
with a skepticism about substantive legal rules. In other words, 
it reflects the marriage of economic rationalism with American 
Legal Realism. \Vhatever one thinks of these t\vo theoretical 
orientations taken separately, their merger has produced a the-
ory, conventional law and economics, that can hardly avoid 
missing the forest for the trees because it presupposes a model 
of human behavior at odds with the liberal institutions it is used 
to interpret. Any comprehensive legal theory must come to 
grips with the nature of man and of the law as a human institu-
tion. Going back to the basics of legal ordering and seeing 
C&M's contribution in that light make possible an improved 
conceptual framework of liberalism's legal entitlements. 
I. A CRUCIAL AMBIGUITY 
In this Part, I restate C&M's typology of rules (Section A), 
identify the ambiguity of interest (Section B), and demonstrate 
the unsatisfactory nature of C&M's statements relating to this 
ambiguity (Section C). The discussion in the last Section also 
points the way toward the solution offered in Part II. 
A. The Rule Typology Revisited 
Starting with the proposition that the law chooses among citi-
zens in the allocation of entitlements, C&M identified three dis-
tinct ways in which those entitlements are protected: 
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent 
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its 
holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which 
the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller . ... 
1997] Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules 843 
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he 
is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an enti-
tlement is protected by a liability rule . ... 
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is 
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller .12 
The authors then exemplified these rule types in the course of 
explaining some relationships among them: 
It should be clear that most entitlements to most goods are 
mixed. Taney's house may be protected by a property rule in 
situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability 
rule where the government decides to take it by eminent do-
main, and by a rule of inalienability in situations where Taney 
is drunk or incompetent.13 
This passage suggests, although it does not exactly say, that in 
a given context, with respect to a given issue, only one of the 
three rules can apply. For example, if Taney's relationship to 
Marshall in regard to Marshall's interest in owning the house is 
governed by a property rule, then it cannot also be governed on 
the same issue by a rule of inalienability. Inalienability denies 
the power of Taney and Marshall to transfer the entitlement by 
agreement, yet the power to transfer seems implicit in the defi-
nition of a property rule. Of course, C&M's definition of a 
property rule does not actually say that such a power to transfer 
exists; it says only that if a transfer is to occur, it must be by 
12 C&M, supra note 4, at 1092 (emphasis added). C&M did not write with the ana-
lytical precision of a Hohfeld, and one should not read this passage as intended to 
provide detailed necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the concepts of 
property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. Indeed, I shall point later to 
qualifications that seem to be implicit in their discussion. 
13 Id. at 1093. One conspicuous ambiguity in the C&M formulation is the reference 
to an "objectively" determined price under liability rules. See id. at 1092. The 
objective-subjective distinction can mean many things, but in this context the authors 
make clear that all that is meant by "objective" is that it is determined by a third 
person, the adjudicator, rather than by agreement between the parties. Id. Their 
eminent domain example illustrates this point. Whether this is a good way to use the 
term "objective" is subject to doubt. I would have preferred a phrase like "publicly 
imposed value" instead of "objectively determined value." But no harm is done as 
long as one keeps in mind the intended distinction. C&M certainly did not mean to 
suggest that "objective" (publicly imposed) valuation is inherently superior to "sub-
jective" (privately agreed) valuation. Indeed, they emphasized that the latter often 
generates more efficient outcomes. See id. at 1124-27. 
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agreement. 14 But the authors clearly intended the power to 
transfer to be an aspect or implicit corollary of a property rule. 15 
Similarly, if Taney's relationship to the government with re-
gard to its interest in owning the house for -a particular purpose 
is governed by a liability rule, then it cannot also be governed 
on the same issue by a property rule. For if the government 
may take the house upon payment of compensation, then it is 
not true that the government may only acquire it by voluntary, 
negotiated transfer. Significantly, it does not matter whether 
the government might obtain the entitlement by a voluntary, 
negotiated purchase. That alone does not make the relationship 
one governed by a property rule. 16 On the other hand, it ap-
pears that a po}ver to malce a voluntary transfer is implicit in the 
concept of a liability rule, just as it is implicit in the concept of a 
property rule. 17 
- Finally, this power to make a voluntary transfer serves to dif-
ferentiate both property and liability rules from inalienability 
rules. Accordingly, an entitlement governed by an inalienability 
rule cannot also be governed by a property or liability rule as 
between the same persons. As far as is indicated by the quoted 
definitions, a rule of inalienability might be constructed so as to 
allow for an unconsented taking, or such a taking might be pro-
1
'
1 Actually, what it says is that someone who "wishes" to "remove" an entitlement 
governed by a property rule "must buy it," id. at 1092, but of course C&M could not 
really have meant that: If anyone who merely "wishes" to have property belonging to 
someone else must buy it, then the law would be compeiling unwanted sales all over 
the place, which is inconsistent with the authors' further specification that the sale be 
a voluntary transaction. Thus, what C&M surely meant was that a property rule is in 
place only if, in order to acquire the entitlement or damage its res, one must obtain 
the consent of its present holder. 
15 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345 (asserting but not arguing the point); 
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L.- Rev. 822, 835, 844, 
849-51 (1993) (assuming but not arguing the point). 
16 Of course, if the government's purpose in acquiring the entitlement does not 
satisfy constitutional requirements for the exercise of eminent domain so that an 
involuntary taking is not allowed, then with respect to that purpose the relationship 
between Taney and the government will be governed by a property rule. But that is 
just to restate the truism that two persons may be related by a different type of rule 
with regard to the same object when a different issue is at stake. 
17 See Morris, supra note 15, at 845 (again assuming but not arguing the point). 
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hibited. In this respect, an ~nalienability rule might operate more 
like a liability rule or mote like a property rule. 18 
Exploring issues of mutual exclusivity suggests a different is-
sue: exhaustiveness. Clearly C&M did not mean that these three 
rules are the only ones that can apply. Other configurations of 
duties, privileges, powers, and immunities can be imagined, 
even when limiting one's attention-as did C&M-to rules gov-
erning the transfer of entitlements.19 Indeed, later in their article 
C&M added what they themselves regarded as a previously ne-
glected rule, although they did not characterize it as a distinct 
type of rule.20 It can be illustrated by taking the case of Taney, 
whose burning of leaves on his land causes smoke and odors to 
pass over to Marshall's. Putting aside inalienability, there are 
actually four readily identifiable configurations of property and 
liability rules. 
First, if we conclude that Taney is free to do so without ac-
counting to his neighbor, we recognize a property rule in regard 
to leaf burning, as long as Taney and Marshall are free to enter 
an agreement to stop the burning.21 If, however, we conclude 
that Taney may not burn the leaves unless Marshall agrees to 
allow it, we again recognize a property rule, except that now the 
property rule favors Marshall by supporting his interest in en-
joying his land free of the smoke and odors of leaf burning.22 
"See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
19 For a thorough discussion see Morris, supra note 15. 
20 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1116. 
21 See id. at 1115-16. 
22 See id. In the first case, Taney's Hohfeldian privilege is governed by a property 
rule, while in the second case, Marshall's Hohfeldian claim-right is governed by a 
property rule. See supra note 1. Since both are property rules, we might describe 
this difference by saying that in the first instance Taney has the property right with 
respect to leaf burning, and in the second Marshall has such a right. Notice, however, 
that in each of these cases, we could look at the matter from the point of view of the 
"loser," that is, we could ask about the nature of the entitlement held by the person 
who does not have the property right. It might appear as if that person has nothing at 
all. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 2178-
79 (1997) (referring to the loser in each case as having nothing). But sometimes this 
is mistaken: In the first case, for example, Marshall enjoys the rightful use of the 
unpolluted air so long as Taney chooses not to pollute, at least so long as Taney has 
no distinct claim-right against Marshall's enjoyment of the unpolluted air. Thus, 
Marshall has something in such a case, although C&M did not recognize that fact by 
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As a third possibility, if we conclude that Taney is free to 
burn the leaves provided he compensates Marshall for any harm 
thereby done to Marshall's interests, then we recognize a liabil-
ity rule with respect to Marshall's entitlement to unpolluted air. 
Indeed, along with eminent domain, such conditionally privi-
leged nuisances constitute the paradigmatic liability rules.23 
Finally, the fourth possible rule arises if we conclude that 
Taney is free to burn the leaves so long as Marshall does not com-
pensate Taney for the damage to Taney's interests in not being 
able to burn the leaves (e.g., the cost of having the leaves re-
moved to be disposed of elsewhere). In that case, we recognize 
a different liability rule, one protecting Taney's leaf burning.24 
All of the foregoing seems to have been intended by C&M 
and is now quite familiar to students of property law. And the 
most important observation to be made about this scheme is 
that its novelty consists entirely of the specification of liability 
rules as coequal to the more familiar property and inalienability 
rules. 25 Indeed, much of the interest in, and influence of, C&M's 
typology arises from this fact. 26 It is significant, therefore, that a 
giving a distinct name to this jural relationship. An exclusive focus on transfer 
relationships obscures this asymmetry. 
23 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1116 & n.55 (citing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (polluting cement plant could continue operations upon 
payment of permanent damages)). 
"According to C&M, "[t]he fourth rule, really a kind of partial eminent domain 
coupled with a benefits tax, can be stated as follows: Marshall may stop Taney from 
poiiuting, but if he does he must compensate Taney." id. at 1116. Although in 
subsequent passages they explain why the fourth rule type is not encountered in 
common-law adjudication, id. at 1116-17, students of property will recognize that this 
is a plausible characterization of the rule in Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. 
Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), a case, coincidentally decided the same year that 
C&M published their article, in which the court ordered the defendant, an operator 
of cattle feedlots, to move and the plaintiff, the developer of a neighboring retire-
ment community, to pay for it. 
25 Under an efficiency analysis, these liability rules are explained as responding to 
the existence of transaction costs, holdouts, or free riders that otherwise would impede 
the voluntary and Pareto efficient transfer of entitlements. See C&M, supra note 4, 
at 1105-10. 
26 There is an enduring controversy over the breadth of the circumstances calling for 
the use of liability rules on efficiency grounds. Compare Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, 
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 
104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995) (arguing that liability rules can improve efficiency even in 
!ow transaction costs contexts by encouraging parties' disclosure of accurate infor-
mation concerning their evaluations of entitlements), with James E. Krier & Stewart 
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crucial ambiguity in their typology involves the nature of liabil-
ity rules. 
B. The Ambiguity Identified 
Consider another hypothetical regarding Taney's entitlement 
in his house: 
Marshall, in a hurry to make an important conference on the 
subject of judicial review, drives at a greatly excessive rate of 
speed, misses a turn, and crashes through the bay window of 
Taney's house. 
Assume that the evidence would warrant, if not require, a find-
ing that Marshall's driving was reckless. If Taney is entitled to 
compensation for the damages, how shall we describe the result 
in terms of the C&M typology? The lawyer's instinct is to de-
scribe the situation as entailing a liability rule, since Marshall is 
"liable" for the proximate consequences of his negligent or reck-
less conduct. Indeed, academics commonly reach this conclu-
sion.27 But this description is problematic and, I will argue, ulti-
mately mistaken, at least for C&M's conception of a liability rule. 
If one returns to their definition of such rules, one finds that a 
liability rule would cover this situation only if Marshall may 
drive recklessly provided compensation is paid.28 Note the per-
J. Schwab, Properly Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995) (arguing that factors like high transaction costs, which 
favor liability rules, are often offset by the high costs of judicial assessments of 
"damages" under liability rules and the need to encourage private parties to find ways 
to reduce transaction costs). 
27 Consider, for example, the following attempt to restate C&M's concept of a 
liability rule: "Liability Rule: My right to X (my security against being harmed by the 
reckless driving of others, say) requires that others compensate me (pay me damages) 
for crossing the border defined by my right to X." Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. 
Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 112 (rev. ed. 1990). 
See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An 
Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 715 (1996) (describing liability rules as 
ones by which the state "discourages violations by requiring transgressors to pay 
victims for harms suffered" (emphasis added)); id. at 753 (characterizing negligence 
liability of drivers as involving a liability rule when driving is negligent). Such views 
are understandable considering C&M's own discussion of the accident situation. See 
infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text. 
28 Actually, C&M wrote in terms of what a Marshall "may" do if "he is willing" to 
pay compensation. See supra text accompanying note 12. If this is to be sensible as 
an interpretation of our practices, it must preclude the possibility that Marshall is 
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missive word "may," implying social acceptance, if not outright 
approval, of the taking of the entitlement. This understanding is 
reinforced by the paradigm examples C&M offered: eminent 
domain and those nuisances that are allowed to continue (upon 
payment of compensation) because of the social good of the ac-
tivities in question.29 In the hypothetical, however, Marshall's 
conduct is not socially desirable; it is not a privileged tort. Mar-
shall is "liable," in part, because society deems his conduct wrong-
ful, the sort of activity that ought to be discouraged. 30 The defi-
nition of a liability rule does not read: 
An entitlement is protected by a liability rule whenever some-
one in fact destroys the initial entitlement, or is able to do so, 
and is required because of such conduct to pay an objectively 
determined value for it. 
Thus the fact that Marshall can act so as to iwpose this loss on 
Taney subject only to a damage award· does not mean that the 
scenario instantiates a liability rule.31 
willing but unable to pay. The state would not, for example, ordinarily be permitted 
to take private property without the constitutionally mandated compensation on the 
excuse that it has no money with which to pay it. See 3 Julius L. Sackman & Russel 
D. Van Brunt, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain§§ 8.9-.10 (rev. 3d ed. 1994). So 
C&M's reference to the actor's willingness to pay was probably intended to indicate 
either the existence of a legal duty to compensate or actual compensation. Which of 
these is the right way to understand "willingness" depends upon the resolution of the 
ambiguity addressed in the text. 
"See C&M, supra note 4, at 1093, 1105, 1106-07, 1119-20. By "paradigm example" 
I mean an example that is so conspicuously employed to iiiustrate the concept that 
one may properly look to the example to help resolve ambiguities in the concept's 
explanation or definition. Clearly, eminent domain is such an example in C&M's 
article, and the conditionally privileged nuisance is at least very close to paradig-
matic. Jn the following Section, I examine C&M's comparatively brief and (I argue) 
non-paradigmatic treatment of accident law. 
30 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts,§ 31, at 169-
73, § 33, at 193-208 (5th ed. 1984). To be sure, negligence liability is also based on 
compensating the injured party. Whether these two ideas can be separated is one of 
the most fundamental theoretical issues in the law of torts, but its resolution does not 
affect the present point. Compare, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 
56-83 (1995) (developing an Aristotelian account of the "intrinsic unity" of the plain-
tiff-defendant relationship) with Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 386-406 (1992) 
(arguing that such separation can legitimately be maintained despite the plaintiff-
defendant linkage inherent in our usual notion of corrective justice). 
31 Of course, it is true that after the fact we "accept" the injury, in the sense that the 
law is unable to undo the accident. But that does not mean that we accept, let alone 
condone, all the actions that brought the injury about. The same point likely is true 
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Perhaps then Taney's entitlement is protected in this context 
by a property rule. After all, we do allow people to agree to ac-
cept the consequences of reckless behavior, as in race car driv-
ing. Taney could have sold his permission to Marshall, thereby 
waiving any right to compensation. It is not, therefore, incoher-
ent to say that Marshall should not have driven recklessly with-
out Taney's consent. Of course, obtaining such permission 
would be practically infeasible, since probably neither Marshall 
nor Taney would have known in advance with whom to deal, 
even if they had the time to negotiate. But that is not the point 
here. The question is not whether transaction costs of negotia-
tion are so high that as a practical matter the entitlement cannot 
be alienated in this context;32 rather, it is simply whether it is 
correct under C&M's definitions to say that Taney's interest is 
protected by a (practically inalienable) property rule, as op-
posed to a liability rule. 
Indeed, the only difficulty with characterizing the matter as 
involving a property rule is an ambiguous word in C&M's defi-
nition: Property rules are said to be in place when the acquiring 
party (Marshall) "must" buy the entitlement in a voluntary 
transaction.33 In our example, Marshall in fact has, in one sense, 
taken Taney's entitlement (to be free of reckless damage to his 
house) without first negotiating a deal with Taney. Conse-
quently, one would infer that the situation does not exemplify a 
property rule if the word "must" in the definition signifies an 
empirical proposition about what can be done by the Marshalls 
of the world rather than an imperative or prescription that only 
consensual transfers should occur. 
of some, but not all, nuisance cases in which an injunction is denied in favor of 
damages for fear of causing substantial waste or harm. Thus in a case like Boomer, 
see supra note 23, prospective, injunctive relief might be denied only because the 
polluting company has made a significant investment that cannot be reversed without 
serious costs; if the issue were to arise before such investment occurs, an injunction 
might issue if the anticipated pollution is considered wrongful. See Daniel 
Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 15-18 (1989) (so 
interpreting Boomer). 
32 Cf. C&M, supra note 4, at 1100-01 (discussing the assignment of entitlements to 
"merit goods" and noting that high transaction costs can make such goods practically 
inalienable). 
33 Id. at 1092. 
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Notice that the interpretive assumption one would use to ex-
clude Taney's entitlement from the property rule category is the 
same one that serves to include the entitlement in the liability 
rule category. If we take the rule types as referring to what per-
sons are empirically capable of doing-what the law does or does 
not prevent them from doing-then we get the result that Taney 
is protected by a liability rule and not a property rule. However, 
if we take these rule types as referring to what the law pre-
scribes-what the law directs that it is proper or improper to do-
then we get the result that Taney is protected by a property rule 
and not a liability rule.34 How shall we resolve this ambiguity? 
C. Wrestling with the Ambiguity 
Of course, in one sense C&M were free to stipulate whatever 
definitions they wanted. I'·Tonetheless, their choices may be criti-
cized if, for example, they cause confusion or are internally in-
consistent. Moreover, in the absence of any clear indication as 
to whether a prescriptive or descriptive definition was intended, 
we are faced with an interpretive question: Which definition 
makes more sense of what is otherwise presented in their paper? 
And even if one can determine what was intended, at least in 
particular passages taken by themselves, the ambiguity allows us 
to ask the interpretive question, especially because C&M's sub-
ject is the explanation of social practices.35 Thus, although C&M's 
concrete intentions are relevant to the discussion, our ultimate 
concern is with the question of how to make C&M's scheme 
most coherent and enlightening as an account of legal practices. 
We may start by noting the way in which C&M characterized 
all of their rule types: They referred to them as ways of "pro-
tecting" entitlements.36 And "protection" might be thought to be 
coincident with enforcement. That is, an entitlement is not "pro-
tected" except to the extent it is enforced, and C&M's rule types 
34 Another logical possibility is that C&M's rule types refer to what the law is 
prepared to enforce, whether or not that enforcement is actually successful as to any 
particular person. This possibility is discussed infra Section IV .B. 
35 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 53-65 (1986) (discussing the role of author's 
intention in interpretation). 
36 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1089, 1105, 1106. 
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are thus seen as marking different ways that society enforces en-
titlements. Indeed, this is today the generally accepted view of 
the matter. Although variations and ambiguities are legion, it is 
fair to say that the prevailing account identifies C&M's rule 
types with particular, assumedly effective remedies: Liability 
rules are identified with the actual payment of compensation if 
an unconsented taking occurs, and property rules are identified 
with the effective prevention of unconsented taking, usually by 
an injunction, which forces parties to negotiate any transfer of 
the entitlement.37 
There is no logical difficulty, however, in distinguishing be-
tween a rule that is designed to protect an entitlement and one 
that succeeds in doing so. This raises the possibility of identify-
ing the rule types with remedies that are not necessarily effec-
tive.38 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that C&M were really 
considering the specification of various rule types designed to 
protect otherwise well-defined entitlements. It is also plausible, 
despite C&M's characterization, to think of these rule types as 
different ways a general sense of entitlement can be given con-
crete form. This is the position taken by a small minority of 
scholars.39 
37 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149, 2150-51 (1997) (identifying liability rules with tort 
damages and property rules with injunctions); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nui-
sance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 19 (1985) 
("[T]he property rule/liability rule distinction goes only to the question of remedies 
to protect substantive rights."). The matter is often presented to students in this way. 
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 102-08 (1988); Duke-
minier & Krier, supra note 5, at 140 n.19, 985; Kurtz & Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 
769-71; A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 15-16 (2d ed. 
1989). Although the effectiveness of the remedies is usually only implicit in the. 
discussions, its definitional significance is sometimes made quite explicit. See infra 
notes 175-177 and accompanying text. 
38 This possibility is taken up in Section IV.B, infra, but for now it is worth noting 
that if one allows for a gap between remedies and behavior, one complicates the 
drawing of efficiency implications from the type of rule employed. 
39 See Coleman and Kraus, supra note 8, at 1340-47; see also Morris, supra note 15, 
at 842-44, criticizing C&M's use of the "protection" terminology and concluding that: 
rules-such as property, liability, and inalienability rules-that determine en-
titlement forms are best thought of as the rules constituting or defining the 
structure of particular entitlements rather than as rules providing for the protec-
tion of pre-existing "general" entitlements. Calabresi and Melamed's three 
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We can obtain some help here by looking more closely at the 
passages that implicitly define the various rule types. Consider 
in oarticular a more comolete version of the passage relating to 
in~lienability rules: ~ ~ -
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is 
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The 
state intervenes not only to determine who is initially enti-
tled ... , but also to forbid its sale under some or all circum-
stances.40 
The italicized words indicate a prescriptive focus. They cer-
tainly do not require that the prohibition be effective. If they 
did, a prohibition of prostitution would involve an inalienability 
rule only in those cases where the act of prostitution is deterred; 
in cases where the prohibited sale takes place we would be 
~ • • 1 • • • r• ' 41 ]' T i • • 
wrced to say t11at a property ru e 1s exempnnea. "-~ otmng m 
their article suggests that C&M would really want to say that a 
rule forbidding prostitution is sometimes an inalienability rule 
and sometimes a property rule, depending upon whether a sale 
is in fact deterred. And if they would, what would they then say 
about a situation in which the nrohibited sale occurs but the par-
ties are caught and prosecuted~?42 • 
The same point applies to ordinary items of personal prop-
erty. C&M assert that "much of what is generally called private 
property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected by 
rules thus constitute three forms of entitlement, rather than one general kind of 
entitlement protected in three different ways. 
ld. at 844 (footnote omitted). 
40 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1092-93 (emphasis added). The significance of the 
omitted material indicated by ellipses is taken up in Section II.B, infra. 
•
11 Because bans on prostitution prohibit only compensated exchanges of sex, they 
generate only a partial inalienability rule, one that applies when the price between 
willing buyer and willing seller is relatively explicit and non-zero. It is sometimes 
useful, therefore, to distinguish between compensated and uncompensated transfers 
and between the inalienability rules that may govern each. See Morris, supra note 15, 
at 837-38. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1849 (1987). 
42 A thoroughly descriptive approach would presumably speak in terms of statistical 
regularities, and the fact that a given act is generally deterred might be enough to 
speak of the existence of an effective rule. However, C&M's treatment does not 
otherwise take such a disengaged anthropological stance, and there is no evidence 
whatsoever of statistical generalization in their arguments. 
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a property rule."43 But is this true if we go with the descriptive 
form of the definitions? Recall the word "must" in C&M's defi-
nition of property rules.44 Clearly there are rules against theft, 
and equally clearly most people honor such rules most of the 
time. But is it true that they "must" honor those rules, in the 
sense that they realistically have no option but to do so? In this 
same passage, C&M go on to write, "No one can take the enti-
tlement to private property from the holder unless the holder 
sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values 
the property."45 Yet, if we take the word "can" literally, rather 
than as an inartful way of saying "is allowed to," the proposition 
becomes rather ludicrous.46 In fact, if we take the empirical 
question seriously, it will be true in a considerable variety of 
contexts that the individual who in most lawyers' and lay per-
sons' ordinary reckoning "owns" an item of personalty does not 
even have the protection of a liability rule, since another person 
could take the thing, avoid detection, and not even have to pay 
compensation. Presumably this is not what C&M meant to fol-
low from their definitions. Certainly, it is not what they should 
have meant to follow if, as the assertion quoted above confirms, 
they wanted their definitions to resemble even loosely our more 
ordinary conceptions. 
These considerations suggest that property, liability, and in-
alienability rules should be considered prescriptions concerning 
what people should do, not descriptions of what they can or 
must do. Consider, however, what CRrM have to say about cases 
like that of the recklessly driving Marshall: 
The example of eminent domain is simply one of numerous in-
stances in which society uses liability rules. Accidents is an-
other. If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to 
be accidentally injured we would have to require all who en-
43 C&M, supra note 4, at 1105. 
44 Id. at 1092. 
45 ld. at 1105 (emphasis added). 
46 See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 453, 458-64 & tbl.l (1997) (arguing that the threat of criminal punishment is a 
weak deterrent in view of the small probability that perpetrators of even serious 
crimes will be successfully prosecuted and presenting in particular data indicating a 
one percent chance of such for larceny or motor vehicle theft). 
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gage in activities that may injure individuals to negotiate with 
them before an accident, and to buy the right to knock off an 
arm or a leg. Such pre-accident negotiations would be extremely 
expensive, often prohibitively so. To require them would thus 
preclude many activities that might, in fact, be worth having.
47 
In this curious passage C&M make an empirical claim, namely 
that society in fact uses liability rules in regard to the allocation 
of accident costs. 48 Now the general ru,le, in this society at least, 
is that the accident costs of someone unintentionally injured by 
the act of another are to be shifted to the other if, but only if, 
the other was negligent, a compensation premised on fault.
49 
How does this relate to the scheme of definitions offered by 
C&M? In particular, does it illustrate the employment of a li-
ability rule as they claim? 
H we assume that their rule types are attuned to the law's pre-
scriptions, then for non-faulty accidents the actor has a property 
right in the activity, whereas for faulty accidents the victim has a 
property right against injury.50 The law's prescription is that 
Marshall should not act recklessly, at least not without his po-
tential victim's consent, and if he does so then he should pay for 
the consequences. The latter part of this rule is a rule of com-
pensation, to be sure, but it is not a liability rule as defined. The 
law does not say that it is good, or even acceptable, for Marshall 
to drive recklessly provided he pays for the consequences.
51 
On the other hand, if we assume that their rule types are de-
scriptive, referring to what Marshall can do rather than what he 
is supposed to do, then it might seem that Taney has only liabil-
"C&M, supra note 4, at 1108-09 (footnotes omitted). 
" Of course, the fact that this claim is empirical does not necessarily mean that the 
rule types at issue are descriptive in the sense we have been discussing. C&M could 
be making an empirical claim about society's use of prescriptively understood rules. 
49 See Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 29, at 162-64 (describing the unavoidable acci-
dent doctrine). For simplicity, this assumes away affirmative defenses as well as issues 
of causal proximity. One subtle qualification is discussed infra at notes 221-223 and 
accompanying text. 
50 See supra note 22. 
51 Once again, one might reply that to say that we will do nothing to stop reckless 
driving other than require compensation, if that were the case, is to "accept" reckless 
driving. But that is true only in the limited sense that we would accept the fact that 
the iaw should do nothing more in terms of coercive responses to reckless driving. 
See supra note 31; infra Section IV.B. 
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ity rule protection of his house. And this would suggest, given 
the empirical claim made by C&M, that they really had the de-
scriptive notion of rules in mind. But what then shall we say, for 
example, about a Marshall who is judgment proof? Since no 
compensation can be collected from him, Taney does not have 
even liability rule protection. Once again, surely C&M did not 
mean, and should not have meant, for their definitions to de-
pend upon such fortuities. 
What then are we to make of the efficiency argument that un-
derlies C&M's discussion of accident costs? If one takes the 
prescriptive interpretation of the rule types, as the foregoing anal-
ysis suggests one should, then accident law is governed in the 
general case by property rules. Are C&M correct that this would 
be inefficient because the transaction costs of bargaining will 
"preclude many activities that might, in fact, be worth having"?52 
To answer that question, one must be more precise than 
C&M were about the identification of the activity that is sup-
posed to be "worth having." For example, the driving of auto-
mobiles is certainly an activity worth having, but how would this 
be precluded by a property rule that "protects" )'aney's entitle-
ment to be free of injury caused by negligent driving? If C&M 
were contemplating an activity, say driving simpliciter, that sim-
ply poses the risk that someone will drive negligently, then it 
may well be important on efficiency grounds not to have a 
property entitlement in Taney to be free of such an activity. In 
fact, the Taneys of our society do not have such property enti-
tlements. But they do have property entitlements against negli-
gent driving, with no impairment of efficiency along the lines 
adduced by C&M.53 
Thus, to the extent it is valid at all, C&M's efficiency argu-
ment works only against certain configurations of property enti-
tlements, and it does not work against the particular property 
52 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1109. 
53 Of course, there may be other reasons that fault-based liability is inefficient, at 
least in a particular context. For example, the administrative costs associated with 
determining fault may be higher than those associated with some no-fault systems. 
See generally Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis (1970) (undertaking a general critique of the fault system); Steven Shavell, 
Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987) (same). 
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rules that our society in fact recognl7:es with regard to accidents.54 
Liability rules, in the prescriptive sense, are certainly used in our 
law, but they are not nearly so common as C&M seem to sug-
gest.55 Only by conflating the lawyer's ordinary sense of liability 
with C&M's technical sense of (prescriptive) liability rules does 
one get the false impression that liability rules, in the latter 
technical sense, are so widespread.56 
54 Indeed, there is a substantial literature illustrating the efficiency of a fault-based 
system of accident compensation, as well as the limits thereof. See, e.g., John Prather 
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973); 
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Steven 
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). 
55 There may be cases of excused speeding, for example in the case of an 
ambulance, but in such cases it vmuld be odd to say that the driving was faulty at all. 
Rarely applied e"amples of liability rules, on the prescriptive understanding, are the 
rules prescribing compensation for damages occurring during privileged intentional 
invasions of property interests and the rules requiring compensation for damages 
accidentally caused by important but ultrahazardous activities. See Keeton et al., 
supra note 30, § 16, at 108-09, § 78, at 545-59. 
50 Indeed, it would have been less confusing had C&M used a different terminology 
for what they called liability rules. Cf. Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 443 (com-
menting that rules allowing forced sales are not ver; aptly called "liability rules"). 
More descriptive, though less convenient, would have been a term like "compensated 
taking" rules. Cf. Morris, supra note 15, at 847, 876-80 (retaining the term "liability" 
rule and contrasting it with an "uncompensated taking" rule); Rose, supra note 22, at 
2178-79 (characterizing a liability rule as involving a "property right subject to an 
option"). In earlier work, Calabresi had referred to both the nuisance and negligence 
rules of liability as "liability rules" without characterizing the latter notion except by 
tacit reference to the lawyer's conventiona] meaning of ]jability. See, e.g., Guido 
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 
11 J. Law & Econ. 67 (1968). To be sure, part of the blame for this particular 
confusion must be placed on Hohfeld, who used the notion of "liability" in the 
similarly technical sense of being subject to a power. See supra note 1. There is, 
however, no evidence that C&M relied on Hohfeld in formulating their conception of 
liability rules. Moreover, Hohfeld's conception of a liability is quite different in other 
respects. In particular, the requirement of payment is irrelevant to whether or not 
something is a Hohfeldian liability, as illustrated by the donative creation and 
uncompensated exercise of a power of appointment. Applying Hohfeld's framework 
to the reckless driving case, if Marshall drives recklessly into Taney's house and is 
required to pay for the resulting damage, Marshall's ability to impose this change 
does not entail an Hohfeldian liability in Taney with respect to the house, since 
Taney's legal rights in the house are not changed thereby. (The physical attributes 
and the value of the house are changed, but these are distinct matters.) Rather, that 
ability (arguably) entails a Hohfeldian power in Marshall to create a new claim-right 
in Taney with respect to a different thing, Marshall's assets. This assumes that a 
Hohfeldian power can be exercised by an act that oniy risks an unintended change in 
legal relations. In this nonparadigmatic Hohfeldian sense, Taney's property in the 
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Evidently C&M were confused on this point. Their various 
arguments and characterizations lead in conflicting directions, 
although the confusion generally goes completely unnoticed.57 
This may be attributable to a desire to illustrate liability rules as 
more commonly employed than people were inclined to admit, 
at least at the time their article was published. Thus, the idea 
that a nuisance would be allowed to continue for the sake of 
some overriding public good sounds like a form of eminent do-
main exercised by a private party, a practice fraught with diffi-
culties.58 C&M were careful to point out such uses of what are 
liability rules, even on the prescriptive understanding of their 
rule typology.59 Nonetheless, when one moves to the problem of 
"accidents," such an understanding of their definitions entails 
house is "protected" by a liability rule, and this is true even though the law neither 
authorizes nor approves of Marshall's exposing Taney to the risk of recklessly inflic-
ted damage without Taney's prior consent. See Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 52-53 (indi-
cating that a holder of a legal power may be under a legal duty not to exercise that 
power, but not indicating whether the exercise of a power in violation of such a duty 
is necessarily a nullity). 
57 For example, one commentator cites C&M in support of the proposition that "we 
could conceptualize strict liability as an entitlement protected only by a liability rule 
(damages) and negligence as an entitlement potentially protected by a property rule 
(an injunction)." Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-
Creation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 113, 135 (1990). As I argue, this is certainly 
the right way to categorize the negligence regime (aside from the apparent identifi-
cation of property rules with injunctive relief), but it is decidedly not how C&M 
categorized it. Undoubtedly, C&M's categorization reflects the fact that negligence can 
almost never be so anticipated as to make injunctive relief practicable. But we have 
seen that this fact is not determinative. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
58 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that permitting a nuisance to continue upon payment of per-
manent damages amounts to illegitimate private exercise of eminent domain); 
Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 816-17 (W.Va. 1969) (Caplan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that permitting innocent improver to take land of neighbor upon payment of 
permanent damages amounts to same). The claim of a private taking in such cases is 
less convincing when the putative taker makes the investment that is being protected 
without knowledge that his actions violate the property rights of another. In such 
cases, the moral power of the argument against compensated private takings suffers 
from the weakness, or even absence, of perverse incentives. Nonetheless, such dis-
sents express legitimate concern about even unintentional but negligent invasions of 
property interests. 
59 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1105-06. 
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the conclusion, contrary to C&M, that liability rules are rather 
unusual.60 
II. THE AMBIGUITY RESOLVED 
A. Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules 
A reader deeply imbued \vith the spirit of American Legal 
Realism and the pragmatic instrumentalism that has been its 
legacy will undoubtedly be impatient with this discussion. She 
will argue as follows. What is the point of this quibble over 
terminology, over "may" instead of "can"? What, after all, is 
the difference between the following laws: 
Law #1: Do not act negligently. H you do act negligently, you 
must pay for consequent injuries. 
Law #2: You are permitted to act negligently, provided you pay 
for any consequent injuries. 
Under each law, she win argue, one is required to pay if (and 
only if) one negligently causes injury.6 ' Of course, if some other 
legal consequence, besides compensating victims, is attached to 
negligence in the context of Law #1 but not in the context of 
Law #2, then there would be an obvious difference between the 
60 One of the interesting puzzles in this regard concerns strict liability for defective 
products. Assuming that defectiveness can be meaningfully distinguished from the 
results of a negligence analysis, then such rules may indeed satisfy the prescriptive 
definition of a liability rule. The familiar implication is that manufacturers are not 
acting improperly by (non-negligently) producing defective products, since the rule is 
simply one compelling that a contract of insurance be sold with the product in 
question, with whatever market-induced deterrence of defects that results therefrom. 
See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud. 
645 (1985); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Comments on Epstein, 14 J. Legal Stud. 671 (1985); 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Comment on Epstein, 14 J. Legal Stud. 675 (1985); Ernest J. 
Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 681 (1985). 
However, the assumption that defectiveness is meaningfully distinguishable from 
negligence is certainly subject to challenge, especially in the context of design defects. 
See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Van d. L. Rev. 593 (1980). See also 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §§ 1, 2 (Proposed Final Draft 1997) 
(effectively precluding non-fault-based liability for defects in design or failure to warn). 
61 The "only if' necessity clause does not, of course, follow analytically from the state-
meni of the rules, but from the unstated premise that no other rule requires payment 
if one is non-negligent or if one's negligence does not proximately cause harm. 
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way these rules operate.62 Conversely, if social practice has 
evolved so as to undermine the prohibition formally expressed 
in a provision like Law #1, then the applicable real rule under 
such a nominal law may well be equivalent to Law #2. But let us 
put these possibilities aside and limit our attention to the quoted 
laws. 63 Even as stated are they not, practically speaking, inevi-
tably the same rule? If so, what is the point of categorizing 
them differently? 
To answer these questions, one must recognize a fact long 
familiar to legal philosophers, going back at least to Aquinas, 
and before him to Aristotle. Rules of law are aimed at two 
theoretically distinguishable types of citizen, each of which can 
and generally does exist in varying degrees in real people. 
Sometimes a rule is directed at the citizen who is law-abiding, 
who turns to the law for guidance as to his responsibilities and 
who would not knowingly disobey the law. On the other hand, 
sometimes a rule is directed at the disobedient citizen, the recal-
citrant who looks to the law only in order to discern what mate-
rial consequences will attend his breach of the law's require-
ments.64 As H.L.A. Hart reminded us a good ten years before 
C&M published their article: 
"For example, criminal punishment is often prescribed for reckless behavior in 
some contexts, including automobile driving. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. 
Scott, Jr., Criminal Law§ 3.7 (2d ed. 1986). 
63 One might also question whether Law #2 makes any sense on its face. After all, 
why would the state permit someone to act in a way that is negligent, which is to say 
unreasonable? There are many possible answers to that question. For example, if 
unreasonableness is determined by a community standard, then the Jaw might express 
a decision to override that community standard, authorize the conduct, and insulate 
the negligent actor from any more serious consequences, legal or otherwise, that 
might result from a determination that the actor has violated that standard. This 
determination could arise because lawmakers are convinced that the prevailing 
community standard of care is too stringent. This may be bad policy, as reflected in 
the fact that our Jaw of negligence looks more like Law #1 than Law #2, but Law #2 is 
certainly not incoherent. · 
"For a quick summary with citations to both Aristotle and Aquinas, see John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 28-29 (1980) (distinguishing between Jaw as 
needed to solve "the co-ordination problems of communal life" and law as needed 
"to force selfish people to act reasonably"). Kant emphasized that sometimes the 
state must resolve good faith disagreements among Jaw-abiding individuals over 
matters of principle. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals *312 (1797). 
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At any given moment the life of any society which lives by 
rules, legal or not, is likely to consist i11 a tension between. those 
who, on the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in 
maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other persons' 
behaviour in terms of the rules, and those who, on the other 
hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the external 
point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of the dif-
ficulties facing any legal-theory anxious to do justice to the 
complexity of the facts is to remember the presence of both 
these Roints of view and not to define one of them out of exis-
tence.b5 
Nor is this just the armchair idealism of philosophers. Empirical 
work supports the proposition that, in general, people obey the 
law at least as much out of a sense of the legitimacy of legal 
authority and the fairness of the laws that it generates as out of 
a fear of punishment."" 
Vi/ith this in mind, it is easy to answer the question posed by 
our legal realist. The two laws quoted above are the same from 
the perspective of the recalcitrant, since the information about 
potential legal consequences is the same.67 Yet they are pro-
foundly different for the la\v-abiding citizen. True, such a citi-
zen might still ask for further guidance on the question of what 
constitutes "negligence" in driving, but given an answer to that 
question, or even given an instruction simply to use the citizen's 
'
5 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88 (1961). Lon Fuller illustrated the signi-
ficance of this distinction most effectively in his famous allegory of King Rex, whose 
subjects were steadfastly Joyal and willing to comply with the law but nonetheless 
found it impossible to regulate their conduct according to the Jaw because of the 
serious mistakes that Rex made in attempting to develop, express, and apply rules. 
See Fuller, supra note 3, at 33-94. Fuller's arguments demonstrate the importance of 
various considerations, such as the norm that rules should not be contradictory, see 
id. at 65-70, that tend to be overlooked when one focuses only on Jaw as a means of 
controlling society's miscreants. 
"''See generally Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990) (presenting an 
empirical study of people's attitudes toward compliance with the Jaw). For a quick 
and more recent summary of the empirical literature see Robinson & Darley, supra 
note 46, at 468-71. 
'
7 Of course, the recalcitrant might view the two Jaws as carrying different conse-
quences in terms of nonlegal reactions by other citizens to the recalcitrant's conduct. 
Notice, however, that such a consideration by the recalcitrant presupposes that the 
two laws carry different social messages for at least some other citizens--citizens who, 
therefore, must not themselves be recalcitrant. 
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own best judgment about the matter, this citizen stands in a very 
different relationship to the first law than he does to the second.68 
Thus, one can distinguish between guidance rules, rules de-
signed for law-abiding citizens, and enforcement rules, rules de-
signed to deal with recalcitrants.69 To avoid confusion, it should 
be added that a given rule can be directed at both audiences and 
so function as both a guidance rule and an enforcement rule. 
For example, the first sentence in Law #1 is primarily a guidance 
rule, while the second states only an enforcement rule. Law #2, 
however, principally states a guidance rule, although an en-
forcement rule would probably be implied in the event that an 
actor refused to compensate someone injured by his negligence. 
In any event, the important point here is to recognize that Law 
#2 is not simply a function-merged restatement of Law #1, be-
cause the guidance aspect of Law #2 is not the same as the guid-
ance aspect of Law #1.70 
Legal realists have difficulty seeing this difference because 
they tend to operate under the famous "bad man" postulate ar-
ticulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes a century ago: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at 
it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences 
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good 
68 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Compensation, 14 Nofis 3 (1980) (distin-
guishing between cases in which A justifiably invades B's rights and cases in which A 
impermissibly invades B's rights, in each case A owing B compensation for the inva-
sion). Of course, negligence is a notoriously tricky concept. For recent work laying 
out theories not based on efficiency, see Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care 
in Negligence Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (David G. Owen ed., 
1995) (articulating a Kantian-Aristotelian theory); Gregory C. Keating, Reason-
ableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1996) (arti-
culating a social contractarian theory). 
"I do not mean to suggest that enforcement rules have no effect of inducing a 
greater degree of law-abiding behavior. In other words, enforcement at time h can 
have the effect of increasing the percentage of the population for whom enforcement 
is unnecessary at a later time h. I discuss aspects of this dynamic feature of the legal 
system in Section V.B, infra. 
70 This is not, of course, an unexplored phenomenon. For example, Hans Kelsen 
has been criticized for his view that a law is nothing but a direction to officials to 
apply a sanction under specified conditions, for such a conception ignores the role of 
rules in speaking to the people whose conduct is ultimately of importance. See Hart, 
supra note 65, at 35-41. 
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one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law 
or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience .... 
. . . The prophecies of what the court will do in fact, and 
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.71 
During this century, this point of view has exercised tremendous 
influence over many legal scholars and practitioners. 72 It has 
also been subjected to withering criticism in the general juris-
prudential literature, most of which underscores the fact that 
under a Holmesian conception of law it is impossible even to 
make sense of the idea that someone might violate the law. 
Holmes' theory strips the law of its normativity, without which 
"duty" and "violation" become meaningless. All that remains is 
"choice" and the non-normative factors that affect it.73 Indeed, 
this provides a convincing explanation for why the Holmesian 
view \Vas incorporated wholesale into the economic analysis of 
law. It remains there today, largely untouched by critical com-
71 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-461 
(1897). There are, of course, many other interesting themes in Holmes's famous 
article that are only tangentially relevant to the present discussion, such as the 
rejection of formalism and antiquarianism in law and the importance of scientific 
policy analysis. See id. at 464-78. For comments on these themes, see Symposium, 
The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1997). 
71 Its influence on the legal realists is obvious. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The 
Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 8-10, 12-15 (3d ed. 1960) (articulating and 
maintaining essentially the same view while recognizing at least some of its limi-
tations). But it has gone beyond this to become an integral part of the dominant 
instrumentalism of American legal thought. See Robert Samuel Summers, Instru-
mentalism and American Legal Theory 36-37, 116-18 (1982) (differentiating legal 
realism from the broader category of pragmatic instrumentalism, but maintaining that 
Holmesian predictivism is typical of both); William H. Wilcox, Taking a Good Look 
at the Bad Man's Point of View, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1058, 1058 (1981) (opining that 
this viewpoint "has survived as the accepted legal theory within the American legal 
profession for much of this century"). 
73 See generally Summers, supra note 72, at 101-35 (summarizing and expanding 
upon the criticisms of "state power predictivism" as a theory of law). This effect was 
fully intended by Holmes. To be sure, he did not deny normativity itself; he denied 
only that law has this feature. Thus, for him decisionmaking could involve consi-
derations of moral duty as well as prudence, but the law entered into the matter only 
as affecting the latter by way of material costs and benefits. See Holmes, supra note 
71, at 459-64 (arguing that such a framework is the consequence of the need to 
distinguish between law and morality). Thus, Holmes' framework does not admit of 
even the possibility that a directive by government, however legitimate, can impose a 
moral obligation. He thus in1plicitly denies the basis of much governmental activity. 
See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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mentary, either in the form of the discredited theory of what the 
law "really" is or as an empirical proposition about how people 
in fact relate to the law. In fact, the connection between these 
two variants of the Holmesian viewpoint can be seen in C&M's 
seminal discussion. 
The bad man view, considered as an empirical proposition, is 
quite evident in C&M's introduction to their rule typology. They 
begin their paper with assertions like the following: 
Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of 
two or more people, or two or more groups of people, it must 
decide which side to favor. Absent such a decision, access to 
goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of 
"might makes right"- whoever is stronger or shrewder will 
win. Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide 
which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.74 
This is a strikingly pessimistic view of human nature, more so 
than even Hobbes would endorse.75 It ignores the existence of 
private institutions that serve to settle disputes as well as the 
willingness of individuals or groups to find alternative methods 
by which to reach fair resolutions that will allow them to con-
tinue to live together in society. 76 
But more important for our purposes than the response of 
citizens to a vacuum of state authority is the response of citizens 
to the exercise of such authority. C&M continue: 
Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that 
choice. Simply setting the entitlement does not avoid the prob-
lem of "might makes right"; a minimum of state intervention is 
74 C&M, supra note 4, at 1090 (footnote omitted). 
75 Hobbes' arguments for a strong sovereign assume only that some people would 
treat others in such short-sightedly instrumentalist ways. See Gregory S. Kavka, 
Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory 96-102 (1986). 
76 There have since been many developments in the understanding of social 
ordering without the state, or in the minimally significant shadow of the state, or even 
in competition with the state. Some are particularized studies of social practices. 
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 
(1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992). Others are 
exercises in grand-scale social and historical theory. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Law 
and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983); 1 F.A. 
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order (1973). 
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always necessary. Our conventional notions make this easy to 
comprehend with respect to private property. If Taney owns a 
cabbage patch and Marshall, who is bigger, wants a cabbage, he 
will get it unless the state intervenes.77 
So the citizenry is assumed to be not only incapable of decent 
social life in the absence of exercised state authority but also 
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to the extent it is backed by further state intervention, presuma-
bly involving the threatened or actual use of force. 
With such views, false though they be/8 it is easy to see why 
C&M slipped into a vocabulary that conflates the idea of rule 
types based on prescriptions of what people are supposed to do 
or refrain from doing and the idea of rule types based on de-
scriptions of what people are in fact compelled to do or not do. 
Their treatment of accident law is illustrative. Indeed, once one 
assumes, or believes, that the law has no behavioral impact be-
yond the effect of the Raw's coercive force, the Holmesian view 
becomes inevitable. Like Holmes, one then perceives no differ-
ence between meaningfullegal authority and the risks, positive 
or negative, of exposure to the state's coercive power. The em-
pirical version of the Holmesian attitude thus comes back to his 
discredited jurisprudence. 79 
77 C&M, supra note 4, at 1090-91 (footnote omitted). 
'"For a powerful critique of the bad man idea as a behavioral assumption in law 
and economics, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The 
Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1309 (1986) (marshaling argument 
and empirical evidence against any such assumption as universally applicable). Even 
the occasional modern defense of Holmesian bad man theory accepts the importance 
of relatively law-abiding citizens. See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 72, at 1061 (arguing 
that the "good man" and the "bad man" at least share an interest in predicting the 
state's material interference with their activities). While it is true that the "good 
man" has such an interest in predicting the state's use of coercive power, he will 
generally have no trouble in this regard because he follows the law's guidance rules. 
Problems arise only if the law is perverse, as when enforcement rules punish conduct 
that is ostensibly permitted under the guidance rules. If the messages are thus seri-
ously conflicting, fidelity to law is undermined. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 65-70 
(discussing the problem of contradictory laws). Conversely, well-designed legal systems 
will avoid such difficulties. 
"interestingly, if the jurisprudential version of Holmes were valid, one could coher-
ently deny the empirical version, for one could believe that the law really is just the 
coercive force that the government exerts and yet also believe that some or a!! of the 
people (always excepting oneself, of course) are simply unaware of that fact, 
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Moreover, this explains the tendency in the literature to iden-
tify C&M's rule types with remedial devices that are effective. 
If the remedy is less than perfectly effective because an award of 
damages is not paid or an injunction is not obeyed, then the 
remedy does not in fact by its terms give an accurate prediction 
of the state's use of its coercive powers. A court order, after all, 
is just words, which might well be a very unreliable indicator of 
the state's actual employment of force. A complete Holmesian 
bad man will not necessarily comply with a court order to pay 
damages or to refrain from a particular act. From the Holme-
sian point of view, the nominal remedy cannot be determinative 
of conduct unless it is effective.80 
Nonetheless, the counterfactual reductionism of Holmesian 
jurisprudence is not the inevitable consequence of an economic 
viewpoint. One can employ a theory of rational economic deci-
sionmaking within the framework of constraints imposed by le-
gal duty or moral duty or both. Optimization strategies need 
not be "unconstrained," nor need they be constrained only by 
physical forces or the pain or unhappiness that they cause.81 In-
deed, if one looks at paradigmatic examples of conventional 
economic analysis, one does not find a general assumption of 
recalcitrance. Rather, what one finds is an assumption of com-
pliance with the prescriptions of law, with special analysis of 
choosing out of their ignorance to obey the meaningless directives to which the real 
laws-the predicted positive or negative exercises of state power-happen to be 
attached. But at some point this must be self-defeating, taken as a theory of Jaw, 
because the effect of compliance with those directives by a significant number of 
people is to give life to those very directives, so that they cannot be considered 
meaningless at all. Of course, if we take the Holmesian view not as a theory of law, 
but as a recommendation to view the law in a certain way, it is not incoherent. It is at 
least intelligible to advise someone to ignore features of the law that others rightly 
take to be important. Such advice may well be unethical, but it is not self-contra-
dictory. Cf. Holmes, supra note 71, at 459 (characterizing his bad man as one "who 
cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors"). 
80 See, e.g., C&M supra note 4, at 1106-24 (implicitly assuming effectiveness of 
sanctions in discussing relative merits of property, liability, and inalienability rules). 
81 See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 32-34 (1974) (discussing end-
state maximizing political theories and the significance of side-constraints to the 
articulation of rights); id. at 171 ("The central core of the notion of a property right in 
X ... is the right to determine what shall be done with X; the right to choose which of 
the constrained set of options concerning X shall be realized or attempted. The 
constraints are set by other principles or laws operating in the society .... " (footnote 
omitted)). 
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situations in which one can specify an economicaHy significant 
group of recalcitrants whose behavior will affect the allocation 
of goods and services.82 In other words, the standard economic 
- • - • • • ... ... • • ... • - 1 ..c_ 1 
analysis concerns opt1m1zmg behavwr m chOices among 1aWu11 
alternatives. Once again, this is "just" an assumption, one that 
can be relaxed if and when conditions indicate illegal conduct is 
taking place. But it is nonetheless significant that many, if not 
most, economists outside the law and economics discipline do 
not use the Holmesian behavioral assumption as a working 
proposition.83 The contrary working assumption of law-abiding 
conduct is not arbitrary, for it is made with good reason. 84 
"'A perusal of almost any standard text on microeconomics will illustrate the point. 
See, e.g., Michael Parkin, Microeconomics 125-49 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing rent con-
trol, minimum wage laws, and sales taxes, and assuming for the most part that citizens 
>viii comply with these laws, while nonetheless indicating that illegal "black markets" 
sometimes arise). Another text illustrates the point nicely in the course of describing 
the economist's sensitivity to unintended consequences: 
Bob, 16 years old, currently works after school at a grocery store. He earns 
$5.50 an hour. Suppose the state legislature passes a law specifying that the 
minimum dollar wage a person can be paid to do a job is $6.00 an hour. The 
legisl~tors say their intention in passing the law is to help people like Bob earn 
more mcome. 
Will the $6.00 an hour legislation have the intended effect? Perhaps not. 
The manager of the grocery store may not find it worthwhile to continue 
employing Bob at $6.00 an hour. ... If the law specifies that no one will earn 
less than $6.00 an hour, and the manager of the grocery store decides to fire 
Bob rather than pay this amount, Bob's losing his job is an unintended effect of 
the $6.00 an hour legislation. 
Roger A. Arnold, Microeconomics 15 (3d ed. 1996). Notice how the assumed choice 
is paying the minimum wage or not employing Bob; employing Bob illegally is not 
even addressed, nor is there any discussion of the severity of the sanction for 
violation of the minimum wage rule. The general assumption, in other words, is that 
the parties involved will choose from among alternatives permirted by the law. See 
also id. at 89 (illustrating same assumption). Of course, the possibility of relaxing the 
assumption in appropriate cases is also noted. See, e.g., id. at 86 ("Buyers and sellers 
may regularly get around a price ceiling by making their exchanges 'under the 
table."'). 
83 One area of inquiry that might seem to be exceptional is game theory. Con-
sidered as part of economics or of political science there is no doubting the influence 
game theory has had on work in law and economics. However, it is important to 
recognize that the very goal of game theory has been to model behavior abstracted 
from the constraints of an existing normative order, often in order to explain the 
emergence of such orders. In other words, there is typically no normative structure, 
let alone a legal structure, toward which one can meaningfully say that the actors 
adopt the Holmesian bad man's view. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution 
of Cooperation (1984); Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (1977). 
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Consequently, one must consider the implications of relaxing 
C&M's excessively Holmesian assumptions. It thus becomes ne-
cessary to locate their rule typology within a background that 
distinguishes between guidance and enforcement rules. In that 
context, the prescriptive mode expressed by words like "may" 
and "must" comes to the fore. This holds true for a wide range 
of possible compositions of the population. For example, if 
a. = the proportion of the population that is perfectly law-abid-
ing, 
f3 = the proportion of the population that is perfectly recalci-
trant, i.e., those who are Holmesian bad men, and 
y = the proportion of the population that is neither perfectly 
law-abiding nor perfectly recalcitrant, 
then the prescriptive interpretation is practically important so 
long as (a.+ y) = (1 - p) is not trivially small. In any such case, it 
makes a difference whether a law is expressed as Law #1 or as 
Law #2. The difference matters even for those members of the 
(a. + y) portion who have less than purely altruistic reasons to 
comply with the law; they may act for any mixture of reasons, as 
long as the presence of an authoritative legal directive counts at 
all as a reason for compliance distinct from the direct material 
costs of non-compliance that may be imposed by the state.85 In 
Whether or not the analysis of purely self-regarding behavior under special 
conditions, such as the repeated play of a game, can succeed in reproducing the 
salient features of a normative order, such analysis is quite different from that which 
applies when one shifts to the context of behavior embedded in an extant normative 
order, the kind of context germane to almost all modern legal issues. The usual 
microeconomic analysis reflects this difference. 
84 See generally Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 647 (1994) (arguing that there is a duty, variously reflected in both civil and 
criminal law, to assume a citizen's compliance with serious social norms until evi-
dence clearly indicates otherwise, and grounding this duty in both descriptive and 
normative considerations including the economics of decisionmaking). 
85 Only the a portion of the population treats legal duty as lexically superior to their 
self-interest, narrowly understood; the y portion treats legal obligation in some more 
complex manner as competing with (and possibly commensurate with) such self-
interest. Cf. Harrison, supra note 78, at 1328-38 (discussing lexical priorities and 
other preference structures that do not reduce to self-interest narrowly conceived). 
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other words, the present argument does not depend on naive or 
even unduly optimistic assumptions about human behavior.86 
How then shall we reformulate C&M's rule typology under 
the modest and certainly more realistic assumption that (a + y) 
is not trivially small? The strange and counterintuitive implica-
tions of a descriptive interpretation of these rule types, can-
vassed in the previous Part, strongly suggest that they should be 
understood as types of guidance rules rather than types of en-
forcement rules. Certainly guidance rules must be part of the 
legal structuring of entitlements, or a lacuna will result: The law 
will fail to address important concerns of law-abiding citizens.87 
On the other hand, enforcement rules must also be part of the 
picture if the law is to deal with recalcitrants. 88 So before we 
" Once again, Hobbes is illustrative. He distinguished between the "just" and "unjust 
man": The former "fulfils the law because it is law and not for fear of punishment or 
for the sake of reputation." Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its 
Basis and Its Genesis 23 (Phoenix Books 1963) (1936). More precisely, Hobbes dis-
tinguished between 
the attitude of the unjust man who obeys the laws of the State for fear of 
punishment, i.e. without inner conviction, and the attitude of the just man, who 
for fear of death [likely to result from a state of anarchy], and therefore from 
inner conviction, as it were once more accomplishing in himself the founding of 
the State, obeys the laws of the State. Fear of death and fear of punishment 
remain as different as far-sighted consistent fear, which determines life in its 
depth and its entirety, is from short-sighted momentary fear which sees only 
the next step. 
ld. at 25-26. 
"'Nor is it sufficient to say, in defense of ignoring the distinction between guidance 
and enforcement rules, that one need only concern oneself with the marginal actors 
who are perfectly recalcitrant. That is true, at least approximately, as to some deci-
sions, such as the level of penalty to be attached to violations of guidance rules. But 
it is decidedly not true about the choice, for example, between Law #1 and Law #2. 
That choice will affect not only the marginal actor, but all non-recalcitrants as well, 
for the latter will understand Law #2 as authorizing a pure, private cost-benefit 
maximization concerning the question of the degree of care to be taken; the side-
constraint form of Law #1 partially precludes such an understanding. In other words, 
replacing Law #1 with Law it2 entails shifting the citizen from constrained private 
optimization to unconstrained private optimization. 
""In principle, even enforcement rules are prescriptive in the sense we have been 
discussing. As rules, rather than empirical generalizations, they refer to what officials 
and citizens should do, not to what they will do. On the other hand, at some point 
prescription must converge with description, at least at a statistical level, or the system 
will be both morally defective and practically ineffective. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 
81-91 (discussing the congruence between official behavior and announced rule as an 
important feature of the internal morality of law); Hart, supra note 65, at 100 
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conclude that C&M's rule types are categories of guidance rules, 
we should review what they had to say on the question of en-
forcement. 
B. Calabresi and Melamed on the Enforcement of 
Transaction Rules 
As one would expect, given their Holmesian premises, C&M 
were not silent on the question of enforcement. As already 
mentioned, they characterized property, liability, and inal-
ienability rules as providing different forms of "protection" for 
entitlements. Our analysis has indicated, however, the ambigu-
ity that remains despite this characterization. So we must look 
further to discern C&M's views on enforcement. 
The most striking feature of C&M's article, given prevailing 
views, is that they did not define their rule types with reference 
to specific methods of enforcing these "protection" devices. With 
one exception to be noted below, legal remedies-effective or 
not-were not an explicit part of their definitional statements.89 
Indeed, at later points, they wrote in contrary terms when the 
exposition required them to do so. Thus, they analyzed situa-
tions in which, they concluded, property rules are appropriate, 
adding that such rules should be "supported by injunctions or 
(arguing that if disregard of the primary rules of a legal system is sufficiently 
widespread it becomes "pointless . .. to assess the rights and duties of particular 
persons by reference to the primary rules"). 
" Long after C&M provide their presumably definitional statements, they do com-
ment in ways that relate the rule types to remedies. For example, they indicate 
injunctive relief has something to do with property entitlements, but the exact rela-
tionship is unclear: 
Yet a nuisance with sufficient public utility to avoid injunction has, in effect, 
the right to take property with compensation. In such a circumstance the 
entitlement to property is protected only by what we call a liability rule: an 
external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the transfer of the 
entitlement from the holder to the nuisance [maker]. 
C&M, supra note 4, at 1105-06. The ambiguity remains: There is no indication here 
whether the shift from property to liability rule protection is analytically determined 
by the "sufficient public utility" (indicating a prescriptive conception of the rule 
types) or by the fact that it "avoid[s) injunction" (indicating a descriptive con-
ception). However, to speak of "facilitating the transfer" certainly signifies social 
approval of the nuisance-creating activity, suggesting the dominance of the pre-
scriptive conception. 
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criminal sanctions."90 This locution presupposes that the specifi-
cation of a property rule is logically distinct from the specifica-
tion of the particular means of its enforcement, at least insofar 
as the enforcement is to take the form of injunction or criminal 
• 91 
sanctiOn. 
Moreover, this passage appears at the end of a section de-
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plication of the previously developed ideas to the topic of crimi-
nal law, C&M's argument proceeds by demonstrating the impor-
tance of using the criminal sanction to enforce property rules 
against what I have called recalcitrants. Specifically, they argue 
that the criminal sanction is employed to prevent recalcitrants 
from effectively treating property rules as if they were mere li-
ability rules.93 But if protecting an entitlement with a property 
rule entails effective enforcement of the limitation to consensual 
transfers, then by definition recalcitrants could not take or dam-
age the eniitlement without such consent, and further sanctions 
would be unnecessary. In other words, C&M's argument here 
presupposes the prescriptive understanding of their rule types. 
They assume the entitlement has been defined for citizens for 
oo Id. at 1127. 
"One could instead try to read the indicated passage as an inartful way of spelling 
out what is entailed by the attribution of a property rule. But this will not work, since 
cases will arise in which neither injunctive relief nor criminal punishment is 
appropriate, yet the entitlement must surely fall within the property rule category. 
for example, intentional nuisances that are not conditionally privileged upon 
payment of damages are governed by a property rule, as we have seen. Yet such 
nuisances might cause injury even though in a particular case the activity has ceased 
before legal action is taken. If there is no risk of continuing injury, an injunction will 
generally be denied. See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 5.7(2), at 763-
64 (2d ed. 1993). At the same time, any criminal prohibition of public nuisances 
might fail to apply because of the private nature of the conflict or because there is 
insufficient evidence of intent to satisfy criminal law standards. In such a case, the 
only remedy that is called for under conventional law is one of damages for injury 
already suffered. See generally id. § 5.6(2), at 755-60 (discussing elements of damage 
awards). Punitive damages might or might not be available, depending on proof of 
malice or other requirements, see id. § 5.12(3), at 833-34, but either way the 
transaction remains governed by a property rule. 
n See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27. 
"ld. at 1126. The significance of this argument is examined more fully in Section 
V.B, infra. 
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whom something other than the criminal sanction (or the possi-
bility of injunctive relief) is relevant. 
The most plausible candidate for this other something is the 
authoritative guidance that the rule provides: Even the perfectly 
law-abiding citizen may well want to know, for example, whether 
or not a given entitlement is subject to compensated, involuntary 
taking. Thus, both the language and the structure of C&M's ar-
gument suggest that, despite their explicit Holmesian assump-
tions about the citizenry, such a specification of rules for the 
law-abiding citizen is meaningful and important. 
But what about other corrective justice measures, such as re-
quiring compensation for a victim? How do these fit into C&M's 
scheme? Unless such measures are to be regarded as imple-
mented by liability rules, this kind of enforcement seems to be 
completely absent from their discussion. But not quite. Return 
once again to the definition of a rule of inalienability: 
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is 
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The 
state intervenes not only to determine who is initially entitled 
and to determine the compensation that must be paid if the enti-
tlement is taken or destroyed, but also to forbid its sale under 
some or all circumstances.94 
The emphasized portion suffers from an ambiguity that follows 
from the conflation of guidance rules and enforcement rules. It 
could mean that part of the very definition of an inalienability 
rule is an aspect of liability rule protection. Or it could mean 
that, quite apart from the specification of an inalienability rule, 
there must as a practical matter be enforcement by way of a rule 
of compensation for involuntary takings. Which is the better 
way to construe this passage? 
Interestingly, C&M's definition of property rules does not in-
clude similar language about compensating the holder. 95 Since 
entitlements defined by prescriptive property rules would also 
require enforcement to deal with recalcitrants, the passage con-
cerning inalienability rules would thus seem to be of a different 
nature, suggesting that it indicates a joinder of a prescriptively 
94 Id. at 1092-93 (emphasis added). 
95 See id. at 1092. 
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understood liability rule feature with the inalienability feature. 
This is paradoxical because, however one interprets C&M's li-
ability rules, such rules either condone or at least permit the 
taking of the entitlement, provided compensation is paid. Yet 
an inalienability rule would seem to work as a desirable entitle-
ment form only if it prohibits involuntary transfers as well as 
voluntary ones. Indeed, later in their discussion C&M make it 
c~ear that an inalienability rule would be the rule of choice for 
particularly important entitlements that we do not want people 
to be without. 96 If this is so, then it is likely we would want to 
prohibit involuntary transfers as well as voluntary ones. Can the 
italicized language be understood as trying to accomplish this? 
It can if we take this reference to compensation as implying a 
sanction that is imposed for violating the inalienability rule. The 
"- ~<- ~-1·1" l~ngu~~~ nn~gen+n +"hn+ +"h= ,-.~mr.<=>ncat~on -pqUJ.TPnlPflt UVL VlH.} ld.L d}:;C '=>U}:; '=>l'=> U!Cll tu·~ ._,'J_H):-''-'-''-' "' !, ! ~ • ~ ... ~ " 
is also true elsewhere, and as just indicated, property rules would 
as a practical matter also need to be protected by compensatory 
damages.97 But that fact need not be definitional for either type 
of rule. Indeed, it should not be definitional because in some 
cases compensatory damages are inappropriate for the protec-
tion of an entitlement that is undeniably governed by a property 
or inalienability rule.98 
'Jo See id. at 1100 (discussing "merit goods," such as minimum !eve!s of education, 
clothing, and bodily integrity, that are considered essential); id. at 1111-15 (discussing 
freedom from enslavement and other entitlements that society might want to prevent 
the holder from selling). 
"For example, when an ongoing activity is found to be a nuisance and the 
"balancing of equities" does not render the nuisance specially privileged to continue 
upon payment of compensation, an injunction is appropriate under conventional 
doctrine. But such prospective relief by itself is inadequate when injury has already 
been incurred, in which case an award of damages will often be appropriate. See Mel 
Foster Co. Properties, Inc. v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Iowa 1988) 
(discussing the measure of damages when nuisance-causing activity has been abated); 
Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 683 (N.C. 1953) (awarding both injunction 
and damages); see generally Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck & Dale A. 
Whitman, The Law of Property§ 7.2, at 421 (2d ed. 1993). 
" Professor Levmore rightly observes that compensatory damages are sometimes 
but not always appropriately used to protect what is ordinarily considered property. 
However, following the usual identification of C&M's rule types with remedies, he 
infers that compensatory damages for past injury are implicit in C&M's definition of 
property rules. This in turn requires Levmore to designate a new rule type for 
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Consequently, the italicized portion of the passage quoted 
above would not appear to refer to an implicit liability rule fea-
ture of inalienability rules so much as it refers to the practical 
remedial consequences of an immunity from such involuntary 
taking. Yet, notwithstanding C&M's discussion, there might 
also be some contexts in which such an iffimunity would be un-
desirable.99 So the better interpretation is that the indicated pas-
sage refers: (a) primarily to an enforcement rule-not necessar-
ily part of the conception of inalienability itself-that specifies a 
right to compensation held by the person whose inalienable 
right (or property right) has been taken contrary to the rule's 
immunity; and (b) secondarily to a prescriptive liability feature 
in those special contexts where inalienability does not involve 
such an immunity. The former we may call a remedial compen-
sation rule in order to distinguish it from liability rules and from 
the liability to involuntary taking that may be a feature of some 
inalienability rules.100 
This distinction, and C&M's failure to draw it clearly and con-
sistently, explains their peculiar treatment of the law of compen-
sation for accident costs. The greater part of that law involves 
property-like interests not protected by a remedy of damages. See Levmore, supra 
note 37, at 2153-61. 
"Certainly it would not be logically incoherent to have a rule that prohibits volun-
tary transfers but permits involuntary, compensated transfers (takings). One can 
imagine an entitlement that should not be marketable but which should be subject to 
compensated takings, on the distributive ground that the surplus of cooperation in 
the transfer should always go to the "purchaser," or on the paternalistic ground that 
the holder would sell the entitlement at what the government considers too low a 
price if given the chance. See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1349 n.20 and 
accompanying text (noting the paternalistic possibility). There certainly are excep-
tional situations, not addressed by C&M, in which an ordinarily inalienable right may 
be taken against the will of its holder with the full support of the law. For example, 
the courts have bad no difficulty allowing involuntary servitude for the state, notwith-
standing the explicit language of the Thiiteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Butler v. 
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (validating public conscription for road construction). 
Thus, it would be better to have a notion of inalienability rules that leaves open the 
question of the permissibility of compensated involuntary transfers. Professor Morris 
refers to situations where neither voluntary nor involuntary transfers are allowed as 
"full inalienability" rules. See Morris, supra note 15, at 881-83. 
100 Again, even remedial compensation rules are, in the first instance, prescriptive in 
the sense we have been discussing. They refer to what the obligor should pay, not to 
what be will pay. See supra note 88. But they are nonetheless very different, even as 
prescriptive rules, in their focus upon correcting a situation that should not have 
occurred in the first place. 
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both a substantive norm-a property rule, as we have seen-
and a remedial norm requiring payment of damages. That is, it 
involves both guidance and enforcement rules. C&M's charac-
terization of this arrangement as instantiating a liability rule 
flows from their Holmesian premises, premises that obscure the 
distinction between the contents of the substantive norm and 
the costs imposed pursuant to the associated remedial norm. 
Yet this distinction cannot be avoided if we are to render the 
whole of their argument intelligible.101 
This analysis supports the inferences developed in previous 
sections. Despite the confusion in their article, it is better to 
understand C&M's rule types as categories of prescriptive judg-
ments imposed by the law. Under this reconstruction of their 
work, property, liability, and inalienability are categories of guid-
ance rules-directives about what oeonle are suooosed to do-
rather than descriptions of what th~ la~ in fact f~~ces people to 
do. Remedial responses to the non-compliant are quite distinct. 
A similar thesis was presented in 1986 by Professors Coleman 
and Kraus, who distinguished between rules specifying the nor-
mative content of entitlements-such as property, liability, and 
inalienability rules-and enforcement rules prescribing reme-
dies for the violation of the former. 102 Strikingly, theorists mak-
101 In an interesting passage, Carol Rose comments: 
When some unidentified person accidentally smashes your car and pays you 
damages in compensation, you do not think that this person has an "option" 
while you have a PRSTO [a property right subject to an option]. You think 
that you and she are caught in a muddle, where rights have suddenly and 
accidentally gotten all confused. A liability rule is the best that you can do 
after your car is wrecked. Your property in the car has turned into a PRSTO, 
not because anybody thinks it is a good idea to define it that way, but because 
nobody can do anything better for you now that it is ruined. 
Rose, supra note 22, at 2181. Professor Rose's sense that this is not the kind of case 
to characterize in terms of C&M's liability rules is correct. But she is confusing the 
prescriptive sense of C&M's "liability rule"-which can be construed as entailing an 
option, see supra note 56-with what I have called a remedial compensation rule. 
Once one sees this, one need not accept the proposition that the property in the car 
was "turned into a PRSTO" by the accident; the paradoxical element simply disappears. 
102 They expressed the matter this way: 
The point we are anxious to emphasize is that property, liability and inalien-
ability rules are best thought of as constituting a subset of the set of norms 
governing the transfer of lawful holdings. They are transaction-norms . ... 
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ing use of C&M's framework have either ignored or miscon-
strued the point. In Part IV, I will substantiate this claim and 
address the question of why Coleman and Kraus were less suc-
cessful than they might have been in redirecting the discourse. 
Meanwhile, it will be useful to examine one way in which the 
confusion between guidance and enforcement is routinely mani-
fested. This examination will illustrate that the issue of liability 
for negligence is only one of many problems inherent in C&M's 
theory. 
III. SANCTIONS AND PRICES 
A. The Distinction between a Sanction and a Price and the 
Standard Holmesian Mistake 
The distinction between guidance rules and enforcement rules 
has many implications. One that is central to the theme of this 
Article concerns the difference between a "sanction" and a 
"price." According to a common and reasonable understanding 
of the terms, a sanction is "a detriment imposed for doing what 
is forbidden, such as failing to perform an obligation,"103 whereas 
a price is the "payment of money which is required in order to 
do what is permitted." 104 The upshot of our previous discussion 
is that the tort law of negligence imposes sanctions rather than 
prices on faulty conduct that causes harm, whereas the law of 
... [l]t is unhelpful to think of them as tools or instruments for protecting 
entitlements. Thus, we insist upon a distinction between the rules by which 
claims are generated and the rules that create the institutions for enforcing 
those claims: a distinction all too often blurred in previous work on the 
property-liability rule distinction. 
Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1344, 1346-47. Professor Morris makes the same 
point tangentially in regard to her very valuable elaboration of the C&M typology, 
but she does not draw the kind of implications addressed here. See Morris, supra 
note 15, at 845 n.59. 
103 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1524 (1984). 
104 I d. at 1525. For a sophisticated and historically informed analysis of this distinc-
tion, see Finnis, supra note 64, at 325-37. While Cooter's definition of a price is 
relatively narrow in restricting the concept to situations in which the required pay-
ment is to be made in "money," as opposed to other things of value, his definition is 
broad in embracing both action that is permitted without the other's consent, as 
under liability rules, and action that is permitted only with such consent, as under 
property rules. By the same token, his definition of sanction is relatively broad in 
that it does not presuppose a punitive purpose in imposing the sanction. 
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eminent domain imposes prices rather than sanctions on legiti-
mate governmental takings, and the law of nuisance sometimes 
imposes sanctions and sometimes imposes prices depending on 
the social value of the nuisance-creating activity. 
To reinforce this conclusion and amplify its significance, let us 
change the context. Consider now the difference between the 
following two environmental laws: 
Law #3: Discharge of chemical XYZ into the air, water, or 
ground is hereby prohibited. If you make such a discharge, you 
shall be liable to the State Environmental Agency for $5,000 
per ounce of XYZ discharged. 
Law #4: You may discharge chemical XYZ into the air, water, 
or ground provided you pay to the State Environmental 
Agency $5,000 per ounce of XYZ discharged. 
unce again, the law-abiding citizen receives a very different 
message from these two laws. She will see the first law as di-
recting her not to pollute in the specified manner and creating a 
sanction for violation of that directive; she will see the second as 
creating a pricing system for such pollution, so that it is appro-
priate-as far as the law is concerned-for her to pollute to the 
extent that payment is compatible with her other goals.105 
Not surprisingly, followers of the Holmesian approach are in-
clined to say that there is no real difference between these two 
105 See Thon1as C. Schelling, Prices as Regulatory Instruments, in Incentives for 
Environmental Protection 1, 6-7 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983) (elaborating on the 
distinction between a "fee" or "charge," on the one hand, and a "fine" or "penalty," 
on the other). A price charged by the government can also be called a tax, especially 
when the obligor does not receive a quid pro quo distinct from the benefits enjoyed 
by citizens generally. Thus: 
The distinction [between a fine and a tax J is that if engaging in a course of 
conduct will result in a fine, then the conduct violates the law; but if a tax is 
levied the conduct does not violate the law (though, as we shall see, we might 
have to say that where a tax is levied the conduct usually does not violate the 
law). Fines are connected with legal wrongdoing; taxes are (usually) not. 
Hence, fines are sanctions whereas taxes are not, even though the point of a tax 
may be to discourage conduct (such as smoking cigarettes). 
Theodore M. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle: Problems of Legal Philosophy 
148-49 (1978). Benditt's parenthetical qualifications concerning a tax arise from the 
fact that taxes can be imposed on acts that are otherwise illegal. See id. at 149. Even 
in such cases. the imposition of the tax is not the feature that makes the conduct 
illegal. · 
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Iaws.106 This in tum can lead to the conclusion that a citizen 
should view Law #3 as equivalent to Law #4. As expressed by 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel: 
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regu-
latory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine 
the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names 
for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms .to 
sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanc-
tions is based on the supposition that managers not only mar 
but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so. 10 
Of course, this view is incoherent when applied to Law #4; dis-
charging chemical XYZ does not violate the rule or incur a 
sanction. There simply is no "disobedience," as long as the 
price is paid. 108 So ifthe authors' assertion makes any sense with 
regard to the decision whether to discharge chemical XYZ, it 
106 See Holmes, supra note 71, at 461 ("[F]rom [the bad man's] point of view, what is 
the difference between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain 
thing? ... If it matters at all, still speaking from the bad man's point of view, it must 
be because in one case and not in the other some further disadvantages, or at least 
some further consequences, are attached to the act by the law."). Thus, even the 
Holmesian bad man might see a difference if it is probable that Law #3, but not Law 
#4, will be construed as a criminal prohibition and thereby subject to special proce-
dural restrictions on enforcement not applicable to Law #4. Ironically, the bad man 
might then see Law #3 as imposing less of a constraint upon discharge, since the 
probability of its enforcement would be reduced by the additional procedural protec-
tions enjoyed by a criminal defendant. In any event, for our purposes we may assume 
away this difference by stipulating that both laws are noncriminal provisions. 
Alternatively, the legal realist might argue that any difference between the two 
laws arises from the fact that a judge would enjoin XYZ pollution under Law #3 but 
not under Law #4. But that depends upon the judge's receiving different messages 
from the two laws; we cannot explain the judge's willingness to grant an injunction by 
the fact that she is willing to do so. Moreover, injunctive relief is not always prac-
tically feasible even when it would be theoretically appropriate, as when the polluting 
discharge cannot be anticipated by others. Yet the law-abiding will want guidance 
even in such instances. 
107 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender 
Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982). The authors cite C&M in the course 
of their argument. See id. at 1156 n.5. 
108 If one takes the Holmesian approach to its logical conclusion, the managers 
should not pay the price prescribed in Law #4 unless they believe that the costs of 
paying such a price are less than the costs of not doing so, which will depend on 
things like the probability of detection of the discharge. For one can make the same 
argument about those rules, distinct from Law #4, that specify the remedial conse-
quences if someone fails to pay as provided in the given price regime. 
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must be in the context of a rule like Law #3.109 Given such a law, 
discharge of the chemical would be "disobedience," would "vio-
late the rules," and would incur a sanction, at least if detected. 
Clearly, it is in the context of laws like Law #3 that Easterbrook 
and Fischel are making their assertion, which treats Law #3 as 
though it were Law #4. · 
Observe catefully the implications of their claim. They assert 
that managers have no ethical duty not to discharge the chemi-
cal. This claim goes beyond the mere assumption of pervasive 
recalcitrance. The Holmesian bad man is actually praised as 
performing his ethical obligation by engaging in his narrowly 
self-interested calculations, not only in the context of Law #4 
where cost-benefit trade-offs are contemplated if not encour-
aged, but also in the context of Law #3, where the law ostensibly 
denies the citizen such trade-offs. Something is seriously amiss. 
The nature of the problem can be discerned from a careful 
reading of one of the articles upon which Easterbrook and Fischel 
rely. In 1979 David Engel argued that, even assuming legislative 
legitimacy, management has no moral obligation to obey civil or 
even criminal prohibitions if it is profitable to disobey them, 
given the p:robability of detection and prosecution and the eco-
nomic detriments potentially imposed by society.no Professor 
Engel's arguments reveal a view of management as incapable of 
109 One might quibble over whether environmental protection laws are within the 
category of "economic regulatory laws" described by Easterbrook and Fischel. How-
ever, elsewhere these authors express the matter in a more general way: 
Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when 
violations are profitable to the firm, because the sanctions set by the legislature 
and courts are a measure of how much firms should spend to achieve compliance. 
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 n.36. Even if one were to limit 
attention to prohibitions designed solely to improve economic efficiency, it would not 
follow that a business undermines efficiency by obeying the prohibition when it is 
more profitable to disobey it. An effective prohibition can have long-run or indirect 
economic benefits that are not reflected in the particular business' revenues. 
110 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 
1, 37-58 (1979) (cited with approval in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 
n.36). To be sure, Engel acknowledged that a stronger case could be made for a cor-
porate duty to disclose harmful corporate activities, beyond that level of disclosure 
which would be profit-maximizing. See id. at 70-85. And he noted that such vol-
untary disclosure would likely lead to "substantive" corporate voluntarism: "Altru-
istic abstention from prohibited substantive conduct is likely to be cheaper than, for 
example, committing a crime and then disclosing it." !d. at 43. 
1997] Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules 879 
understanding a law's content or purpose apart from the mate-
rial detriments that it imposes. Implicitly, he posits a radical 
separation of the manager's social epistemology from that of the 
political community, so that management views government not 
as a part of the same social system but rather as a set of morally 
inscrutable exogenous forces, like hurricanes or droughts, that 
impinge on the business.111 These forces lack normative signifi-
cance in themselves, so their significance is measurable only by 
reference to material consequences such as costs.112 
This suggests an explanation for Easterbrook and Fischel's 
unelaborated qualification, "We put to one side laws concerning 
violence or other acts thought to be malum in se."113 The obvi-
ous purpose of this qualification is to avoid a reductio ad absur-
dum from the application of their reasoning to decisions about 
whether to engage in violence, fraud, or other such acts as means 
to the end of profit maximization. One might try to argue that 
acts malum in se will be understood by managers as acts that 
ought not to be done, whether profitable or not. But even if we 
can give a noncircular meaning to the notion of malum in se, the 
reductio cannot be avoided. For the clarity and predictability of 
prohibitions are not uniformly greater for prohibitions of acts 
m As Robert Gordon has recently observed: 
Probably the most common reading of [The Path of the Law] is that it sets 
forth a purely positivist theory of law-a deflated, de-moralized, "disenchan-
ted" view (to use Max Weber's term) of the legal system. To those who like 
this view, the "bad man" is just the rational man-Homo law-and-economi-
cus-who treats all legal rules as prices on conduct. To less approving eyes, 
Holmes recommends that the lawyer regard the legal system in a wholly 
alienated and instrumental fashion-not as a set of norms established for com-
mon membership in a political community, nor an attempt to realize (however 
imperfectly) ideals of justice or social integration, but simply as random and 
arbitrary outputs of state force, which are opportunities for or obstacles to 
realizing his client's self-interested projects. 
Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (1997). 
112 A similar argument might be offered to explain the identification of property, 
liability, and inalienability rules with specific remedies. The remedies might be 
understood as the only available measure of the importance of the entitlements they 
protect, which implies an agnosticism about the meaning of the substantive prescrip-
tions, even in light of the purposes they serve. As discussed in the following text, 
such an attitude is unjustifiable in most cases. 
113 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 n.36. 
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malum in se. Indeed, often the opposite is true. 114 Even if it 
were true that prohibitions of acts malum in se are generally 
more understandable and predictable than other prohibitions, 
managers' moral obligations as to any particular law cannot be 
determined by such a statistical fact. In any event, as a general 
matter neither the rationale nor the reach of prohibitory laws, 
even those not addressing acts nwlwn in se, are so incomprehen-
sible as to drive managers and their lawyers to such agnosticism, 
self-serving protestations notwithstanding.115 Many such laws 
may be ill-advised, but that is another matter entirely. 116 
Of course, a clear understanding of the difference between a 
sanction and a price does not obviate policymakers' difficulty in 
choosing which to employ in response to a particular problem. 
H may be highly controversial whether a particular activity should 
be sanctioned in some way, priced in some way, or handled in 
yet some other fashion. Considerations of justice or efficiency 
may indicate that pricing is appropriate in contexts that might 
naiVely be thought to call for sanctions. 117 And if considerations 
11
" Some may believe, for example, that negligent driving is malum in se while 
polluting with a particular chemical thnl poses dubious, long-term risks is malum 
prohibitum. Yet the laws governing the former may be much more vague and less 
predictable than laws governing the latter. Compare, for example, Law #1 with Law #3. 
115 Although skeptical complaints about our ability to discern the law from nomi-
nally authoritative sources have generally come from the critical legal theorists of the 
political left, the replies to their arguments apply as well to the extreme skepticism 
evidenced in Professor Engei's arguments and reiterated by Easterbrook and FischeL 
See generally Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989) (arguing 
that the frequency of cases in which a determinate answer is not readily available is 
not large enough to undermine the claim of adjudicative legitimacy); Lawrence B. 
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
462 (1987) (arguing that the moderate indeterminacy in judicial decisionmalcing does 
not delegitimize the liberal state). My argument leaves open the possibility that 
particular subclasses of regulatory Jaws are so vague and of such dubious purpose as 
to warrant the agnostic response. But there is nothing to indicate that Professors 
Engel, Easterbrook, and Fischel had any such modest claim in mind. 
116 One reason such laws might be considered ill-advised is that they do not facilitate 
the maximization of wealth, a substantive consideration related to the economic 
question of whether particular entitlements are more efficient if constructed as prop-
erty rules or as liability rules. See supra notes 25-26. 
117 For example, to the extent that liability for the crimes of a corporation's agents is 
vicarious and therefore strict, an argument can be made that pricing is the better way 
to govern corporate efforts to monitor and control the agents' conduct unless man-
agement is complicit in the criminal conduct. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" 
1997] Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules 881 
of justice are unhelpful or inconclusive in resolving a particular 
question, one may well turn to considerations of efficiency as 
the primary determinants.118 But any such analysis must still 
recognize the difference between a sanction and a price if it is to 
gauge accurately the effects of the choice upon the behavior of a 
population that does not consist entirely of Holmesian bad men. 
If one wants to encourage nonconsensual takings in a particular 
context, then one will do so less effectively with a sanction than 
with a price, ceteris paribus. Conversely, if one wants to dis-
courage nonconsensual takings, then one will do so less effec-
tively with a price than with a sanction, again ceteris paribus.119 
B. Rediscovering the Distinction: Cooter}s Theory of 
Sanctions and Prices 
These points are strengthened and refined by an examination 
of one of the most explicit and systematic treatments of the 
subject of prices and sanctions in the law and economics litera-
ture, an article published by Robert Cooter in 1984. 120 Using the 
definitions of sanction and price quoted above,121 Cooter argues 
persuasively that even the narrowly self-interested citizen will 
experience a difference between the two. 122 The difference 
arises from the fact that the paradigmatic sanction will involve a 
substantial discontinuity in the private cost function of the af-
fected citizen, whereas the paradigmatic price will involve a con-
Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in 
American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193,228-30 (1991). 
118 This is one way to understand the enormous literature on nuisance law spawned 
by Ronald Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 
(1960). 
119 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strat-
egies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 29-36 (arguing, inter alia, that by 
adopting a stance of moral neutrality, pricing may undercut informal moral norms 
against polluting). For a recent study emphasizing the important role of a sense of 
moral duty in white collar crime, see Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction 
Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate 
Crime, 30 L. & Soc'y Rev. 549 (1996). 
12° Cooter, supra note 103. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 103-104. 
122 Actually, the way he describes this point of view is as "rationally self-interested." 
Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527. I would not so readily concede the term "rational" 
to the Holmesian legal realists. It is clear, however, that Professor Cooter means to 
refer to someone who acts to minimize private costs in a narrow economic sense. 
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tinuous tradeoff between the payment of the price and the cost 
of conduct necessary to avoid payment. 123 
For example, a rule prescribing liability for negligently in-
flicted injuries will create a discontinuity at the point where the 
level of precaution drops below the legal standard; at lower lev-
els, a substantial liability will be added to the costs of precau-
tion, whereas at higher levels of precaution, the private cost will 
be only the significantly lower cost of precaution. In contrast, a 
rule that simply prescribes that one should pay for the costs of 
accidents that one causes, or some subset of such accidents not 
defined with reference to a standard of conduct, produces a 
relatively continuous private cost curve that is the sum of the 
costs of precaution and the costs of the damages done.124 
Cooter's point is that the first kind of rule will produce a differ-
ent set of incentives for conduct than the second. Under the 
first kind of rule, the self-interested actor will be driven to com-
ply just barely with the standard of care necessary to avoid the 
extra costs associated with liability, however those costs are re-
lated to the costs that the actor imposes on others. On the other 
hand, under the second kind of rule, the actor will engage in a 
tradeoff at the margin in order to choose a level of precaution 
that minimizes the sum of precaution costs and external costs. 125 
Professor Cooter goes on to argue that there are reasons to 
believe that, in a context like automobile accidents, a sanction 
rule based on collliuunity standards of due care will operate 
more efficiently than a pricing rule,126 whereas in a context like 
pollution control a pridng system will operate more efficiently 
123 See id. at 1525-31. 
'" Id. at 1526-27. 
' 25 I d. at 1529-30. Cooter's argument depends on the existence of a continuous 
behavioral variable that is within the control of the actor, the chosen quantity of 
which both affects the likelihood of the occurrence of an externality and determines 
the imposition of any applicable legal sanction. These conditions may be met in some 
contexts, such as the choice of a level of precaution in driving an automobile, but 
they may not model well the actor's choices in other contexts, especially dichotomous 
choices about whether or not to act. Late in his article, Cooter does try to adjust his 
model to account for dichotomous choice. See id. at 1548-50 (discussing criminal law). 
"'See id. at 1533-34 (arguing that auto accidents will generate an efficient com-
munity standard of care because of the symmetry of risks inflicted and endured by 
drivers). 
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than sai:J.ctions.127 More generally, Cooter prescribes when to se-
lect a sanction rule and when to select a price rule based on con-
textual features such as the ability of private and public actors to 
discern the relevant cost conditions. He summarizes his conclu-
sions this way: 
If obtaining accurate information about external costs is cheaper 
for officials than obtaining accurate information about socially 
optimal behavior, then [lawmakers] should control the activity 
by pricing it; if the converse is true, then they should control 
the activity by sanctioning it. 128 
Cooter's argument is certainly insightful. On the empirical 
side, he confirms our rejection of C&M's claim by observing 
that negligence law in fact operates as sanctions and not as 
prices. 129 In other words, negligence law exemplifies property 
and compensation rules rather than liability rules. 130 
127 See id. at 1150-51 (arguing that pollution may require pricing because officials 
lack the information about external private costs necessary to impose a publicly 
determined and sanction-backed standard of care). Cooter does not address the pos-
sibility that the community standard that emerges from accidents, for example, might 
reflect some notion of reciprocity that diverges from that required for efficiency. His 
basic point would remain intact, however, provided that the increased costs of public 
determination of the efficient standard of precaution are greater than the costs 
resulting from a divergence of the community standard from the efficient level of 
precaution. 
,,. Id. at 1533 (emphasis omitted). 
129 See id. at 1538-40 (contrasting negligence as sanction with strict liability as price). 
130 Professor Coffee errs, therefore, in the first half of his assertion: "Character-
istically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits." Coffee, supra note 117, at 194. 
Only if one takes strict, no-fault liability as the "characteristic" form of tort liability 
may one reach such a conclusion. Contrary to Coffee's claims, see id. at 197, 226-28, 
Cooter's argument does not provide support for such a theory of the distinction 
between tort and crime. To be sure, Coffee is much less explicit than Cooter about 
what is meant by "pricing." At certain points, for example, Coffee seems to equate 
pricing with the effort "to force the defendant to internalize the costs [he] imposes on 
others." ld. at 228; see also id. at 238 n.157. This conception may more readily allow 
one to subsume negligence Jaw under pricing rules, but it is not the more ordinary 
notion of price that I, together with Cooter, have followed. Under this more ordinary 
notion, while pricing tends to internalize the costs of action under both property and 
liability rules, the converse is not true; not all means of internalizing costs are prices. 
I should note, however, that the deficiencies in Coffee's theory of the tort/crime 
distinction that are thus revealed do not seriously undermine his central practical 
conclusions about the overextension of the criminal law. This is because the primary 
target of his argument is vicarious criminal liability, which is typically strict, no-fault 
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On the other hand, Cooter's argument does not completely 
respond to the problem articulated here. Returning to the neg-
ligence issue, the first rule described by Cooter closely matches 
the negligence standard of liability prescribed by our 
Law #1: Do not act negligently. If you do drive negligently, you 
must pay for consequent injuries. 131 
But the second rule Cooter discusses is a rule of compensation 
that does not depend for its incidence upon the presence of 
negligence, quite unlike our 
Law #2: You are permitted to act negligently, provided you pay 
for any consequent injuries.132 
Indeed, the economic cost conditions, whatever they are for a 
given context, will generate precisely the same incentives under 
Law #1 as under Law #2. Cooter's argument, therefore, does 
not allow us to distinguish between these two laws. Under his 
discontinuity theory, both Law #1 and Law #2 are sanctions, 
since they equally involve a "jump" in the costs imposed on the 
actor as her precaution level drops below the standard for negli-
gence. Yet, under Cooter's definitions of sanction and price,133 
Law #2 is not a sanction, at least not if one takes at all seriously 
the language in which the law is expressed. 134 
Conversely, neither Law #3 nor Law #4 is a sanction under 
the discontinuity theory, since they both entail a private cost 
curve that is essentially continuous. 135 Nonetheless, Law #3 
clearly qualifies as a sanction under Cooter's definition. 136 Again, 
liability, in the context of which pncmg under liability rules will sometimes be 
appropriate. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
131 See supra Section II.A. 
m See supra Section II.A. 
m See supra text accompanying notes 103-104. 
1
" Of course, one might argue that, language notwithstanding, Law #2 was "intended" 
to create a detriment for doing what is forbidden, but for our purposes we can assume 
that the legislative history is quite explicit in expressing legislative approval of 
conduct that by community standards is negligent. See supra note 63. 
m See supra Section IIJ.A. These laws are discontinuous only to the extent that the 
money paid for discharge cannot be prorated for partial ounces of discharge. 
136 Again, one might argue based on legislative or enforcement history that Law #3 
is a de facto pricing scheme, its language notwithstanding. But we may assume for 
purposes of discussion that the legislative intent, if meaningfully expressed at all 
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Cooter provides no explanation for this result, except to acknow-
ledge that the discontinuity feature is characteristic, not defini-
tional, of sanctions, commenting in a footnote that, "Someone 
who acts from duty and obeys the law out of respect will also 
satisfy the legal standard, but not in order to minimize private 
costs. "137 
To be sure, Cooter's results indicate important considerations 
that affect the choice of a sanction system or a price system from 
the point of view of inducing appropriate conduct by the 
Holmesian bad man. From that point of view, Law #2 is defec-
tive as an attempt to price behavior, and Law #3 is defective as 
an attempt to sanction it. These facts may help to explain why 
rules like Law #2 and Law #3 are not frequently encountered. 
Of course, Law #2 is not encountered for the even more obvious 
reason that it would be very unusual, though not inconceivable, 
for the law to condone action by citizens that is unreasonably 
dangerous when measured by community standards.138 In con-
trast, Law #3 does not suffer from such internal moral tension, 
and its defectiveness qua sanction can be cured by aggravating the 
penalty according to willfulness or recurrence of the discharge.139 
Consider, however, how Professor Cooter characterizes his 
contribution: 
Scholars of jurisprudence traditionally view law as a set of ob-
ligations backed by sanctions, or commands backed by threats. 
In contrast, economists tend to view law as a set of official 
prices. Associated with each of these viewpoints is a charac-
teristic blindness. The jurisprudential perspective blinds law-
yers to the fact that officials cannot regulate the economy effi-
ciently by giving orders. Instead, they must rely upon legal 
instruments similar to prices. Conversely, the economic per-
spective is blind to the distinctively normative aspect of law, 
viewing a sanction for doing what is forbidden merely as the 
price of doing what is permitted. In brief, the economic analy-
sis of law lacks a clear account of sanctions, and the jurispru-
dential tradition lacks a good account of prices. This Article at-
beyond the language of the law, was clearly expressed to the opposite effect and has 
not been undermined by subsequent events. 
137 Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527 n.9. 
138 See supra note 63. 
139 See Cooter, supra note 103, at 1551. 
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tempts to bridge the two traditions by developing a theory 
about the difference between the effect of prices and sanctions 
b h . 140 -upon e avwr. 
Cooter is about half right: The standard economic analysis has 
lacked an adequate account of sanctions, and Cooter has con-
tributed to that account from within the tradition of economic 
analysis. On the other hand, his account does not fully bridge 
the gap because it leaves unexplained the differences between 
Law #1 and Law #2 and between Law #3 and Law #4. That is, in 
his account-notwithstanding the qualification mentioned ear-
lier141-the citizen is still assumed to view all of these laws as 
only imposing costs on behavior, instead of providing authorita-
tive directives for the guidance of conduct. Cooter's identifica-
tion of sanctions as typically involving discontinuities in private 
cost functions does not change that. Indeed, in the end he does 
not provide the "distinctively normative aspect" that he prom-
ises.142 A significant part of the economist's blindness endures. 143 
The other prong of Cooter's criticism is less accurate. He is 
certainly right that a tendency to consider laws only in terms of 
flat prohibitions of conduct might blind one to the need to price 
certain conduct instead of sanctioning it. However, this blind-
ness does not arise from anything in the "jurisprudential per-
spective." If what is prohibited is not the performance of an act 
that needs to be priced but the refusal to pay a price that has 
been or should be established for an act, then even an impover-
ished jurisprudence of pure criminal law can allow for pricing 
1
'
10 I d. at 1523 (footnotes omitted). 
1
'
1 See supra text accompanying note 137. 
1
" See supra text accompanying note 140. 
1
" This is further illustrated by Cooter's interesting clarification: 
This Article distinguishes two kinds of rules and identifies one of them with 
prices and the other with sanctions. Of course, it is possible to expand the 
definition of a price to cover sanctions by defining a sanction as a discontinuous 
price, or to expand the definition of a sanction to cover prices by defining a 
price as a continuous sanction. However, the important point is not to argue 
about names but to understand the differences in the behavior caused by (the 
first kind of rule] and (the second kind of rule]. 
Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527 n.10. Cooter does not explore how to reconcile such 
definitional restructuring with his o'vvn earlier articulated distinction between sanction 
and price. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
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structures, both those consensually determined prices associated 
with property rules and those imposed prices associated with li-
ability rules. In any event, jurisprudence has long been more 
sophisticated than such a view allows, as Professor Cooter is cer-
tainly aware. 144 The culprit here, responsible for using draconian 
prohibitions of actions that should be priced, is not simplistic ju-
risprudence. It is simplistic politics and a lack of the imagina-
tion needed to set up markets where they have not previously 
existed.145 
C. Reclaiming the Distinction: Brennan and Buchanan on 
Rules of the Game 
Much of the preceding discussion is critical of the methodol-
ogy of law and economics practitioners. To conclude this Part, I 
offer a brief illustration of the fact that economists who study 
law, especially those who were not trained as lawyers, some-
times do get it right. The illustration comes from the work of 
two leading proponents of the economic analysis of political be-
havior, the "public choice" school of thought.146 
In 1985, Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan published a 
work addressing, among other things, the methodological and 
jurisprudential foundations of their theories of political econ-
omy.147 They defended the use of Homo economicus to model 
the behavior of political actors, arguing that parsimony and 
symmetry require the same assumptions about political actors 
that apply to non-political ones: 
144 See, e.g., id. at 1524 n.4 (noting distinction between commands backed by threats 
and the more general idea of norms backed by sanctions). 
145 For discussions of market-oriented solutions to environmental problems arising 
from the absence of the property rights necessary to give rise to markets, see 
Symposium, Free Market Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environ-
mental Protection, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 297 (1992). For discussions of the use 
of prescriptively understood liability rules in environmental law, compare Schelling, 
supra note 105 (emphasizing the advantages of pricing structures), with Rose, supra 
note 119 (articulating, and pe:J:'haps overstating, the offsetting disadvantages of pricing 
structures). 
146 For a quick overview of this relatively new field of study, see Edward L. Rubin, 
Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. Legal Educ. 490 (1996). 
147 Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional 
Political Economy (1985). 
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If an individual in a market setting is to be presumed to exer-
cise any power he possesses (wit.b,in the limits of market rules) 
so as to maximize his net wealth, then an individual in a corre-
sponding political setting must also be presumed to exercise 
any power he possesses (within the limits of political rules) in 
precisely the same way. If political agents do not exercise dis-
cretionary power in a manner analogous to market agents, then 
this result must follow because the rules of the political game 
constrain the exercise of power in ways the rules of the market 
do not .... 148 
Now, whether or not one agrees with this particular argu-
ment, or any of the other arguments they offer for modeling po-
litical actors as profit maximizers, these economists clearly rec-
ognize the idea of constrained optimization and the fact that 
"rules" form a crucial part of the constraints. 
Of course one might reply that these economists use the idea 
of "rules" metaphorically, as a simplified and approximate sub-
stitute for the Holmesian specification of costs and benefits of 
predictable exercises of public power. But elsewhere they ad-
dress this point quite clearly, rejecting the Holmesian refine-
ment: -Following-Hobbes they propose, also controversially, 
that "just conduct" is nothing more nor less than conduct "that 
does not violate rules to which one has given prior consent."].l9 
They then explain more precisely what it means not to violate 
such rules: 
[A ]!though the rules will typically include instructions as to 
how violations are to be handled and what punishments are to 
attach to such violations, and although these instructions are 
therefore contained within the inclusive agreement, it seems 
wrongheaded to say that agreement implies only a willingness 
to accept the defined punishment for violations. Consent is to 
the rules, and the moral force of promise keeping is such that 
one is obligated to other players to play by those rules. To 
violate the rules may sometimes be personally profitable, but it 
will not be "just," and it will not become "just" simply by virtue 
of one's acceptance of punishment. "Just conduct" will consist 
in keeping one's promises to other players, that is, in abiding by 
,., Id. at 48-49. 
"' Id. at 97. 
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agreed-on rules. A player, for example, who punches another 
with his fist in American football concedes a fifteen-yard pen-
alty. But he also endures the moral opprobrium of having 
committed an "unjust" act, and it is expected that this purely 
moral dimension-the player's sense of justice-will carry 
weight in moderating his behavior. 
It is important to make this point because, in some econo-
mists' discussions of the law, one obtains the impression that 
choosing whether to abide by the rules is like selecting a drink 
at a soft-drink machine; that is, one either abides by the rules 
and pays no penalty or fails to abide by the rules and simply 
pays the price of so doing, as reflected in the rules. But the 
legislated punishment is not to be construed simply as the 
"price" of an alternative course of action; it also symbolizes the 
fact that a "wrong" has been committed.150 
One need not endorse a purely contractarian theory of justice, 
or the indicated moral significance of promises, in order to ap-
preciate the force of these points. In a society where respect for 
law is not totally absent, sanctions are not simply prices. Put 
another way, guidance rules are distinguishable from enforce-
ment rules; both have behavioral significance as well as theo-
retical importance.151 
15
" Id. at 101. 
m Other economics-oriented theorists are moving in a similar direction. See, e.g., 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1 (arguing that the Jaw can discourage 
criminal behavior not only by raising its cost but also by instilling aversion to the 
criminalized behavior). In this, they recapture at least part of the insights of an older, 
less economics-oriented generation of scholars. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The 
Limits of the Criminal Sanction 64-65 (1968) (arguing for an expansion from the 
Benthamite conception of deterrence as "the propensity of punishment to scare 
people," adopted to address the "rational hedonist who will do anything that 
promises to enhance his well-being if he thinks he can get away with it," to a broader 
conception as a "complex psychological phenomenon meant primarily to create and 
reinforce the conscious morality and the unconscious habitual controls of the Jaw-
abiding"). Professor Dau-Schmidt has also extended this analysis to certain elements 
of civil law, but curiously seems to stop short of calling ordinary fault-based civil 
damages "preference shaping." See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as 
More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, 
in Law and Economics: New and Critical Perspectives 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & 
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995). 
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IV. CONCEPTUAL PRAGMATISM: 
AN ALTERl'..JATIVE RESOLUTION? 
Perhaps, however, one ought not draw so sharp a contrast be-
tween guidance and enforcement rules. To be sure, the two 
kinds of rules-or two functions of a given rule-are distin-. 
guishable, but they are also related, both as a matter of histori-
cal development and as a matter of normative theory. In this 
Part, I explore certain consequences of this relationship. As a 
way of introducing the matter, and in order to answer a residual 
question from Part H, I start with a brief treatment of the impact 
of the work of philosophers Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus. 
A. Recent Work on Transaction Structures 
As already noted, Coleman and Kraus have argued that prop-
erty rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules should be con-
strued as rules of a different type than enforcement rules: The 
former are various ways of specifying the content of entitle-
ments, in particular the "transaction structures" applicable to 
such entitlements. 152 The question of structuring entitlements, 
they a:tguea~ ts~~quite distinct frow the question of how to en-
force the structure that is chosen. The distinction they drew is 
essentially the same as the one I have drawn here. Yet most 
scholarship concerning entitlement transaction structures con-
tinues to ignore their argument. 153 
A good example is an article recently published by Louis 
Kaplow and Ste,;en Shaven. 154 Purporting t~ follow C&M, they 
define a property rule as involving "absolute protection" of an 
otherwise specified entitlement, such that a potential actor 
"would not dare to cause [the harm protected against]." 155 It is 
15
' See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
153 An exception is Akhil Reed A mar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 
84 Geo. L.J. 641,674-77 (1996) (citing Coleman and Kraus in support of an argument 
that monetary remedies for Fourth Amendment violations do not necessarily condone 
police misconduct by simply adding a "cost of doing business"). 
15
·' Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27. 
155 ld. at 723; see also id. at 723 n.27 ("The characterization of a property rule as a 
choice of who should enjoy an entitlement, coupled with its absolute protection, is 
emphasized in Calabresi and Melamed .... ") (failing lo identify exactly where C&M 
"emphasized" such absoluteness). Elsewhere, Kaplow and Shavell define property 
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hard to imagine a clearer endorsement of the descriptive concep-
tion of a property rule: It refers not to what citizens are told they 
should do, but to what the citizens are in fact coerced into doing. 
The Coleman and Kraus article is not discussed or even cited. 
In another recent article, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley explicitly 
distinguish between the "ownership structure" of entitlements 
and their "degree of protection," refer to C&M's typology as 
addressing the latter issue, and identify liability rules with 
"remedies at law" and property rules with "equitable relief."156 
Misleadingly, they cite Coleman and Kraus for the proposition 
that the type of protection determines the content of an entitle-
ment.157 Essentially the same remedy-based definitions are em-
ployed, with no attention paid to the Coleman and Kraus thesis, 
in a still more recent essay by James Krier and Stewart Schwab.158 
A more perplexing example is provided by a philosopher. 
Jeremy Waldron at least responds at some length to the Cole-
man and Kraus thesis. 159 But even after an obviously careful 
reading of their article, Waldron professes not to understand 
why it is important to determine whether a particular rule is part 
of the contents of a transaction rule or part of the means of its 
enforcement.160 So it is not surprising that Professor Waldron's 
restatement of C&M's scheme reflects no cognizance of the am-
biguities analyzed in the foregoing pages: 
rules more ambiguously as ones in which the state "guarantees property right 
assignments against infringement through the threatened use of its police powers," id. 
at 715, without indicating whether the threat is invariably successful as deterrence or 
whether the state's "guarantee" is anything more than the threat itself. 
156 Ayres & Talley, supra note 26, at 1031. Elsewhere, they expand their conception 
of a property rule to include "specific performance ... and certain types of punitive 
sanctions," id. at 1037, or indeed any sanction "severe enough to deter all noncon-
sensual takings." Id. at 1036. This makes their conception essentially equivalent to 
that of Professors Kaplow and Shave!!. 
157 See id. at 1041 n.50. While Coleman and Kraus did argue that what C&M called 
the type of protection partly determines the entitlement's content-because it is actu-
ally part of that content-this connection dissolves once one identifies the type of 
protection with particular remedial devices. 
158 Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 442-43. 
159 Jeremy Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1441 
(1990) (reviewing Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals, and the Law (1988), which 
reprints the article by Coleman and Kraus). 
160 See id. at 1448-49. 
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A right is protected by a property rule if the right-holder may, 
with the support of society, enjoin any infringement that takes 
place without his consent; a right is protected by an inalienabil-
ity rule if it is legally impossible for even an apparently wining 
right-holder to sell or give away his entitlement; and a right is 
protected with a liability rule if a person other than the right-
holder may invade or reduce the value of an entitlement pro-
vided he compensates the right-hoider afterwards. 161 
Notice that, as in the pieces written by Ayres and Talley and 
Krier and Schwab, property rules are here defined in terms of 
one of the many possible coercive remedies (the injunction) that 
the right-holder can obtain from the state. Again, this was not 
the way C&M originally defined such rules. 162 Nor does Profes-
sor Waldron's reformulation make any more sense of the matter 
than C&M did. For example, it implies that a prescription re-
quiring consensual transfer- supported by a criminal prohibition 
of an unconsented taking would not create a property rule if 
injunctive relief were unavailable. 163 
Vv'aldron also seems to define inalienability rules in terms of 
one particular kind of sanction, the sanction of nullity in the 
r.tnte's~ -ra+u-~,.,-a1 -.--o· -~~r-e· '"'0~ gn1"ze <-he rle +n~t~ <-~nn~+e·· ~+a.,., ~n"' 1 l.""nahl"" ;:) a l_ \.,...j_ .:) A l \,.... ! l ! U .!a\.... V ll_ a !L).L ..II. V!. !..1 .LIL U.! V ll Ll '-" 
entitlement. 164 But C&M wrote no such thing; they specified 
only that "[ a]n entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its 
transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing 
161 Id. at 1444 n.3 (citing C&M). 
'"See supra Part I and Section I LB. 
163 See supra note 91 (discussing the unavailability of injunctive relief when a nui-
sance has been discontinued); cf. Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1366-67 (reject-
ing the idea that property rules should be defined in terms of the availability of 
injunctive relief). Of course, Waldron might reply that I take him too technically, 
that he means "enjoin" in a non-technical sense closer to "prohibit." If he means it in 
this way, and if the "support of society" to which he refers means simply the moral 
support provided by social authority, then he would be using a notion of property 
rules that is very close, if not identical, to the prescriptive interpretation of C&M for 
which 1 have argued here. If, however, the social support is a matter of coercive 
sanctions, then his notion of property is somewhat different, a notion that l consider 
infra in Section IV.B. 
1M Another possible interpretation of Waldron's "legal impossibility" is that the law 
makes it factually impossible to make the transfer in question. At best, this reading 
would make Waldron's notion equivalent to the descriptive form of the rule types 
shown wanting in Parts 1 and II supra. 
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seller."165 More importantly, a nullity approach leads to the odd 
conclusion that an explicit prohibition of alienation would not 
create an inalienability rule if a de facto transfer would be le-
gally accepted after the fact, even if criminal punishment were 
imposed for the transfer. 166 
To be sure, Waldron defines liability rules with somewhat 
greater precision than did C&M: He specifies that the actor 
must compensate in order to remain within the bounds of social 
approval, whereas C&M confusingly specified that the actor 
must be "willing" to compensate. 167 But this improvement only 
reinforces the prescriptive theory advanced here and the corre-
sponding distinction between the content of a prescription and 
the issue of its enforcement.168 Waldron's definition of liability 
rules, though coherent in itself, thus stands in sharp, perhaps 
unintended, contrast to his remedy-based definitions of property 
and inalienability rules. In other words, the confusion persists. 
What accounts for these intransigent responses to the Cole-
man and Kraus thesis? I suggest several contributing factors. 
First, mistakes in exposition may have led readers to dismiss the 
arguments of Coleman and Kraus as providing merely an alter-
native account of transaction rules, an account others are en-
tirely free to disregard in preference for C&M's original, pre-
sumably coherent account. As one illustration, Coleman and 
Kraus characterized liability rules as rules legitimating a transfer 
of the entitlement in question if and only if ex post compensa-
tion is paid therefor. 169 It is clear that under their conception of 
165 C&M, supra note 4, at 1092. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 94-100 and accompanying text. 
166 In the context of prostitution laws, for example, one can imagine concluding that 
the restitution of money paid for illegal sex should not be required because of the 
inability to undo the sexual experience, and yet at the same time deciding to punish 
one or both parties for violating the rule against selling sex. Cf. Cougler v. Fackler, 
510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974) {holding that the civil remedy of restitution is inappropriate 
where part of consideration for payment is an illicit sexual relationship). 
167 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
168 Unfortunately, Waldron adds a temporal dimension to the definition by requir-
ing that the compensation be paid "afterwards." Waldron, supra note 159, at 1444 
n.3. This is another mistake, one that Waldron apparently picked up from Coleman 
and Kraus. See infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text. 
169 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345; see also id. at 1345 n.15 (asserting 
without documentation, that this view "follows closely [the] standard meaning since 
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a liability rule, the holder of the entitlement has no power to 
make a voluntary sale to the other party. 170 This must have come 
as quite a surprise to anyone working with C&M's scheme, since 
their first and paradigmatic example of liability rules was the 
power of eminent domain. 171 In the context of such governmen-
tal acquisition, the parties are free to negotiate a voluntary sale 
if they wish, so that legitimate transfer does not proceed only 
nonconsensually. Moreover, in the event of a forced sale, the 
compensation is typically paid in the same way, temporally 
speaking, as for voluntary sales, even though it is sometimes 
permissible that it be paid ex post. 172 Similar points apply to 
C&M's other principal example of liability rules: nuisances con-
ditionally privileged by their accompanying social benefits. 173 It 
Calabresi-Melamed," with the obvious qualification that in their view "transaction 
rules specify the content of particular rights"). 
170 See id. at 1347-49 (noting that liability rules could be defined so as to allow for 
the possibility of voluntary sale, expressed as an "alternative" to their view of the 
concept of a liability rule, but not attributing this alternative view to C&M). 
171 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1093, 1106-07. But see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 
27, at 758 n.143 ("Eminent domain is usually viewed independently, rather than as 
part of-the-subject-of property versus~ liability rules .... Nonetheless, some authors 
have cited this example in the present context [of liability rules]." (citation omitted)). 
And what is the example Kaplow and Shavell give for the "unusual" use of eminent 
domain as an example of liability rules? Answer: C&M! 
172 See Sackman & Van Brunt, supra note 29, §§ 8.10-.14 (describing limited and 
conditional judicial acceptance of ex post compensation and a variety of state laws 
requiring prepayment). While landowners occasionally are successful in claiming 
that past government action has "taken" the owner's property without just com-
pensation, a so-caiied "inverse condemnation" action, the presumptive remedy for 
such a claim is the reversal of the government action (unless the government chooses 
to exercise eminent domain). See, e.g., first English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (recognizing landowner's right to 
compensation only for losses incurred pending reversal of the governmental action, 
at least when such reversal is practically possible). 
173 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1105. Certainly nuisance easements can be purchased 
before the fact. While I am not aware of modern American cases in which such an 
easement has been taken without consent but for ex ante compensation, such takings 
are not inconceivable. Indeed, a historical example exists in the allowance of private 
eminent domain by milling companies flooding private lands in order to provide 
services considered important to the public. See, e.g., John F. Hart, The Maryland 
Mill Act, 1669-1766: Economic Policy and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private 
Property, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 3-5 (1995) (discussing such a statutory rule widely 
used for a century in colonial Maryland and contrasting it with the colonial law of 
Virginia, which also provided for compensation to be paid ex ante). Virginia still 
retains statutory provisions for such private takings, although they are phrased in 
terms of a taking in fee rather than by easement, lease, or other lesser interest. See 
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does not seem, therefore, that Coleman and Kraus were re-
working C&M's scheme so much as providing an entirely new 
scheme that they believed would be a more useful way to think 
about transaction rules. Their readers may simply disagree about 
its superior usefulness.174 
Relatedly, Coleman and Kraus did not stress as much as I 
have here the strange consequences, indeed the virtual incoher-
ence, of a scheme that identifies property, liability, and inal-
ienability rules with categories of effective enforcement. To re-
hearse the point in the context of a recent article, consider the 
implications of Kaplow and Shavell's characterization of a 
property rule: 
We will suppose that a property rule involves two elements: 
the grant of an entitlement to either the victim or the injurer 
and absolute protection of that entitlement. Specifically, if the 
victim has the entitlement to be free from harm, the injurer is 
precluded from causing harm. We might imagine, for instance, 
that an injurer would suffer such a stringent sanction if he 
Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-116 to 62.1-127 (Michie 1992). There are numerous other 
occasions on which private companies have been, and still are, permitted to take 
easements or fee interests for a judicially determined amount of compensation. 
Historically and economically most important is the example of takings of rights of 
way by canal and railroad companies. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, 
Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789-
1910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232, 237 (1973). It would be very odd not to consider such 
practices as involving liability rules under C&M's rule typology just because the 
compensation is paid ex ante. 
174 In retrospect, Coleman and Kraus were attempting to accomplish part of what 
Madeline Morris more effectively achieved several years later. See Morris, supra note 
15 (expanding and recategorizing C&M's typology). For example, one confusing 
aspect of the article by Coleman and Kraus is the use of the term "combination" to 
refer to the creation of new rule structures out of property, liability, and inalienability 
rules. See Coleman and Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345-52. If I am correct in my anal-
ysis of these rule types, they cannot be "combined" in the sense of creating a rule that 
is "both a property and a liability rule," id. at 1348 (their rule (3)), because each rule 
type is logically incompatible with each other; combination thus produces a rule that 
cannot apply to anything. The same mutual exclusivity applies even more clearly to 
the definitions of these rule types as provided by Coleman and Kraus. See id. (their 
rules (1) and (2)). Presumably, therefore, they were addressing the creation of hybrids 
rather than combinations, which is facilitated by identifying the components that 
make up property, liability, and inalienability rules. See Morris, supra note 15 at 831-
38 (analyzing these and other mutually exclusive rule types in terms of their 
"initiation choice," "veto power," "monetary compensation," and "in-kind enjoy-
ment" components). 
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caused harm that he would not dare to cause it, or that the state 
would directly prevent the injurer from acting to cause harm 
(for example, by closing down a plant that did not stop pollut-
ing). Similarly, if the injurer possesses the entitlement to cause 
h h . . hi f d . 175 __ arm, t e VlCtlill cannot stop m rom omg so. 
As already mentioned, all ambiguity about the prescriptive or 
descriptive character of C&M's rule types has been resolved 
here in favor of the descriptive version. Thus, A's entitlement 
relative to B is governed by a property rule if and only if B is in 
fact so scared by the threat of sanction that he "would not dare" 
to take the thing without A's consent. If C is not so scared by 
that threat, for reasons entirely personal to C or otherwise un-
related to the normative features of the entitlement, A's rela-
tionship to Cis governed by, at most, a liability rule. 176 
The resulting conceptual scheme does not even cowe close to 
the notions of property actually in use in law and in everyday 
discourse. In particular, it means that A's right to, say, his auto-
mobile is governed by a property rule as to many private citi-
zens, but not as to many others who have no different moral or 
legal claim to be privileged in their acquisition of it. If Coleman 
m Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 723. Notice that they do not assume, 
separate from the specification of property rules, that persons will be too scared to 
violate such rules; rather, they posit that an entitlement is governed by a property 
rule only as to those persons who are too scared to violate it. 
"'Once again, C might not even be subject to a liability rule, under Kaplow and 
Shavell's formulation, if she can somehow avoid the state's demand to pay 
compensation. However, their characterization of liability rules is Jess clear in terms 
of the issues discussed here. At one point, for example, they write, "We will presume 
that under a liability rule, the injurer is permitted to cause harm but must compensate 
the victim for the harm, or the court's best estimate of it." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
Notice their use of the word "permitted" instead of the word "able," thus suggesting 
a guidance rule, but also their use of the ambiguous word "must," which, given their 
conception of property rules, probably denotes that the taker cannot avoid paying 
the compensation. Elsewhere, they write, "[T]he state may employ liability rules, 
under which it merely discourages violations by requiring transgressors to pay victims 
for harms suffered." Id. at 715. Once again, the word "requiring" is ambiguous, and 
the phrase "discourages violations" stands in sharp contrast with the language of 
permission used in the former characterization. The former is clearly closer to that of 
C&M, since it covers eminent domain; under the latter characterization, while it is 
probably true that the requirement of compensation discourages the use of that 
power, such use cannot be said to "violate" the landowner's legal rights. The latter 
characterization matches more closely \Vhat 1 have called a remedial compensation 
rule, such as that governing tort liability for negligence. 
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and Kraus had emphasized such bizarre implications of the de-
scriptive interpretation of C&M's typology perhaps they would 
have had greater impact, even among the economists. 177 
Finally, Coleman and Kraus did not explain at any length ex-
actly why it is that one needs to provide "content" to entitle-
ments.178 For consequentialists in general, and law and econom-
ics practitioners in particular, consequences are everything, or 
nearly so. By the same token, conceptual pragmatists will ques-
tion whether there is any meaning in a rule'aside from its associ-
ated consequences. Why, they might ask, does one need more 
than the existence of a general sense of entitlement coupled 
with the specific enforcement mechanisms that support or deter 
its transfer? Doesn't this provide all we need to know in order 
to understand transaction structures? 
I have suggested the importance of "content" rules by refer-
ring to them as "guidance" rules and distinguishing between the 
law-abiding citizen and the recalcitrant. Guidance rules are im-
portant for law-abiding citizens; for the most part, enforcement 
rules are not.179 Thus, one view of the cathedral is obtained by 
m To be sure, Kaplow and Shavell did seem to be aware of a problem. Acknowl-
edging this lack of correspondence with ordinary conceptions, they were forced to 
qualify their notion of a property rule by commenting in a footnote, "Of course, 
possessory rights are in fact often insecure; theft of one sort or another is frequently a 
serious problem. The social intent, however, is ordinarily for possessory rights to be 
inviolate, and for ease of exposition, this Article will usually analyze them as such." 
I d. at 716 nJ (emphasis added). But what does this mean? The authors' charac-
terization of property rules as providing "absolute protection"-adopted, we are told, 
"for ease of exposition"-is fundamentally incompatible with their retreat to the 
prescriptive concept of social intent as the key to the property concept. If Kaplow 
and Shavell are really operating within the framework of social intent, relevant if not 
determinative in a world of Jaw-abiding citizens, their language of fear and physical 
restraint is inappropriate as a component of the rule typology; but if they are really 
addressing protection against Holmesian bad men, as that language implies, then 
social intent is of no behavioral significance. As we shall see, it is possible to combine 
the idea of social intent with the interest in controlling recalcitrants, see infra Section 
IV.B, but that requires two distinct components of the rule typology rather than a 
single but equivocal component. 
178 They did give brief attention to the matter in a footnote. See Coleman & Kraus, 
supra note 8, at 1347 n.17. 
179 There are secondary or derivative ways in which enforcement rules become 
relevant to fully law-abiding citizens, as when such citizens must interact with recal-
citrants, or otherwise consider their behavior. Even for interactions among law-
abiding citizens, enforcement rules will matter for some purposes on some occasions. 
898 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:837 
supposing a society populated entirely by such citizens. Even in 
such a society, there would be a need for authoritative answers 
to questions about the structure of entitlements. Well-behaved 
citizens are not necessarily omniscient, nor do they always agree. 
So problems of coordination and conflict resolution would still 
arise, as would good faith differences of opinion on matters of 
principle.180 As long as there are controversial questions on such 
matters that need to be settled for all or most citizens, there will 
be a need for guidance rules. 181 Of course, as one moves away 
from the admittedly unrealistic assumption of no recalcitrance, 
the importance of enforcement rules increases and the impor-
tance of guidance rules decreases. But guidance rules remain 
behaviorally significant short of the also unrealistic assumption 
of perfect recalcitrance. 182 Greater emphasis on these points 
would help to convince even the most ardent consequentialist of 
the importance of taking seriously the distinction between guid-
ance rules and enforcement rules. 
It would also help to overcome the analytical difficulty en-
countered by Professor Waldron. His inability to see why it 
matters whether a given norm is part of the content of a rule or 
For example, despite the implicit assumption made throughout the text, it is possible 
for a guidance rule and an enforcement rule to conflict so that the enforcement rule 
imposes a sanction on an act that the guidance rule permits or even requires a person 
to perform. This represents extraordinarily bad law, possibly so bad as not to be law 
at all, despite any positivist claims of pedigree. Cf. Fuller, supra note 3, at 65-70 
(discussing the related problem of contradiction in the guidance rules themselves). 
But ho\vever vve characterize the situation, the !a\v-abiding citizen wiH then have to 
attend both to his privileges and duties under the guidance rule and to the potential 
consequences of his being sanctioned under the enforcement rule. 
wo For interesting work on the problems of coordination and the relevance of norms 
thereto, see, e.g., David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (1969); 
Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 83. On the public resolution of good faith disagree-
ments on matters of principle, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, supra note 35, at 164-224 
(discussing a theory of legislative integrity and how it affects the resolution of such 
disagreements). 
"
1 To avoid misinterpretation, I should add that the notion of "guidance" involved 
here does not presuppose that the state acts in a paternalistic way, though of course 
that is possible. A good faith difference of opinion among citizens as to the appro-
priate rule to govern a particular context may require resolution without necessarily 
implying that the state's lawmakers know better than the citizens what the right result 
is, let alone that the rules adopted will neglect the importance of individual autonomy. 
1
" See Laycock, supra note 6, at 8-9 (noting the importance of non-remedial 
substantive law to the law-abiding citizen and accordingly criticizing the tendency to 
collapse the distinction between such law and the law of remedies). 
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part of its enforcement structure can perhaps be attributed to 
the uninformative nature of the term "content" employed by 
Coleman and Kraus. Whereas ''enforcement" speaks clearly to 
the purpose of dealing with recalcitrants, "content" is opaque in 
terms of purpose. To put the matter differently, guidance rules 
have content, but so do enforcement rules, and the importance 
of content is determined by the purpose to be served. Once one 
sees this, it is clear why one needs to know whether a given pro-
vision is part of the (content of the) guidance rule or part of the 
(content of its) enforcement provisions. 
For example, we have seen that a monetary exaction that is 
part of a guidance rule operates as a price, as in Law #2 and 
Law #4, whereas one that is part of an enforcement rule oper-
ates as a sanction, as in Law #1 and Law #3.183 And that differ-
ence, once again, matters to the law-abiding citizen. Thus, when 
a law is ambiguous, some interpretive effort is required to de-
cide which canonical form is involved. Consider: 
Law #5: Any person who discharges chemical XYZ into the air, 
water, or ground in excess of the amounts specified in the fore-
going provisions must pay to the State Environmental Agency 
$5,000 per ounce of excess XYZ discharged. 
A law expressed in this manner must be construed by the law-
abiding citizen to determine whether the discharge of chemical 
XYZ is prohibited, as in Law #3, or conditionally permissible, as 
in Law #4. Only by making that judgment can such a citizen un-
derstand the law and conform her conduct to its requirements.184 
With the benefit of these clarifications, the significance of the 
Coleman and Kraus thesis should be more widely appreciated. 
In Part V, I take some preliminary steps toward incorporating 
into a general analytic theory of law the insight that C&M pro-
'
83 See supra Section III.A. 
184 For example, if the "foregoing provisions" prohibit the discharge of XYZ beyond 
stated amounts, then Law #5 would be interpreted as a sanction, especially (but not 
only) if the $5,000 figure is disproportionate to the costs imposed by the discharge. 
If, on the other hand, the discharge of XYZ is not expressly prohibited and if dis-
charges within the stated limits are probably of de minimis impact, and the $5,000 
figure approximates the environmental harm of larger discharges, then Law #5 would 
be more sensibly interpreted as a price. Other assumptions can make interpretation 
more difficult. 
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vided a typology of guidance rules. Before doing so, however, I 
address more fully the jurisprudential significance of enforcement 
rules in relation to the reconstructed typology of guidance rules. 
B. The Pragmatic Significance of Enforcement 
The persistent attention to consequences nevertheless raises 
the possibility of a third conception of what C&M's transaction 
rules are about. To see how, one must recognize the interde-
pendence of guidance and enforcement issues. For any norma-
tive legal theory-including, in particular, any form of liberal-
ism-in which the question of the moral validity of a rule is, at 
least in part, a function of the means of its enforcement, to ad-
dress the content of a legal rule is unavoidably to address the 
question of enforcement. VVhen we ask whether to make a law 
against particular conduct, ordinarily \Ve are not simply asking 
whether that conduct is desirable and whether a rule should ex-
ist to discourage it, but rather whether it is so undesirable, or so 
undesirable in particular ways, as to warrant a prohibition backed 
by coercive sanctions.185 Distinguishing between guidance rules 
and enforcement rules carries the potential to be understood, or 
rather misunderstood, as necessarily separating the process of 
generating guidance rules from the process of generating the as-
sociated enforcement rules. 
I have argued elsewhere that any radical separation of this 
sort is a misleading way of thinking about legal issues. 186 The 
ability to distinguish analytically the problem of formtilating 
guidance rules from the problem of formulating enforcement 
rules should not lead to the conclusion that the former task can 
be undertaken without regard to the latter. This is true not only 
185 To be sure, the state can and sometimes does act in ways that are not coercive, at 
least not in the physical sense, and one should avoid the conceptual mistake of 
thinking that a particular norm is "law" only to the extent that it is backed by such 
coercive sanctions. See generally Hart, supra note 65, at 26-48 (developing objec-
tions to the simple model of law as coercive orders). Thus, it would be a mistake to 
say that Law #1 and Law #2 are identical qua law even though they are admittedly 
different qua guidance rules. 
'"Dale A. Nance, Legal Theory and the Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion, 
57 U. Colo. L Rev. 1 (1985) (arguing that the paradigmatic conception of law is the 
governance of human conduct by coercively enforced rules and criticizing tendencies 
in modern jurisprudence to downplay the significance of coercion). 
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for practical reasons, such as the need to shape guidance rules in 
ways conducive to enforcement, but also for the important theo-
retical reason that the "moral jurisdiction" of an institution to 
promulgate guidance rules is affected by the nature of the en-
forcement rules that will be brought to bear.'87 It may be mor-
ally legitimate to condemn the white supremacist's advocacy, yet 
morally illegitimate to incarcerate him for that advocacy. 
Moreover, persons recalcitrant in a particular context are not 
necessarily selfishly free riding on a system of social coopera-
tion. They might be civil disobedients acting entirely in good 
faith, or they might be morally in the right, or they might be 
both.188 Inevitably, the use of coercive sanctions to deal with re-
calcitrants affects the nature of the guidance rules that an insti-
tution may properly promulgate, at least in a liberal order. 189 
The desire to structure our concepts so as to retain at least the 
possibility of such liberal discourse may help to explain the per-
sistence of attempts to connect the different rule types with par-
ticular coercive remedies or sanctions. As indicated above, these 
attempts have so far been imprecise and largely unsuccessful, 
but that does not mean that they necessarily must be so. The 
idea would be to interpret the various rule types as being stated 
187 To amplify this point, two potential errors can creep into the process of 
lawmaking when the formulation of guidance rules is separated from the process of 
generating enforcement rules. First, the issue of enforcement may come to be seen as 
of quite secondary importance, so that any good guidance rule is automatically seen 
as worthy of enforcement-the problem of the overenforcement of morality. Second, 
one may fail to recognize that the content of the guidance rule may be rightly 
affected by the means of enforcement that is chosen. In other words, one cannot 
assume that the set of properly enforceable guidance rules is simply a subset of the 
set of guidance rules that would be proper if enforcement were unnecessary. As the 
history of the common law amply demonstrates, the evolution of enforced guidance 
rules is affected by the interaction of guidance rules with the particular means of 
enforcement employed. Or, to put the matter differently, rights have evolved in the 
context of remedies. 
188 A classic statement of the liberal ethos is Justice Brennan's majority opinion in 
the Texas flag burning case. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute criminalizing the offensive burning of the national flag). 
189 Although the examples in the text are drawn from the context of governmental 
restrictions on speech, similar concerns undoubtedly affect seemingly more mundane 
topics like property rights. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale 
L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (emphasizing the importance of private property in protecting a 
sphere of privacy and autonomy within which the state may not reach). 
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with implicit reference to the use of the full panoply of coercive 
remedies. 
Thus, when C&M wrote that under a liability rule a person 
"may destroy" the entitlement conditioned on payment of com-
pensation/90 perhaps they were trying to capture the idea that 
no coercive state action may be employed as a consequence of 
the taking or damaging except to assure a public determination 
of appropriate compensation and, if necessary, to induce its 
payment. If that is all that the permissive locution means, then 
it is silent on the question of governmental approval or disap-
proval of the action, for the permission is directed at officials. 
So construed, the definition offered by C&M would embrace 
both situations in which the activity is condoned, such as emi-
nent domain, and those in which the activity is proscribed, such 
as negligent driving. On the other hand, it would not cover the 
application of criminal sanctions or punitive damage awards to 
reckless driving. 
A more complicated adjustment would be necessary to make 
coherent the definition of property rules. One would need to 
indicate that property rules involve the use of coercive remedies 
e\!eri When- appi'ophate c-ompensation is paid, if consent to the 
transfer is not obtained. But which coercive remedies? Once 
again, the availability of injunctive relief is an inadequate crite-
rion, since one can imagine protecting property guidance rules 
with only criminal sanctions. Conversely, a definition solely in 
terms of criminal sanctions will not do, since one can easily 
imagine protecting property guidance rules with only civil 
remedies. So we are driven to something like the foUowing: A 
property rule is in place whenever some coercive state action 
(other than those permitted under liability rules) may be em-
ployed against a person who takes or damages an entitlement if 
and only if the taking or damaging is without the consent of the 
holder of the entitlement.191 Inalienability rules would in turn be 
characterized as operating whenever some coercive state action 
(other than those permitted under liability rules) may be em-
19° C&M, supra note 4, at 1092. 
191 The parenthetical qualification is necessary to preserve the mutual exclusivity of 
the rule types, as C&M clearly intended; the "only if" restriction is necessary to 
prevent the definition from embracing what we will want to call inalienability rules_ 
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ployed in the event of a putative transfer, taking, or damaging of 
an entitlement with the consent of the holder of the entitlement. 
Scholars working in this tradition may have been groping to-
ward a set of definitions like these, definitions that place the co-
ercive remedies in a predominant position in the very conception 
of transaction rules.192 As an interpretation of C&M's original 
work, this description has the virtue already described of sub-
suming two very different kinds of "liability" rules under the 
same category, seemingly in accord with C&M's applications. 
But what has really been gained by this reformulation? On 
closer inspection, very little. 
In the first place, this pragmatic approach does not speak in 
terms of what citizens are in fact forced to do, but rather in 
terms of what the law is prepared to try to force them to do. The 
latter is morally relevant, but it is of very little help to those in-
terested in efficiency comparisons, since it is impossible to say 
anything meaningful in a world of non-negligible recalcitrance 
about the relative efficiency of the various rule types unless one 
adds empirical information, or at least empirical assumptions, 
about the nature, extent of use, and effectiveness of the coercive 
measures that are in fact available in each context. For exam-
ple, it would be impossible to conclude that a liability rule is 
more efficient than a property rule-even if there are high 
transfer transaction costs and low damages assessment costs-
until one knows much more about the coercive remedies that 
would be applied to enforce them. In particular, enforcement of 
the liability rule might be so weak that it does not deter recalci-
trants from taking without paying the required compensation, in 
which case a property rule could be more efficient than a liabil-
ity rule whether or not the property rule deters takings. So the 
pragmatic consequentialist approach, or at least this particular 
one, leaves too much unspecified for the economist's purposes.193 
'"See supra notes 5, 37, 154, 156, 158, 161 and accompanying text. 
193 The same point remains true even if the definitions are changed by specifying not 
when coercive sanctions may be employed but when they will be employed. This 
compromise descriptive approach eliminates, definitionally speaking, uncertainty 
about sanction employment in trying to discern the effects of a rule, but the seri-
ousness of the sanctions remain too indefinite to allow accurate conclusions about 
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In the second place, such remedy-based grouping of guidance 
rules loses important information about the subject norms. In 
particular, since both Law #1 and Law #2 fall within this prag-
matic categorization of "liability" rules, neither the citizen nor 
the analyst can discern, just from knowing that it is governed by 
a "liability" rule, whether the conduct is socially approved or 
socially condemi1ed. 194 The grouping does not respond, there-
fore, to the needs of the law-abiding citizenry or to the concerns 
of the analyst who would take such citizens into account. Of 
course, the actual rules that fall into this grouping may provide 
the needed information. But as long as there are significant 
numbers of law-abiding citizens in the society, empirical gener-
alizations about their behavior will be in part a function of the 
content of those rules in a way that is not captured by the fact 
that they both fall within the category of "liability" rules. And 
that further complicates the task of making any useful generali-
zations about the relative efficiency of those rules. 
This second category of problems can be handled by fusing 
guidance rules with coercive sanctions. More precisely, one 
could cl~fine eac}l rule type by reference to both (1) its content 
as a pure guidance rule, and (2) conditions on the use of coer-
cive sanctions. Such hybrid rule types would preserve the focus 
on guidance for the law-abiding and, at the same time, serve to 
highlight the moral issues raised by the use of state coercion to 
deal with recalcitrants. For example, one could interpret C&M's 
property rule category as follows: 
Pragmatic Conception of Property Rules in Law: A's entitle-
ment relative to B is governed by a property rule if and only if 
(1) B is permitted to take or damage the entitlement only with 
A's consent, and (2) some state-authorized coercive sanction 
may be employed against B on account of B's taking or dam-
aging the entitlement in violation of (1). 
Thinking in terms of such Janus-faced structures may well be 
the most philosophically illuminating way to understand many 
efficiency in the face of recalcitrance. A formal demonstration of this point is 
presented in the Appendix. 
PM In other words, some instances of conventional property, those protected only by 
a monetary damage remedy, would fall within the liability rule category. 
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legal rules. 195 Certainly, this conception of property rules is far 
closer to conventional use of the idea of property, _that of lay 
persons as well as lawyers, than the remedy-focused conceptions 
articulated above.196 But once again, without empirical informa-
tion or assumptions about the effectiveness of the coercive sanc-
tions as well as the extent of recalcitrance among the popula-
tion-information that is no part of this conception of property 
rules-one is unable to make any significant generalizations 
about the efficiency of such rules as compared to similarly de-
fined liability or inalienability rules. 197 
"'Compare this Pragmatic Conception with the following now classic definition of 
property: 
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached: 
To the world: 
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or 
withhold. 
Signed: Private citizen 
Endorsed: The state 
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 374 (1954). Of 
course, neither the Pragmatic Conception in the text nor Professor Cohen's more 
picturesque formulation captures the liberal concept of full ownership of a thing, 
though for different reasons. For example, to obtain the notion of A's ownership of 
Blackacre, one must specify not only that A may keep B off Blackacre, but also that 
A may herself use Blackacre without B's consent. The Pragmatic Conception, like all 
versions of C&M's typology, leaves open the nature of the entitlement at issue; it can 
refer to A's Hohfeldian liberty vis-a-vis B to use a thing or to A's Hohfeldian claim-
right that B not use the thing. Nevertheless, ownership entails more than just a par-
ticular form of transaction rule. See generally A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (A. G. Guest ed., 1961). 
19
' Notice that conventional property rights, even those protected only by damages 
remedies, are back in the property rule category where they belong. 
197 To complete the story, such definitions are included here: 
Pragmatic Conception of Liability Rules in Law: A's entitlement relative to B is 
governed by a liability rule if and only if (1) B is permitted to take or damage 
the entitlement with or without A's consent, provided that if done without A's 
consent then B must compensate A for the value of the loss in an amount and 
under terms publicly determined, and (2) some state-authorized coercive sanction 
may be employed against B on account of B's taking or damaging the entitle-
ment in violation of (1). 
Pragmatic Conception of Inalienability Rules in Law: A's entitlement relative to 
B is governed by an inalienability rule if and only if (1) B is not permitted to 
take or damage the entitlement with A's consent, and (2) some state-authorized 
coercive sanction may be employed against B on account of B's taking or 
damaging the entitlement in violation of (1). 
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The present argument certainly does not rule out on concep-
tual grounds a comparative efficiency analysis, even one that 
proceeds by making simplifying assumptions. It insists only that 
concepts be employed in a coherent and sensible fashion. Up 
until now, the most common simplification facilitating efficiency 
comparisons has been to assume, either implicitly or explicitly, 
the operation of perfectly effective sanctions, whether as part of 
the meaning of transaction rules or as a separate social parame-
ter. As in C&M's arguments, damages are assumed to be paid, 
injunctions are assumed to be obeyed, and criminal prohibitions 
are assumed to be effective, at least until the question of "opti-
mal enforcement" is addressed specifically, usually in the con-
text of criminal sanctions. 198 
The principal difficulty with this approach is that the assump-
tion about remedial effectiveness, however quickly it is aban-
doned, is in tension with the Holmesian assumption about the 
citizenry, the assumption that makes it superficially plausible to 
ignore the distinction between guidance and enforcement. Does 
it make sense after all to assume that all citizens will ignore any 
legal rule to the extent it is not backed by a coercive sanction 
and~-at the sametime, 10 assume that they will obey the rule to 
the extent it is backed by such a sanction? Such a world is pe-
culiar indeed. The examples that come to mind are the legal 
Notice that under these Pragmatic Conceptions not all structures involving remedies 
limited to compensation are liability rules, but only those that, like conventional 
options, B is permitted to exercise. On the other hand, the traditional option does 
llOI involve a liability rule, because the option exercise price, as distinct from the 
price of the option itself, is privately determined. Such options simply constitute a 
form of property rule. Thus, all liability rules involve a kind of option, but not all 
options involve liability rules. Cf. Rose, supra note 22, at 2178-79 (characterizing a 
liability rule as a property right subject to an option). Notice also that the Pragmatic 
Conception of inalienability includes, but is not limited to, structures under which the 
entitlement may be taken without A's consent for a publicly determined price. As 
noted earlier, it might be better to separate such rules from rules that provide for full 
inalienability, that is, from entitlements that may not be taken with or withoul A's 
consent. See supra note 99. This has the virtue of isolating two logically independent 
binary variables, A's power to transfer voluntarily to B, or its absence, and A's liability 
to involuntary transfer to B, or its absence. 
198 Compare C&M, supra note 4, at 1106-24 (apparently assuming effectiveness of 
sanctions in discussing relative merits of property, liability, and inalienability rules) 
with id. al 1093 (noting that economic considerations include questions of admin-
istrative costs of enforcement) and id. al 1124-27 (acknowledging that enforcement of 
criminal sanctions is less than perfect). 
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system of an unjust and illegitimate state populated by moral yet 
cowardly citizens, or alternatively that of an omnipotent state, 
however just, populated by narrowly self-interested citizens. 
Evidently, the latter is the image that hovers in the back of more 
than one scholar's mind.199 Still, why either such system should 
be used as a model from which to learn about our own is in con-
siderable need of explanation. 
Economic analysis can proceed, however, without the Holme-
sian baggage. One need not assume ubiquitous recalcitrance. 
Starting with our Pragmatic Conceptions, which avoid the con-
fusions that attend building effectiveness into the rule types 
themselves, one can separately assume that the sanctions brought 
to bear are in fact sufficiently powerful to persuade all recalci-
trants, or at least those of interest, not to violate the rules' pre-
scriptions. Since the law-abiding need no compulsion, this would 
produce a situation of uniformly law-conforming behavior that 
can be analyzed in terms of transaction costs, compensation as-
sessment costs, and so forth. 200 Some, but by no means all, of the 
conclusions that law and economics writers have advanced can be 
restated in such terms.201 A major difference identified in the 
course of the present analysis is that sanctions will not be 
treated as prices by the law-abiding, a fact that will be of practi-
cal significance as the assumption about the strength of the sanc-
tions is relaxed. Failure to recognize this fact, and a resulting 
underestimation of the behavioral impact of guidance rules 
backed by relatively weak sanctions, have been recurring fea-
tures of extant law and economics literature. 
199 Recall C&M's assumptions about the behavior of people in the absence of state 
authority. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
200 In particular, this is the best way to reconstruct the confused yet laudably explicit 
conceptual scheme employed by Professors Kaplow and Shavell. See supra notes 
175-177 and accompanying text. For example, A's entitlement to her automobile can 
be felicitously described as governed by a property rule by noting that the pre-
scriptive norm is that others are not allowed to take her car without her permission. 
It is also true, as a contingent and assumed fact, that recalcitrants who would not 
honor this prescription are prevented from taking the car without her permission by 
the presence of sanctions. This way, when the assumption of perfect effectiveness of 
sanctions is relaxed, it is still correct to say that A's entitlement is governed by a 
property rule even as to a person who is willing to take A's car without her consent. 
201 This point will be illustrated further in Part V, infra. 
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Rather than continue this line of analysis, I want to suggest a 
different, and I think more useful, way to approach the design of 
transaction structures. Instead of assuming initially a nonubiq-
uitous recalcitrance that is entirely offset by powerful threats of 
coercive sanctions, it is in many ways more illuminating to as-
sume initially no recalcitrance at all. Although in theory one 
should generate the same results from either direction, this as-
sumption requires one to focus more explicit attention on law's 
relevance to the neglected "silent majority" of citizens. who are 
generally law-abiding. 
V. THE DESIGN OF GUIDANCE AND ENFORCEMEI'IT RULES 
Consider the simplifying assumption that all persons, or at 
least those persons of interest in the particular analysis, are 
completely law-abiding. This eliminates the need to assume the 
uniform effectiveness of coercive remedies and allows a direct 
comparison of the efficiency of property, liability, and inal-
ienability rules on terms not terribly dissimilar to that of C&M 
(provided one filiers out the language of recalcitrance). Indeed, 
this is the best way to reconstruct C&M's argument.202 As we 
have seen, one then works with the prescriptive concepts of such 
rule types, as reflected in the first component of our Pragmatic 
Conceptions. There is no conceptual tension of the sort encoun-
tered in the more usual analysis, built on the Holmesian per-
spective. Of course, one need not limit the arguments to effi-
ciency considerations; the assumption of no recalcitrance facil-
itates, but does not require, a focus on efficiency. In any case, 
the model of society from which this analysis works is consid-
erably less cynical, and in most contexts substantially closer to 
reality, than those associated with the Holmesian perspective.203 
201 Recall that C&M proceed by first addressing the allocation of entitlements, 
based on considerations of economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and other 
concerns, see C&M supra note 4, at 1093-1105, and then addressing the protection of 
those entitlements by property rules, liability rules, or inalienability rules, see id. at 
1105-15. The analysis in the text parallels this approach but does not duplicate it. 
203 1t is interesting to contrast this model with those that economists consider 
optimistic. Professor Polinsky, in an oft-cited early article elaborating and qualifying 
the C&M framework, started with a set of unusually explicit assumptions that he 
called "the best of all possible worlds," one of "cooperative behavior, costless 
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In the following Sections, I illustrate the value of approaching 
the analysis of entitlements in this way. ·After developing sev-
eral thoughts about how the law would be articulated in the con-
text of no recalcitrance, the assumption is relaxed to allow for 
some, but never complete, recalcitrance. Only a cursory analy-
sis is attempted here, as this subject amounts to the reconstruc-
tion of law in a liberal state. 
A. Guidance Rules in a World of No Recalcitrance 
Guidance will be of value even to the most scrupulously law-
abiding citizens. Our assumption does not require that citizens 
have shared values, other than r_ecognition of the importance of 
the rule of law, nor does it require that citizens have perfect, or 
even imperfect but shared, information about the world.204 As-
suming a world of persons of varying interests, values, and in-
formation, in some contexts people will need to know whether a 
certain entitlement is alienable. If so, they may consider options 
for alienation. If it is not, they will not attempt to alienate. In 
some contexts people will need to know whether a certain enti-
tlement can be adversely affected, destroyed, or taken, without 
the consent of its holder, provided compensation is paid. If not, 
they will not take. If so, they will choose, on whatever grounds 
of utility or fairness that matter to them, whether or not to take 
the entitlement. But if they do take, they will voluntarily pay 
the necessary compensation. Some form of adjudication may be 
necessary in order to determine an "objective" value of the enti-
tlement, but declaratory relief will suffice; enforcement of the 
debt so generated will not be necessary. In this manner, C&M's 
redistribution, and perfect information." A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance 
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1075, 1080 (1980). Moreover, it is clear from his discussion that "cooperative 
behavior" does not mean law-abiding behavior, but rather the absence of often self-
defeating and efficiency-defeating strategic hold-out behavior. See id. at 1078. 
Polinsky was, of course, precluded from considering law-abiding behavior as part of 
the "best of all possible worlds" because he followed the usual identification of rule 
types with remedy types, in the context of which recalcitrance is implicitly assumed. 
See id. at 1076 (identifying property rules with injunctive relief and liability rules with 
damages). 
204 See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text. 
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property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules should be 
seen as among the various ways that social life can be structured. 
Problems such as the overuse of resources held in common, 
transaction costs, holdouts, and free riders-the principal issues 
underlying C&M's analysis-would exist as well in the hypothe-
sized world. Consequently, in considering how particular classes 
of entitlements should be structured, the various considerations 
of static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, and distributional pref-
erences that C&M describe would still come into play.205 Per-
sonally, I find C&M's framework rather impoverished in its fail-
ure to take seriously justice-based arguments that do not depend 
ultimately on the idea of preferences. But that is another story. I 
do not pretend to offer here a comprehensive normative theory 
of transaction structures.206 Certainly, it is difficult to envision a 
system that emphasizes property rules and inalienability rules 
without presupposing some form of liberal legal order, wherever 
situated on the political spectrum. And that has important im-
plications. The most obvious is that liability rules should be dis-
favored, involving as they do a clear incursion on the autonomy 
of the entitlement holder. Of course, as communitarians would 
be quick to observe, property rules involve an incursion on the 
autonomy of the non-holder in that they eliminate the freedom 
to take without the holder's consent. But economists will surely 
recognize that the two incursions are not symmetric: The holder 
may invest time and energy in the res governed by the rule and 
thus stands to lose under a liability rule in a way that is not ap-
plicable to the non-holder under a property rule.207 Thus, iiabi1-
' 05 In many cases, work by scholars in the Jaw and economics tradition can be 
"translated" into versions relevant to such an assumed world. See Stephen Marks, 
Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 215, 
225-26 (1996) (indicating that C&M's article, as well as more recent work by Ayres 
and Talley and by Kaplow and Shavell, may be understood as relevant to a world in 
which full compliance is assumed). 
'Db This would, of course, be a Herculean undertaking. As Professor Marks notes in 
connection with his assumed world of full compliance, we can imagine working out 
the details of "property Jaw, contract Jaw, corporation Jaw, the Jaw of estates and 
trusts, tax Jaw, commercial law, and securities law," among others. See id. at 226. 
207 And this is true even if the investment of time and energy by the holder is not 
reflected in the economic value of the res. Professors Coleman and Kraus distinguish 
the classical liberal conception of property rights, motivated by a concern to protect 
autonomy, from the economistic conception of property rights premised on pro-
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ity rules should be limited to situations in which there is a de-
monstrable and convincing need to override the holder's choice 
to refuse alienation. Further, as between property and inal-
ienability rules, property rules should be the default preference, 
in this context out of respect for the autonomy of the willing 
holder and the willing transferee. The precise conditions under 
which a convincing need arises to override these default prefer-
ences are of course controversial, but a mere gain in economic 
efficiency may not be enough.208 Moreover, the reality of the 
claimed needs, even on narrow economic grounds, is often sub-
ject to challenge.209 
The main point for present purposes, however, is that the en-
tire thrust of the questions to be addressed changes dramatically 
as one shifts focus, however incrementally, to consider the re-
calcitrant citizen. In particular, it should now be clear that in 
discussing the various guidance rule types, one can raise the 
question of what form of enforcement is best as to each. Thus it 
is perfectly coherent, if not always desirable, to speak of prop-
erty rules that are enforced only by compensatory damage 
awards, or only by punitive damage awards, or by both; of li-
ability rules that are enforced only by injunctions, or only by 
criminal sanctions, or by both; and of inalienability rules that 
are enforced by any of these, singly or in combination. The 
combinations are obviously many. Indeed, if there are, say, six 
primary remedial options (e.g., criminal sanction, civil compen-
sation, restitution, civil punitive awards, injunctive relief, and 
recovery of litigation expenses) that can each be used or not 
used to protect a given entitlement, then sixty-four basic reme-
tecting only the (economic) value of the entitlement. See Coleman & Kraus, supra 
note 8, at 1356-65. 
208 Professor Dworkin has argued, for example, that even if certain rights, like 
property rights, are causally attributable to the economic advantages to society 
derived therefrom, those rights generate claims that need not be defeasible in the 
interest of policies such as achieving economic efficiency. See Ronald Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously 90-100 {1978). 
209 For example, a recent article demonstrates that the need to allow buyers to take 
intellectual property without enduring high transaction costs, a problem that has led 
to proposals for compulsory licensing schemes, can be and is being handled under 
property rules by parties' contracting into schemes that allow subsequent compen-
sated takings. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293 (1996). 
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dial combinations are possible.210 For each guidance rule cate-
gory, one can therefore consider which combination of remedies 
is appropriate.211 
A recent article by Stephen Marks illustrates several of these 
points nicely.212 Professor Marks employs a set of simplifying as-
sumptions in order to investigate the relationship of the C&M 
sche11Ie to tort and crilTLinallavv. He assumes "shared valt1es" in 
the sense of views about what constitutes a good society, 
"shared knowledge" about the facts of the world, and voluntary 
"full compliance" with the authoritatively announced rules.213 Af-
ter analyzing how entitlements might be structured in this as-
sumed world, he relaxes first the assumption of full-compliance 
and then the assumption of shared knowledge. In particular, 
Marks recognizes the crucial if obvious point that the question 
of coercive remedies only enters the picture when the former as-
sumption is relaxed. This analysis is offered for the ultimate 
purpose of illustrating how utilitarian theorists can explain the 
now prominent idea of excluding from the social utility to be 
maximized the utility resulting for criminals from their criminal 
acts.214 Marks' solution is that we collectively choose rules so as 
to maximize social utility in the full compliance world, but we 
strip criminally derived utility from the social welfare function 
210 A remedial dimensionality of m = 6, meaning six binary variables that can be 
combined in any way, yields (2)' = 64 possible remedial combinations, not all of 
which would necessarily be meaningful or practical. In Section IV.B, infra, I iry to 
outline some practical considerations identifying the most important combinations. 
For a good discussion of some remedial subtleties inspired by the C&M framework, 
see Levmore, supra note 37. 
211 According to Professor Morris' elaboration of the C&M scheme, the three (or 
four, if one distinguishes between partial and full inalienability, see supra note 99) 
C&M rule types are just some of the 14 meaningful entitlement forms (out of a 
possible (2)' = 64 forms) that can be generated by different combinations of three 
binary variables with respect to transfer applicable to either party: "initiation choice," 
"veto power," and "monetary compensation." See Morris, supra note 15, at 838-49. 
Thus, C&M's scheme of transfer rules is based on a guidance rule dimensionality of 
n = 6, meaning six independent binary variables, even though not all combinations 
are meaningful. 
21
' See Marks, supra note 205. 
213 ld. at 223-24. This is the only such use of the full-compliance assumption that I 
have encountered in the work of theorists making explicit use of the C&lvl rule 
typology. 
214 See id. C\t 221-23. 
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once the full-compliance assumption is relaxed and the issue is 
simply one of optimal enforcement levels.215 
Despite the insightful use of a full-compliance model, Marks' 
argument suffers from confusing features and incomplete argu-
ments. Foremost is the question of why, in a world with all 
these assumptions, one would need rules at all. With shared 
knowledge, shared social values, and well-behaved citizens, why 
would people not simply know and do what is best without the 
aid of rules? Perhaps there is an answer to this question, but 
Marks does not provide it.216 My suggestion that the need for 
authoritative rules arises from problems of coordination in a 
world of imperfect information and from good faith disagree-
ments on matters of moral principle provides the basis for the 
promulgation of rules, compliance with which Marks initially as-
sumes. Thus, in constructing models for an analysis of law, how-
ever ideal, one must not lose sight of the problems that make 
law an important, if not necessary, social institution.217 
Notwithstanding the assumption of no recalcitrance, whatever 
scheme of property, liability, and inalienability rules is chosen 
for the law-abiding citizenry will include a class of remedial 
rules concerning transfers that can be subsumed only with some 
215 See id. at 228-29. 
216 See id. at 224 (asserting, without explanation, that inhabitants of such a world 
would promulgate rules). Because of the assumptions of shared knowledge and 
shared social values, the answer cannot lie in the claim that individuals will have 
differing opinions about how social utility should be maximized. Perhaps the answer 
lies in the proposition that the full-compliance assumption, which pertains only to 
rules, presupposes that authoritative rules are adopted, so that without such rules 
there will be no assurance that people will choose to maximize social utility in their 
actions even though they all know what actions would lead to such a result and all 
value such a result. It is not clear how this can be fleshed out. 
211 One cannot tell exactly what Professor Marks intends by his assumption of 
shared values, because he does not go through the exercise of relaxing that assump-
tion. See id. at 217 n.7. Such an exercise would give needed contextual definition to 
the original assumption as well as to its relationship to the assumption of shared infor-
mation. Similarly, his main argument for the possible usefulness of liability rules-
rules conditioning the permissibility of some acts upon the payment of compen-
sation-in a world of full compliance depends upon the public's being unable to 
observe directly the actor's personal utility, so that compensation is used to test the 
value of the act to the actor. See id. at 225. But Marks does not explain how this 
problem even arises in a world of completely shared information, which he also 
assumes at this point in his argument. See id. at 224. 
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work under the prescriptive version of the C&M typology or a 
suitable elaboration thereof. These are rules that deal with the 
innocent mistakes that even law-abiding citizens will occasion-
ally make. For example, suppose Taney sends money to Mar-
shaH by mistake; the money was meant to go to Chase in dis-
charge of a debt. Assuming that the social judgment is that 
I\tiarshall must return the money, l\1arshall has a duty that is a 
not so obvious feature of Taney's property right in the money. 
Not only must Marshall refrain from intentionally or negligently 
taking or destroying Taney's money, the more obvious kind of 
duty, but he must also return such money when mistakenly 
given to him without any fault on his part.218 
Similarly, suppose Taney destroys the object of Marshall's 
property right under the reasonable but mistaken belief that the 
res was within Taney's property rights or that their relationship 
with regard to the res was governed by a liability rule.219 As-
suming that the social judgment is that the burden of such mis-
haps should fall on the destroyer, Taney may be required to 
compensate Marshall for the loss.220 
To be sure, one might conclude from the preceding that the 
law of negligence, in its remedial dimensions, would have no 
role at all in a world of law-abiding citizens; negligence is faulty 
conduct, and such conduct would not occur in the hypothesized 
world. Individuals' property interests in not being harmed neg-
ligently would be respected, so the law of negligence would con-
sist simply of a prohibition or set of prohibitions against unrea-
sonably risky acts. The problem of innocent mistakes, however, 
forces us to qualify this conclusion to a small but perceptible ex-
m See Dobbs, supra note 91, § 4.1(1), at 553. By the same token, an innocent finder 
must return the thing found to its previous holder. See Ray Andrews Brown, The 
Law of Personal Property§ 3.1, at 24 (Walter B. Raushenush ed., 3d ed. 1975). 
'
1
' As these possibilities i!!ustrate, there can be uncertainty among a wholly Jaw-
abiding citizenry even after guidance rules are promulgated on a given subject. 
Devices such as declaratory relief are of value in such cases. See Hart, supra note 65, 
at 89-96 (discussing uncertainty as one of the central problems that developed legal 
institutions attempt to solve, and distinguishing this issue from the problem of devel-
oping efficient sanctions to enforce obligations). 
220 See Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 17, at 110 (noting that reasonable mistake is 
rarely an effective defense to a claim for damages resulting from otherwise inten-
tional torts). 
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tent. Negligence liability under current law is often said to be, 
in theory and perhaps in practice, a matter of objective fault, 
with conduct measured by what is reasonable for the hypotheti-
cal person of ordinary prudence, not what would or did seem 
reasonable to the actual actor.221 Consequently, such liability 
may be imposed upon someone who has acted in utmost good 
faith. Of course, the presence of good faith does not mean that 
the actor is without fault, even in a subjective sense, because a 
mistake that led to those good faith beliefs might itself have 
been one that ought not to have been made. But in the case of 
actions of children or the insane, for example, fault-based liabil-
ity under negligence law might well entail no plausible claim 
that the actual actor should have acted otherwise.222 Thus, to the 
limited extent that subjective fault is not mirrored by objective 
fault, the compensatory demands of conventional negligence li-
ability might be necessary even in the hypothetical society of 
completely law-abiding citizens.223 
211 See id. § 32, at 173-75. 
212 See id. at 176-82. Use of an objective standard might be a consequence of under-
lying principles of moral responsibility, as distinct from moral fault, or it might simply 
be a consequence of concerns about the difficulties of proving subjective fault, with 
objective fault being used as a proxy. See id. § 4, at 21-23. To the extent that this use 
of an objective standard is the result of proof difficulties, it would be largely unneces-
sary in a world of law-abiding citizens, who would not make perjurious denials about 
material facts. 
223 It is instructive to contrast this point with what Professor Marks has to say about 
compensation rules when he relaxes the full-compliance assumption. Marks draws 
the following conclusion about the respective roles of strict and fault-based tort 
liability: "Tort law has a dual nature, encompassing both prohibited and conditionally 
permissible acts. However, this duality does not correspond to the divide between 
strict liability and negligence." Marks, supra note 205, at 233. The first of these 
conclusions is entirely consistent with the arguments of the present Article. The 
second is consistent with the present arguments only to the extent that negligence 
liability covers conditionally permissible acts as described in the text or to the extent 
that strict liability is a misnomer. See supra note 60. These are not, however, the 
considerations that led Marks to his conclusion, for he concedes that compensation 
based on negligence is a form of fault-based liability that is introduced as a possible 
legal response only with the relaxation of the full-compliance assumption. See id. at 
228 n.39 and accompanying text. Rather, he reaches this conclusion by hypothesizing 
a world without full compliance in which the following transaction structure is put in 
place: 
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These various obligations of restitution and compensation for 
mistakes might be construed as prescriptive liability rules, since 
they do not involve the social judgment that the action giving 
rise to the obligation was improper. On the other hand, this is 
not to say that the law condones those actions. In the context of 
negligent or intentional (but good faith) harms, it is surely true 
that, could those harms or mistakes be publicly anticipated, the 
social judgment would be that the act should not be performed; 
indeed, if such anticipation were communicated to the actor be-
fore the action is taken, it would change the conditions that ren-
der the act not improper. Even in the context of a mistaken de-
livery of an item to another, communication of the anticipated 
burdening of the innocent recipient might well deprive the actor 
of the benefit of the rule requiring restitution. Such features are 
not part of the paradigms of liability rule invoked by C&M, such 
as eminent domain, and there is no reason to think C&M in-
tended their conception to extend to the restitutionary obliga-
tions outlined here. 
act prohibited act conditionally permissible act permissible 
lowest level I I highest ievei 
of care A B of care 
harms 
compensated 
harms 
compensated 
harms 
not compensated 
Id. at 231 exhibit 3G. Under this structure, actions with the lowest levels of pre-
caution (less than A) are prohibited and violations of the prohibition are subject to a 
requirement of compensation; actions with the highest levels of precaution (greater 
than B) are unconditionally permitted; and actions with intermediate levels of 
precaution are permitted subject to a duty to compensate. This and similar struc-
tures, Marks concludes, "resemble activities subject to negligence," id. at 231, yet it 
entails conditionally permissible action (between A and B). Given his earlier 
concession that negligence entails fault, it is not clear why Marks concludes that the 
structure as a whole "resembles" negligence, except that it is true that the require-
ment of compensation is discontinuous as a function of precaution, with the discon-
tinuity occurring at point B. He does not explain why it would not be more accurate 
to say that the structure is a mixed system of negligence and strict liability, with 
negligence liability below level A and strict liability at levels between A and B. For 
there are two discontinuities in the structure, one that determines fault (at point A) 
and one that determines the duty to compensate (at point B). Similar problems 
affect Marks' conclusion that strict liability does not "exclusively" price behavior. 
See id. That conclusion appears to entail the implicit assumption that what defines 
strict liability is the negation of the discontinuity in compensation as a function of 
precaution, whereas it would be more accurate to say that strict liability is defined by 
a duty to compensate without the violation of a fault-based prohibition. 
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This suggests a more general point. I have deliberately re-
ferred to an assumption of "law-abiding" conduct rather than 
one of "moral" conduct. Yet many non-legal social norms would 
provide all the guidance that is needed for law-abiding citizens 
who are also reasonably moral persons. Moral norms prohibit 
murder, for example, and most people do not need to be guided 
on that subject by legal rules. Consequently, legal guidance 
rules concerning murder are, for the most part, unnecessary un-
til one takes account of those who are significantly recalcitrant. 
But this is true only because guidance rules exist in a different 
form. Moreover, to reiterate a point made earlier, there can be 
legitimate differences of opinion about the morality of killing in 
special circumstances, such as euthanasia and abortion. Such 
problems often call for legal guidance because of the authority 
that derives from deliberative resolution and the need for a 
1 "f 224 clear, or at east um orm, answer. 
224 Omitted from the text is a consideration of breach of contract and the difficult 
issue of whether damages for breach are a price-the "efficient breach" theory, see 
Holmes, supra note 71, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common Jaw means a 
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.")-or 
a sanction. This can be rephrased as asking whether the breach of a contractual 
promise is socially approved when the breaching party is prepared to compensate the 
other party for the Joss. Compare Cooter, supra note 103, at 1544-47 (contending 
that, because expectation damages vary with the extent of the harm, and not with the 
state of mind of the breaching party, damages for breach of contract are a price), with 
Finnis, supra note 64, at 320-25 (criticizing the Holmesian version of contractual 
obligation and asserting that the common good requires performance of contracts). 
Daniel Friedmann makes a powerful case against the efficient breach theory, empha-
sizing the presumptive authority of the contracting parties to choose whether to 
permit efficient breach and the Jack of convincing evidence or argument showing that 
permitting compensated breaches is more efficient than not permitting them. See 
Friedmann, supra note 31. He does not, however, specifically address the issue of a 
default rule, a rule determining the permissibility of compensated breach in the absence 
of evidence of the parties' intentions on the question. Perhaps he assumes that the 
parties' hypothetical intentions would be to prohibit even efficient breach, given the 
moral force of promise-keeping and the need to plan one's activities. The popularity 
of the efficient breach theory attests to the proposition that Friedmann's case for the 
inefficiency of permitting compensated breach is not entirely irresistible. In any 
event, the issue of a default rule warrants a clear and authoritative resolution upon 
which contracting parties can rely. Friedmann's description of the current state of the 
law suggests a default rule against intentional compensated breach. See id. at 18-23. 
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B. Enforcement Rules in a World of Imperfect Recalcitrance 
Obviously, innocent mistakes are not the only problems a soci-
ety encounters in the real world. Consideration of recalcitrants 
leads to a number of predictably necessary enforcement measures. 
In light of the importance attributed to such remedial structures 
in the post-C&M literature, I develop in this Section a some-
what more explicit account of the content of enforcement meas-
ures than I did of the guidance rules they are there to support. 
C&M's treatment emphasized criminal sanctions as the means 
of supporting the property rule/liability rule framework.225 As 
we have seen, their analysis of damages, injunctions, and other 
civil remedies is torn between the problem of defining entitle-
ments and the problem of enforcing them. Confusion continues 
to flow from the former emphasis and the latter tension.226 So it 
is important to reemphasize that any particular form of enforce-
ment-whether it be a criminal sanction, a civil punitive sanc-
tion, a civil compensatory sanction, or only social stigmatiza-
tion-might in principle be brought to bear to protect any one 
of the three rule types that C&M explicitly discuss, as well as 
other types they did not address. 
Before turning to the draconian level of criminal sanctions, it 
is both just and prudent to consider what can be accomplished 
by the use of civil remedies. Justice requires this because a soci-
ety committed to individual freedom, however that idea is ex-
pressed, must have a powerful justification for the imposition of 
such burdens on individual interests as those that result from 
"'See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27. 
226 Note, for example, the implicit identification of property rules with the criminal 
sanction and liability rules with compensatory sanctions in the use by Professors 
Murphy and Coleman of the C&M framework: 
The criminal law [in contrast to "other branches of the law"] functions to 
prohibit and thus to go beyond requirements of mere negotiation and liability. 
(If you willfully injure me, you may have to pay me compensation, but you are 
also very likely to suffer criminal punishment for what you have done to me.) 
Murphy & Coleman, supra note 27, at 112. In other words, we are told that civil law 
rules do not "prohibit" violations of property or inalienability rules; they provide only 
for compensation under liability rules. For these authors' further views on civil versus 
criminal awards, see id. at 143-61. 
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the application of the criminal sanction.227 Prudence requires it 
as well, in view of the enormous public costs associated with the 
prosecution of crime and the execution of criminal sentences.228 
Moderate recalcitrance might be controlled by less serious sanc-
tions than those corporal punishments, including incarceration, 
associated with the criminal law. Several categories of issues 
readily come to mind. 
First, a recalcitrant might not respect property rules. To be 
effective such rules require some sort of enforcement, perhaps 
by a rule requiring compensation for violating the property enti-
tlement. Second, recalcitrants might not accept inalienability 
rules, so there will be a similar need to provide for compensa-
tion to someone whose inalienable entitlement has been vio-
lated, as C&M explicitly recognized.229 Third, a recalcitrant 
might refuse to honor a duty to compensate under a liability 
rule that he has invoked by an unconsented taking. In each such 
case, further efforts to enforce the payment of compensation 
might take a non-punitive form such as empowering a court or 
other agency to seize assets of the recalcitrant in order to pay off 
the debt.230 
m See id. at 109 (arguing that measures Jess intrusive than criminal punishment 
should be considered in the interest of protecting individual liberty and avoiding the 
harshness of criminal sanctions). 
228 The direct financial costs of incarceration and the judicial costs that result from 
understandable efforts to resist incarceration are obviously enormous. For a recent 
contribution addressing some of the Jess obvious negative implications of incar-
ceration, see Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in 
the Age of Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 497 (1994). 
229 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
230 Obviously, such power is a significant part of our legal system. For an overview, 
see David G. Epstein, Bankruptcy and Other Debtor-Creditor Laws in a Nutshell 
(5th ed. 1995). In the case of liability rules, there are often special mechanisms for 
securing payment of the price for exercise of the taker's option. See, e.g., Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (enjoining polluting activity 
until payment of permanent damages). If title or possession has passed before default 
in payments, the most likely result is the court-ordered return of title or possession if 
such restitution is possible. See, e.g., Sackman & Van Brunt, supra note 29, § 8.10[1] 
(summarizing cases holding that land taken by eminent domain must be returned if 
the awarded compensation is not paid). 
Professors Coleman and Kraus seem to believe that such problems present an 
unavoidable need for recourse to the criminal law "or some institutional arrangement 
very much like it." Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1366. They reason that crim-
inal or quasi-criminal sanctions would be necessary to enforce judgments that pre-
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Of course, there will be cases in which the harm done to indi-
viduals by the failure of the recalcitrant to pay in accordance 
with such obligations is too small to justify the expenditure of 
the victims' resources in litigation, and this is true even if litiga-
tion expenses are potentially recoverable by the successful liti-
gant. If corrective justice is to be achieved, such problems will 
need to be solved by resorting to some sort of public enforce-
ment or a class action device, whether privately or publicly initi-
ated. In the latter case, for particularly diffuse and widespread 
harm, the state might act as proxy in the collection of compensa-
tory damages. Some civil fines imposed under current law 
might be explained and justified in this manner.231 'Nhether such 
public enforcement is necessary depends upon the litigative 
economies of scale available to the state and whether such 
economies can be achieved in the private sphere. It might be, of 
course, that private institutions will emerge to fill the void if the 
state does not act. But do we have confidence in that possibil-
ity? If we do not, is our lack of confidence warranted? For ex-
ample, before its large-scale use, would we have had confidence 
in the emergence of the contingent fee as a means of financing 
lawsuits by relatively poor plaintiffs suffering significant harm?232 
scribe the payment of debts or damages. See id. (Although presented as a hypo-
thetical interpretation of an argument that the criminal law backs transaction 
structures, the authors clarify in a footnote that they endorse that form of the 
argument. See id. at 1367 n.35.) But as indicated in the text, in many cases it may not 
be necessary or even desirable to invoke the criminal sanction in such contexts. 
Property can be seized and sold without doing so, and in fact this is the usual practice. 
(Physical resistance by the debtor, a rare phenomenon, might invoke the criminal 
law, but because of the resistance to lawful authority rather than the failure to pay 
the debt itself.) Only if there is available property from which to satisfy the judgment 
but which is not readily accessible without the debtor's cooperation does debt 
enforcement against the recalcitrant potentially drive one to something "very much 
like" the criminal Jaw, namely "civil contempt" incarceration. See, e.g., Hicks ex rei. 
Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (addressing the use of incarceration for con-
tempt of court in ignoring court orders to pay available money in discharge of child 
support duty). Nonetheless, this qualification only strengthens the ultimate point 
Coleman and Kraus were making, that the criminal law's relation to transaction struc-
tures is more indirect than some law and economics practitioners have assumed. 
m But see Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76 
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 7-10 (1996) (lamenting the tendency of public enforcement to expand 
from civil fines that might be explainable in this fashion to criminal fines and 
imprisonment). 
232 On contingent fees, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.9, at 
567-74 (4th ed. 1992). 
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Such a civil compensatory enforcement scheme, even if aug-
mented by publicly initiated enforcement when needed, will 
likely be insufficient in two important ways.233 First, as C&M ar-
gued, a stronger response is necessary in order to prevent recal-
citrants from converting property rules and inalienability rules 
into de facto liability rules, that is, rules that function like liabil-
ity rules except that the involuntary taking is not socially con-
doned.234 These further measures will be necessary to offset the 
uncertainty of enforcement of the compensatory remedies,235 to 
avoid undermining incentives for investment under property en-
titlements,236 and to reassert the wrongfulness of the recalci-
trant's cost-benefit analysis itself.237 
233 A third inadequacy that may be noted is that on rare occasions both the harm 
and the perpetrator can be predicted with reasonable certainty, in which case pre-
ventive relief is feasible and desirable, in the form of an injunction backed by the 
potential of coercive measures, or even preventive detention. See generally Stephen 
J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 113 
(1996). 
234 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27 (noting also that the circumvention of 
established property rules will hamper the effectiveness of the market in achieving 
static Pareto efficiency); see also Murphy & Coleman, supra note 27, at 114-16 
(describing the public interest in suppressing conduct that undermines the pre-
scriptive rule structure, a kind of revolutionary activity). The prevention of injuries 
that are not plausibly compensable, such as loss of life or limb, is often suggested as a 
reason to impose a regime of deterrence. See id. at 112-13 (developing a similar sug-
gestion by the philosopher Robert Nozick). But as the problem of automobile acci-
dents illustrates, this reasoning by itself does not explain our existing institutions, 
which frequently and rightly provide only compensatory remedies for such injuries. 
m See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. 
Econ. 169 (1968) (applying economic analysis to suggest an "optimal level" of 
enforcement); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between 
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979) (same). One 
must, of course, adjust for the Holmesian assumptions that appear in such articles. 
236 See David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary 
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1990) 
(arguing that extraordinary remedies such as punitive damages are needed to prevent 
opportunistic takings that capture the potential gains from trade and thereby dis-
courage investment by the initial entitlement holders). This otherwise illuminating 
article is a good example of the continuing legacy of conceptual confusion about rule 
typology. The problem mentioned in the text, that resort only to compensatory pro-
tection of property rules can undermine incentives, is described by these authors as a 
problem that "liability rules may be strategically abused." I d. at 13. But what they 
should have referred to is the strategic abuse of property rules enforced only by 
compensatory remedies. This can be seen most easily by noting that, if entitlements 
are correctly allocated as between property and liability rules, then it is difficult to 
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Second, there is the distinct problem of recalcitrants who try 
to convert inalienability rules into de facto property rules.238 If 
the directly affected persons actually agree to the sale of a 
nominally inalienable entitlement there may be particularly dif-
ficult problems associated with detection, since mutual consent 
makes the existence of a complaining party unlikely. Thus, 
publicly initiated punishment may be necessary for "victimless" 
crimes, crimes for which a victim, if there is one, is unlikely to 
complain by way of a civil suit because she is a willing party to 
the transfer, or for illegal alienations in which the numerous vic-
tims are each too minimally affected to warrant expenditures 
necessary for litigation.239 Such publicly initiated punishment is, 
in general, criminal punishmene40 
make sense of the idea of a liability rule being "abused" by the taker's paying only 
compensation: That is exactly what the law contemplates, for whatever good reasons 
that may be. Abuse of liability rules must be attributed not so much to strategic 
opportunism by takers, but rather to the law's error in allocating the entitlement to a 
liability rule structure rather than a property rule structure. Of course, Haddock et 
al. were precluded from articulating the matter in the way suggested here because, 
like most people working in law and economics, they were unable to distinguish a 
property rule that is enforced by a compensatory remedy from a liability rule how-
ever enforced. 
237 See generally Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean 
Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (1988). Although deterrence and retribution 
are often viewed as incompatible ideas, the one forward-looking and the other 
backward-looking, Hampton rightly emphasizes their compatibility. See id. at 138, 
143; see also B. Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat, 
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 Law & Phil. 151 (1989) (arguing that the usual 
emphasis on retribution in Kant's theory of punishment neglects the deterrent 
element of the threat of punishment also evident in Kant's theory). 
DB See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in Criminal Justice: 
Nomos XXVII 289,302-03 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985). 
m Indeed, the Jaw would also have to decide which party to a consensual trans-
action is the "victim." The law could achieve some deterrence by picking one or the 
other party to the transaction, the identity of whom might or might not be known in 
advance of the transaction, and endowing that person with civil remedies. But in 
many cases the profit to be derived from the suit would not be worth the conse-
quential losses to the "victim" in foregone future transactions. 
'""To be sure, under existing law there are proceedings that are publicly initiated 
and entail the imposition of punitive sanctions but that are not considered criminal, 
perhaps because only monetary sanctions are available. These aberrations, created 
in part to avoid constitutional restrictions on criminal prosecution, are criminal pro-
ceedings by any reasonable conception, and should be examined in that light. See, 
e.g., Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 Duke L.J. 960 (arguing that the nature and 
severity of sanctions under the Act render it quasi-criminal). 
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The same is not necessarily true of the first class of cases, un-
consented takings, since there will generally be an aggrieved 
party who would be willing to take legal action. In other words, 
itis important to assess to what extent arguments presented for 
sanctions that are more severe than compensation lead to the 
need for punishment simpliciter and to what extent they support 
specifically criminal punishment, meaning public prosecution.241 
One can put the question this way: Given the institutions of pu-
nitive and restitutionary civil awards, why have criminal pun-
ishment at all, other than to suppress consensual transfers of 
nominally inalienable rights? As presently constituted the criti-
cal characteristic of criminal punishment, aside· from the fact 
that prosecution is done by the state at public expense, is that 
certain kinds of penalties, mainly incarceration or death, are 
available only in such a context. Given this feature, there are 
several things to say about the necessity of criminal punishment. 
Civil remedies, at least as presently configured, give a cause of 
action only to a plaintiff who has been injured, whereas one 
might well want to be able to punish some outrageous actions 
that only expose people to unacceptable risks of injury. This is a 
problem for the civil law, though it may not be insuperable. 
That is, the civil law could be configured to allow punitive dam-
ages without proof of actual injury.242 Although it would require 
greater institutional changes, tort law could also be restructured 
to allow compensatory damages for risk exposure, whether or 
not predicated on injury to all compensated persons.243 
241 C&M barely mention the subject of punitive civil awards. See C&M, supra note 
4, at 1126 n.71. 
242 There has long been controversy in the courts over whether a punitive award 
must bear some relationship, some proportionality, to the injury suffered. See 
Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 2, at 14-15. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
endorsed the idea that potential as well as actual damages may constitutionally be 
considered in determining appr.opriate punitive awards. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-1602 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources 
Corp., 509 U.S. 443,460 (1993). 
243 Interestingly, Professor (now Judge) Calabresi was one of the first to explore 
such possibilities. See Calabresi, supra note 53, at 306. For a recent exchange on the 
subject, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing 
Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 439 (1990); Simons, supra note 57 (commenting on 
Schroeder); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and 
Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1990). 
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Then, too, there will be some plaintiffs who, although seri-
ously harmed, do not pursue a civil remedy, such as persons who 
are killed or incapacitated by a recalcitrant or children (or other 
family members) who suffer from abuse but are unabie or un-
willing to sue or for whom the recovery of money would be of 
little practical significance. These problems may be solvable: 
Estates may sue by way of a guardian ad litem, which could be 
the state itself as a last resort; children can also be so repre-
sented. But the more important relief in the family context 
would be prospective, that is injunctive, and then the problem of 
the ignored injunction must be anticipated. And if the injured 
persons are unwilling to take action, it might be necessary for 
the public to do so. Once again, criminal penalties will be nec-
essary at some point.244 
However, the problem that many tend to identify most readily 
(if my students are at all indicative) is that monetary awards, no 
matter hmllf high, -vviH not adequately deter certain conduct. 
This is true in some situations, but one must sort it out carefully. 
First, one must segregate examples where even the harshest 
criminal punishment would not deter, such as where the actor 
does not even take into account the punitive consequences of 
her action. Such cases may still call for punishment on retribu-
tivist grounds, but it is unclear whether that necessarily means 
criminal punishment. Perhaps in some cases retribution requires 
something like "an eye for an eye," so that only the impairments 
of life and liberty possible under criminal law will suffice.245 
One can also point to the very rich person, for whom paying 
punitive damages might seem to be just a "cost of doing evil 
business" even if she does attend to the consequences of her 
getting caught. This example also seems misdirected, but for a 
244 Exactly at what point criminal law has a valuable role here is controversial, and 
alternative remedies-such as terminating the parental rights of an abusing parent-
might be superior in many cases. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic 
Relations in the United States§ 9.4, at 358-60 (2d ed. 1988). 
245 This is closely related to the idea that punishment involves an "expressive 
dimension" that cannot be duplicated by monetary penalties. Even here, however, it 
is not clear that incarceration is the only way to achieve such public expression of 
condemnation. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996) (arguing that shaming punishments can express soci-
ety's disapproval of crimes). 
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different reason: It underestimates the extent to which rich peo-
ple value their wealth.246 To say that rich people will not be de-
terred by punitive damages-in some way that criminal punish-
ment would deter them-is really to say that our judges and 
juries will fail to set the punitive award high enough. Why 
should we assume this to be true? Maybe there are some acts 
that would be appropriately deterred by the threat of incarcera-
tion but would not be so deterred by the threat of taking all or 
nearly all of a rich person's present (or future) wealth, but it 
seems unlikely.247 A potentially more serious problem, one that 
could necessitate criminal sanctions operating on the person of 
the wrongdoer, is that a monetary sanction will be ineffective to 
the extent that the wrongdoer can immunize her wealth and in-
come against prevailing methods of debt collection. 248 
For the time being, however, the more serious version of this 
argument concerns those at the other extreme of our society: 
Monetary penalties will not deter someone who has no wealth 
to lose, especially if he suspects that he will never have much 
wealth or that his wealth, either transient or illegally obtained, 
will never be seized. This is a serious problem with civil punitive 
damages and suggests that one of the most important reasons 
for the institution of criminal law is to control willful wrongdo-
ing by the poor. 249 Of course, there may also be offenses that are 
246 Indeed, punitive civil remedies may well be essential for disciplining economically 
powerful entities that are largely immune from significant criminal punishment. See 
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Plural-
ism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1440-45 (1993). 
147 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 409 (1980) (arguing that, in the context of white-collar crime, large 
fines provide deterrence as effective as that provided by imprisonment). At one 
point, however, Posner concedes without explanation that "some ... crimes, such as 
murder, are so serious that even the affluent cannot PCIY adequate fines." ld. at 417. 
248 Under the current regime, some scholars believe that this is a seriuus and 
increasing problem as to unsecured judgment debts such as those that result from tort 
recoveries. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale LJ. 1 (1996). 
24
' See Epstein, supra note 231, at 15 {"Although a person might have 'plenty of 
nothing,' he always fears losing at least two assets: his liberty and his life. Take these 
away and deterrence against aggression can proceed apace even if compensation is 
utterly unavailable to the injured party."); Galanter & Luban, supra note 246, at 1426 
("Increasing reliance on civil punishment therefore fosters a two-tier system with 
organizations, the affluent, and those with modest but stable economic positions 
controlled by civil remedies, while the economically marginal are controlled by the 
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so heinous that, even if committed by a rich person, warrant 
punishment more severe than monetary penalties, regardless of 
deterrence. Moreover, if we use the criminal sanction against 
the poor recalcitrant, some will believe that it must be extended 
to the rich out of a notion of equal treatment, even if it is not 
needed for adequate deterrence or the exaction of appropriate 
retribution.250 
Despite these various arguments for the use of punitive sanc-
tions of some sort and of civil or criminal punishment in par-
ticular contexts, a scheme of compensatory civil enforcement 
should be optimal for an enormous number of situations. In 
particular, our working theoretical contrast between the law-
abiding citizen and the recalcitrant will not accurately describe 
the majority of real persons. The ordinary person will be largely 
law-abiding, subject to temptations to disobey the law's direc~ 
tives when strong personal interests are at stake. Even after a 
knowing or negligent violation of some prescriptive entitlement, 
the ordinary citizen may be brought back to the fold at the re-
criminal process."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 
85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1204-05 (1985) ("[T]he criminal law is designed primarily for 
the nonaffluent; the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law."). Of 
course, the problem of the judgment-proof perpetrator explains the recourse to non-
monetary punishments; it does not explain why the action to impose those punish-
ments should be prosecuted by the state. To the extent that the practice is justifiable, 
it must be because of the government's economies of scale in the detection and 
prosecution of serious wrongdoing and the inability or unwillingness of victims to 
finance prosecutions that do not hold out any prospect of monetary return out of 
which to pay even their litigation expenses. 
250 These last two arguments, especially the equal treatment argument, seem rather 
weak, but a full consideration of the issue would unduly extend this Article. For 
some helpful thoughts on the equal treatment issue, see Posner, supra note 247, at 
414-15. Professors Robinson and Darley have recently argued that the moral force of 
the criminal law depends upon the public perception that the severity of criminal 
punishments is in accordance with the community's perceptions of just desert. See 
Robinson & Darley, supra note 46 at 477-88. From this one might construct an 
argument that criminal punishment of rich malefactors is necessary to preserve public 
confidence, perhaps because civil punishment is not as visible to the public as 
criminal punishment or because the public does not appreciate the deterrent force of 
punitive civil awards. Compare id. at 480 (arguing that the law "cannot have moral 
credibility outside of a system with a clear criminal-civil distinction"), with id. at 491 
(noting that "non-incarcerative [crimina!] sentences frequently can be used to inflict 
the punishment deserved, even for many non-minor offenses"). 
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medial stage of a dispute.251 And in situations where the legal 
standard that separates prohibited from permissible conduct is 
unavoidably vague, as in the case of negligence law, concern for 
the difficulties in accurately knowing and applying the standard 
to particular acts argues in favor of the modesty of compensa-
tory responses.252 Thus, it is plausible to believe that civil enforce-
ment, indeed purely compensatory remedies, will be enough in a 
great many situations. 
Obviously, these are only the barest bones of a theory of en-
forcement rules. Much of the preceding simply reworks ideas 
developed by others without any systematic attention to the 
guidance/enforcement dichotomy. Yet even at this level, several 
things should be clear. The present analysis benefits from a richer 
set of assumptions about citizen response to authoritative norms 
than one generally encounters in the literature spawned by 
C&M's article. This helps to explain features of our existing law, 
such as the often perplexing mixture of civil and criminal sanc-
tion schemes.253 And it provides a useful framework from which 
251 This claim is at least not inconsistent with the moderate deterrent effects that tort 
Jaw seems to provide. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort 
Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377 (1994) (reviewing evi-
dence and suggesting that tort Jaw has a moderate deterrent effect). 
252 Cf. Marks, supra note 205, at 239 (suggesting the reduction of errors by limiting 
penalties "to continuous (categorical) prohibitions or to the extreme range of discon-
tinuous prohibitions"). 
253 It also helps open these schemes to criticism. For example, it is one thing to 
establish in what respect punishment, or criminal punishment in particular, is a 
necessary adjunct of compensatory schemes. It is another to craft the institutional 
relationship between the two or more systems in a coherent way. For example, one 
should question the rationalizations of the multiple punishment that results from the 
simultaneous availability of civil and criminal forms of punishment. See, e.g., Tuttle 
v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358-60 (Me. 1985) (articulating various rationales for 
the use of punitive damage awards even in cases where a criminal punishment can be 
imposed for the same act). The only sound basis for such multiple punishment is that 
the criminal court was unable to impose a harsher penalty than the one it did, where 
that inability is not attributable to the authoritative policy of proper lawmaking or 
law-applying authorities. (Such an inability might be reflected in the criminal court's 
imposing the maximum penalty under a statute that did not contemplate the kind of 
offense, or the kind ofoffender, involved in the particular case.) Cf. Galanter & Luban, 
supra note 246, at 1443 (commenting on the low level of criminal fines imposed on 
corporate offenders without addressing whether this is a function of unintended 
imperfections in the system or of explicit moral judgments by the judges and juries in 
such cases). 
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to consider the claim, made by others, that the criminal sanction 
is overused, at least in its current form. 254 
Most importantly, however, the present analysis gives greater 
definition to the distinguishable problems of formulating guid-
ance rules on the one hand, and formulating enforcement rules 
on the other. This analytical precision allows one to focus on the 
possibility that the former problems-detefTI1ining the appropri-
ate guidance rules-pose important issues of distributive and 
commutative justice, while the latter-formulating enforcement 
rules-arise entirely in the domain of corrective justice.255 In par-
ticular, the problems of specifying the existence and content of li-
ability rules, as technically defined here, fall in the former cate-
gory; the problems of choosing between compensation and other 
remedies fall in the latter. Conventional economic analysis of law 
has great difficulty even contemplating this difference. 
This in turn helps to explain another feature of the relation-
ship between substantive and remedial law that is obscured 
when the two are collapsed. Entitlements tend to be structured 
as rules, what I have called guidance rules, much more so than 
the remedies that are used to protect them. That is, substantive 
legal norms tend to be wore rule-like and prospective in opera-
tion, providing more information to the potential nonofficial ac-
tors, whereas remedial norms tend to be more retrospective in 
operation, allowing the judge to tailor a response after the fact 
to suit the situation, pursuant to looser standards of application.256 
2
" See generally Charles F. Abel & Frank H. Marsh, Punishment and Restitution: A 
Restitutionary Approach to Crime and the Criminal (1984) (arguing that a restitu-
tionary model of criminal law would better serve the combined goals of deterrence, 
retribution, and rehabilitation); Randy E. Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 Am. 
J. Juris. 117 (1980) (arguing that a rights-based theory of justice is incompatible with 
retribution- and deterrence-based theories of punishment); Herbert L. Packer, Two 
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 66-68 (1964) (arguing that a 
solution to the rising costs of providing due process is narrowing the scope of actions 
subject to criminal sanction). See also Lois G. Forer, A Rage to Punish: The Unin-
tended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing (1994) (arguing that imprisonment 
should be the least favored response to crime); Robert Sommer, The End of Impris-
onment (1976) (advocating the end of long-term imprisonment). 
255 The notion of "commutative justice" is intended to capture elements of justice in 
interactions between people that are not appropriately called "corrective" but also 
do not involve any "distributive" dimension. See Finnis, supra note 64, at 177-84. 
256 See Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 Yale L.J. 
2083, 2084-89 (1997). 
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Of course, from the perspective I have articulated, it is entirely 
understandable that things would be structured this way. The 
key role of guiding nonofficial conduct is supposed to be pro-
vided by what I have called guidance rules. If the substantive 
and remedial norms are reasonably well constructed, only recal-
citrants will look to the remedy in deciding how to act, and the 
law might not want to provide very precise information to assist 
them in this regard. Because of risk aversion, the very uncer-
tainty of the remedy that will be applied will often serve to dis-
courage a cost-benefit calculation about whether to violate 
someone's entitlement. In an extreme case, the government 
might be satisfied with people's knowing virtually nothing about 
remedial law, although this is not without its difficulties.257 
This does not mean that efficiency concerns have no place at 
the enforcement level. Certainly the creation of incentives for 
efficient or inefficient behavior is one factor to be considered in 
choosing among remedial options, if only as a tie-breaker be-
tween options that are equally just. There is also the inevitable 
question of how much direct and indirect cost is worth incurring 
in our efforts to enforce guidance rules. But this obviously is 
not only a question of efficiency, because economic cost is 
weighed against more intangible social goals reflected in the 
guidance rules, goals that can be reduced to monetary terms or 
even to collective preference satisfaction terms only in a tauto-
logical but obfuscating decision-theoretic sense. At the same 
time, considerations of distributive justice are pushed into the 
background, applying only to such decisions as whether to adopt 
a particular scheme of privately financed civil enforcement or to 
adopt a publicly financed scheme of criminal enforcement. In-
deed, the principal relevance of both efficiency and distributive 
justice is that the scheme of enforcement rules is designed in 
part to protect the collection of efficiency goals and judgments 
of distributive justice that have been adopted by the polity in its 
guidance rules.258 
257 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic 
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (suggesting that such "selec-
tive transmission" might prevent some crimes). 
258 This does not mean that enforcement practices are justified entirely by the need 
to effectuate the particular judgments and choices about efficiency and distribution 
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CONCLUSION 
As a set of guidance rules, we might call C&M's scheme an n 
dimensional view of the cathedral.259 Additional dimensions can 
be constructed by taking account of the extent of recalcitrance 
among the parties to the entitlement structure. An assumption 
of significant recalcitrance gives rise to the need for remedial 
rules that are unnecessary in the n-space of a law-abiding citi-
zenry. These rules can be articulated as adding a set of m vari-
ables, corresponding to the number of possible remedies that 
can be employed, either singly or in combination. This n+m di-
mensionality gives us not only a different picture but a richer 
picture than the one C&M provided. We can, if we wish, make 
the Holrnesian assumption about the citizenry, thus projecting 
onto an m-space in which only the coercive remedies matter. 
For limited purposes this may be useful, provided it is done in a 
consistent manner. But generally more valuable is the projec-
tion onto n-space made possible by assuming a law-abiding citi-
zenry. By comparing these two views, we obtain valuable in-
formation about the important roles of guidance and enforce-
ment rules in the real world. 
But C&M's pervasive assumption of a "flat" Holmesian world 
blinds them to the difference between guidance and enforce-
ment. Although their analysis is more coherent when under-
stood as a rudimentary framework of guidance rules, it is none-
theless motivated in the language of enforcement rules and a 
concern for recalcitrance that is assumed to be ubiquitous. The 
resulting ambivalence is associated with several related mistakes. 
First, there is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of both 
efficiency and distributional goals in what should be seen as the 
that are made; in part they protect the very authority and capacity to make such 
institutional judgments and choices. This is one reason that an act of a kind that 
threatens the system of public judgments and choices cannot always be defended on 
the ground that, on the particular facts, the act happens to facilitate the effectuation 
of such judgments and choices. Compare James W. Nickel, Justice in Compensation, 
18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 379 (1976) (arguing that corrective action such as a compen-
sation award is just only to the extent that it protects a just distribution), with Peter 
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 
Iowa L. Rev. 515 (1992) (arguing that corrective justice can be validated without 
reference to distributive justice). 
15
' With regard to the numerical value of n, see supra note 211. 
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context of corrective justice, a tendency that reflects the broader, 
justice-agnostic components of the pragmatic instrumentalism 
favored by many law and economics adherents. This tendency 
leads in turn to exaggerated empirical claims about the preva-
lence of rules allowing the violation of otherwise valid entitle-
ments for the sake of efficiency or other consequentialist social 
goals. Closely related is a tendency to exaggerate the importance 
of the criminal sanction and other supracompensatory remedies 
in enforcing what are dimly understood as guidance rules. 
These tendencies, which some law and economics practitioners 
have struggled to correct, can be largely attributed to the 
Holmesian view. That view allows one to conflate monetary 
sanctions, especially compensatory civil remedies, with "prices," 
thus obscuring the system's capacity to control violations of en-· 
titlements by the use of such lesser legal sanctions directed to-
ward relatively law-abiding citizens.260 
More generally, to adopt the Holmesian view of the citizenry 
undermines the factual foundation of all theories. of justice in 
law that depend on notions of individual autonomy and respon-
sibility and even those that depend only on the notion of respect 
for the individual. After all, how can one maintain any such 
theory when the subjects are assumed to be Holmesian bad 
men? Such a vision of law in society undermines the legitimacy 
of the law by assuming away the citizens' general duty of obedi-
ence and their recognition thereoC6 ' Indeed, to view the nonof-
260 To be sure, for C&M this may have been an unintended consequence of an argu-
ment that otherwise served an important function at the time: 
It is not widely realized that Guido Calabresi's pathbreaking paper with A. 
Douglas Melamed on the distinction between property rights and liability rules 
was written in reaction to [Gary) Becker's article [on the economics of crime). 
The article had seemed to imply that if the probability of apprehension and 
conviction for theft was one, the optimal fine for theft would be simply the 
value of the good taken. But then people would be indifferent between steal-
ing and buying the things they want. The point of property rights, as Calabresi 
and Melamed explained, is to compel voluntary transacting where transaction 
costs are low. 
Richard A. Posner, Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics, 22 J. Legal 
Stud. 211, 211-12 (1993) (footnote omitted) (referring to Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968)). 
261 See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 166 (2d 
ed. 1995) (arguing that systemic legitimacy "requires that the people generally recog-
932 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 83:837 
ficial citizenry consistently in the legal realist way is conducive 
to a condescension, latent in ideas of "social engineering," that 
sees citizens only as pawns to be manipulated in the service of 
some good defined by a distinct officialdom, with the able assis-
tance of its lawyers and academic advisors. If this is not the pic-
ture of society and public policymaking that one endorses, then 
one should use the Calabresi and lV1elamed framework only af-
ter significant adjustment. 
To paraphrase a famous judicial opinion, "Five generations of 
bad man theorists are enough."262 Put simply, the time has come 
to relegate the ubiquitous recalcitrance assumption to those 
specific contexts in which it has demonstrated plausibility and 
usefulness. 263 As a general framework for the analysis of ordi-
nary legal entitlements, not only is it unrealistic but it is highly 
counterproductive. Hs rejection allows us to articulate a more 
sophisticated, more realistic, and, yes, more honorable analysis 
of legal entitlements. 
nize an obligation to abide by the law, because it is the law"); Dworkin, supra note 
35, at 190-92 ("A state may have good grounds in some special circumstances for 
coercing those who have no duty to obey. But no general policy of upholding the law 
with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a source of genuine 
obligations."). 
'"'See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes, J.). 
263 To be sure, such contexts are not necessarily limited to the problems of dealing 
with hardened criminals. Analysis based on a Holmesian assumption might be neces-
sary, for example, in a context where lawyers in a position to make crucial decisions 
have been trained to think like the bad man. See, e.g., Lynn !VI. LoPucki, Legal 
Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1498, 
1545-49 (1996) (recommending bad man strategic analysis in contexts like bankruptcy 
law). 
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APPENDIX 
The purpose of this Appendix is to indicate the additional com-
plexity of efficiency comparisons of property and liability rules when 
these rule types are understood in the purely prescriptive manner. 
suggested in Part II of the body of this Article or even in the prag-
matic ways suggested in Section IV.B. It considers only the situation 
in which transfer transaction costs attending a consensual trade (TC) 
are high enough to preclude any possible consensual trade, and the 
loss assessment costs attending a public determination under a liability 
rule (AC) are low enough that they would not offset any social gain 
that would result from a transfer of the entitlement. In such situa-
tions, the standard modern result in law and economics is that liability 
rules are more efficient than property rules.264 This result is shown to 
entail further assumptions that are necessarily distinct from the defi-
nitions of property and liability rules. In what follows, the entitle-
ment E is· assumed to reside initially in person A. Proposition 1 con-
siders cases in which the value of the entitlement E to A-V(A)-is 
more than the value of that entitlement if it were instead granted to 
B-V(B). Proposition 2 addresses cases manifesting the opposite re-
lationship, V(A) < V(B). Proposition 3 generalizes to cover both pos-
sibilities. The concept of efficiency employed can be either wealth 
maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency relative to subjective utili-
ties; the choice does not affect the results given.265 For simplicity, in 
264 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 453-57 (criticizing the common assumption 
that loss assessment costs are negligible and asserting that they are commonly as high 
as transaction costs). Actually, one might restate the standard result in terms of the 
relative size of TC and AC; that is, one could assert that liability rules are more 
efficient whenever TC > AC, even though TC is not so high as to preclude consensual 
transfer. Cf. id. at 464 (arguing that property rules should be used whenever TC <A C). 
However, even C&M apparently rejected this, at least as a general conclusion, 
because they believed that allowing the market to effectuate transfers where possible 
would avoid errors in the estimation of the value of the entitlement to its initial 
holder. See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27. Of course, in recent years other strands 
of economic analysis have emerged claiming wider usefulness of liability rules or, 
conversely, wider usefulness of property rules. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 
26, at 1036-72 (asserting that certain liability rules and other forms of divided owner-
ship can lead to more efficient bargaining even when transaction costs are low); 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 765-68 (asserting that property rules are superior 
for "possessory" entitlements even if transaction costs are high). These subtleties, 
which are affected by the conceptual confusions discussed in the text of this Article, 
can be ignored for purposes of this Appendix. 
265 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the concept employed by C&M in their analysis: 
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would 
lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense 
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all cases sanctions are assumed to be costlessly enforced. Even more 
complicated results would obtain if enforcement costs were introduced. 
Proposition 1: V(A) > V(B). That is, A is the more efficient user of 
E. Property rules can be more efficient than liability rules even in 
contexts of high consensual transaction costs and low loss assessment 
costs. 
Assumptions: A is assigned the initial possessory use of enti-
tlement E. V(A) is 200; V(B) is 100. TC is 150; AC is 0. B is 
perfectly recalcitrant, a Holmesian bad man, capable of taking 
E without costs other than those specified herein. Whether A 
is perfectly recalcitrant, perfectly law-abiding, or anywhere in 
between does not affect the result. H is, however, assumed 
that A has no desire to suffer a loss on a transaction. Sanc-
tions are enforced with certainty (or, alternatively, the figures 
stated for sanctions can be taken to be discounted for the 
probability that B will be detected and the sanction will be 
i_mposed). 
Rule L: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is permitted to 
take without A's consent, in which case B should compensate 
A for his loss. If B takes but does not compensate A, the 
(only) sanction is that B will be fined 50 (payable either to A 
or the state ).266 
Result: If Rule L is in place, B will take and not pay 
compensation (a net gain of 100- 50= 50). Taking 
with voluntary payment of compensation would net a 
loss, since 100 - 200 = -100; purchasing E will net no 
more than 100- 350 = -250, unless A does not demand 
full compensation or severely underestimates the dis-
counted value of her future income stream.267 
that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained 
by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off 
than before. 
C&M, supra note 4, at 1093-94. See Morris, supra note 15, at 848 n.62 (explaining 
C&M's mistake in calling this "Pareto optimality"). 
"'Thus, Lis a liability rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions. 
201 A would obviously benefit from being able to bribe B into not taking, but there 
is no assumption warranting a belief that such a bribe would be successful; B might 
simply take the bribe as well as the entitlement. Moreover, the ability to enter such 
an agreement, assuming it vvere effectively enforceable, \Vou!d depend upon trans-
action costs; if TC for such an agreement were as high as for the sale of E itself, then 
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Rule P: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is not permit-
ted to take E without A's consent. If B takes E without A's 
consent, B will be fined 150 (payable either to A or the 
state).268 
Result: If Rule P is in place, B will neither pur-
chase E (again, at a probable loss of at least 250) nor 
take E without A's consent (with a net loss, since 
100- 150 = -50).269 
Conclusion: Rule Pis efficient; Rule Lis not. 
Corollary 1.1: If V(A) > V(B), then the claim that liability rules are 
more efficient if transfer transaction costs are high and loss assess-
ment costs are low holds for a perfectly recalcitrant B only if (1) the 
disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the duty to compen-
sate under a liability rule is greater than the subjective valuation that 
B would place upon E if B had the use of E; and (2) the subjective 
valuation that B would place upon E if B had the use of E is greater 
than the disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the duty 
(not to take) under the property rule. 
Corollary 1.2: If one generalizes to consider a B who is not perfectly 
recalcitrant, the necessary conditions indicated in Corollary 1.1 may 
fail even though the monetary value of the sanction for violating the 
liability rule is greater than the value of E in B's hands and the latter 
is greater than the monetary value of the sanction for violating the 
property rule. This is because the disutility associated with the viola-
tion of legal rules must then include not only the monetary value of 
the sanction, but also some additional factor representing B's regret 
in violating a legal rule as such. In such a case, condition (2) might fail. 
Proposition 2: Suppose now that V(A) < V(B), that is, B is the more 
efficient user of E. A property rule can be more efficient than a li-
ability rule even though transaction costs are high enough to preclude 
consensual trade, and even though assessment costs are not so high as 
under the assumed TC = 150, there would be no net surplus of cooperation to be 
divided. 
268 Thus, Pis a property rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions. 
269 Two points: (1) This result does not obtain if B is perfectly law-abiding. P and L 
are equally efficient in that case. (As argued in the text, this is one way, perhaps the 
best way, to construe the standard result that emerges from the law and economics 
literature.) (2) Whether the result would be stable over time depends on the legal 
relations between the parties after the taking, which are unspecified here. 
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to offset the potential gains from a compensated taking under the li-
ability rule. 
Assumptions: A is assigned initial use of E. V(A) is 100; V(B) 
is 200. TC is 150; AC is 50. B is perfectly recalcitrant. A's at-
titude toward the law's prescriptions is irrelevant, but he will 
not willingly suffer a loss. Sanctions are enforced with cer-
tainty (or, alternatively, the figures stated for sanctions repre-
sent probabilistic discounting). 
Rule L: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is permitted to 
take without A's consent, in which case B should compensate 
A for his loss. If B does not compensate A, the (only) sanc-
tion is that B will be fined 200 (payable either to A or the 
state). 270 
Result: If Rule L is in place, B will take and pay com-
pensation (a net private gain of 200- 100 = 100, and a 
net social gain of 100- 50= 50). Taking without volun-
tary payment of compensation would not be profit-
able, since 200 - 200 = 0; purchasing E would net a loss, 
since 200- 250 =-50, unless A does not demand full 
compensation or severely underestimates the dis-
counted value of A's future income stream. 
Rule P: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is not permit-
ted to take E without A's consent. If B takes E without A's 
consent, B will be fined 130 (payable either to A or the state) 
regardless of whether B compensates A after the fact. 271 
Result: If Rule P is in place, B will not purchase E 
(again, at a probable loss of at least 50). But B will 
take E without A's consent, with a net gain of 
200 - 130 = 70. 
Conclusion: Rule P is more efficient than Rule L; the net so-
cial gain under Pis 70, while the net social gain under Lis 50.272 
Corollary 2.1: If V(A) < V(B), then the claim that liability rules are 
more efficient if transfer transaction costs are high and loss assess-
21n Again, Lis a liability rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions. 
m Again, P is a property rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions. 
271 Once again, the result does not obtain if B is assumed perfectly law-abiding. In 
that case, only L would yield a transfer to the more efficient user, in accordance with 
the standard claim in law and economics. 
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ment costs are low holds for a perfectly recalcitrant B only ifV(B) is 
less than the disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the 
duty (not to take) under the property rule. Otherwise, under the 
property rule, B would simply take E without A's consent, thereby ef-
fectuating the efficiency gain without incurring either TC or AC. 
Corollary 2.2: If one generalizes to consider a B who is not perfectly 
recalcitrant, the necessary condition indicated in Corollary 2.1 may be 
satisfied even though the value of E in B's hands is greater than the 
(probabilistically discounted) monetary value of the sanction for vio-
lating the property rule. This is because the disutility associated with 
the violation of property rule must then include not only the mone-
tary value of the sanction, but also some additional factor represent-
ing B's regret in violating a legal rule as such. In such a case, condi-
tion (2) might be satisfied. 
Proposition 3: Unless the lawmaker can know which of V(A) and 
V(B) is larger, it is necessary to take both potential conditions into 
account. In such a situation of ignorance, there are numerous com-
plexities. One can at least say, however, that a liability rule might be 
more efficient than a property rule if (a) the liability rule is no less ef-
ficient when V(A) > V(B), and (b) the same liability rule is more effi-
cient when V(A) < V(B). In order to satisfy both these conditions, it 
must be true that: 
(1) B's disutility associated with violating either the liability 
rule or the property rule, including but not limited to the 
probabilistically discounted material sanctions imposed, ex-
ceeds V(B), and 
(2) When V(A) > V(B), then V(B) - V(A) > AC, i.e., there is 
a net social gain from a compensated nonconsensual taking, 
which, by hypothesis, will be greater than the net gain from a 
consensual transfer because TC > AC. 273 
273 Two points: (i) The reason for the qualified term "might" is that dynamic consid-
erations, such as encouraging parties to find ways to reduce consensual transfer 
transactions costs, might make property rules more efficient even if the indicated 
conditions are met. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 462-64. (ii) The reason 
Proposition 2 is stated in terms of sufficiency conditions (a) and (b) is that it is pos-
sible that the liability rule could be more efficient in contexts with V(A) < V(B) yet 
less efficient in contexts with V(A) > V(B) and the gains from the former context 
might exceed the losses from the latter (or vice versa). 
